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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Stimulus for Research on Cooperatives 
The late 1980s and early 1990s marked renewed research into cooperative 
forms of organisation in South Africa (SA) The stimulus for this research 
came from two major sources One was the growing recognition of the 
extent of structural unemployment and a consequent interest in survival 
mechanisms of the unemployed in the context of limited state social 
welfare The other was a growing interest in the response of organised 
labour to repeated mass retrenchments in the context of industrial 
restructuring These responses included attempts by trade unions to create 
jobs for retrenched workers through the establishment of producers' 
cooperatives Such action on the part of trade unions was linked to their 
attempts to keep retrenched workers organised 
The struggle of labour against restructuring in the 1980s should be 
seen in the context of the extended economic crisis facing SA at the time 
Among the key participants have been the organised black trade unions 
under the federation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) This struggle in combination with the unions' emphasis on 
industrial democracy raised critical questions about relationships between 
capitalists, labour, management and the state These questions contributed 
to laying a basis for ideas and practices for building industrial democracy 
Cooperative forms of organisation can be seen as possible ways of creating 
jobs, albeit in a limited way, while at the same time contributing towards 
building industrial democracy 
This research was done in the late 1980s out of an interest in both the 
survival mechanisms of the unemployed and various forms of industrial 
democracy More specifically, my interest is in the cooperative form of 
work organisation as implemented among the unemployed 
1.2 Local Debates 
The issues predominant in local debates on cooperatives echo those raised 
internationally (ILO 1988) These include mainly 
(a) the nature of cooperatives, 
(b) their social and economic potential, 
(c) the roles of the state and trade unions in supporting co-ops and 
(d) economie viability in co-ops 
In the light of limited local experience of cooperative organisation, 
debates in the late 1980s and early 1990s were concerned with the 
possibilities and limitations of co-ops as partial solutions to unemployment 
and vehicles of social transformation (Philip 1988, Etkind 1989, Jaffee 
1990, Lupton 1991) This dissertation attempts to contribute mainly to 
debates about the nature of cooperative development and possible 
1 
implications for the role of support structures including service 
organisations, the state and trade unions 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The objectives of the dissertation are threefold Firstly, to assess the degree 
of participatory democracy in each of the enterprises studied Secondly, to 
explore whether cooperative development is a process involving various 
stages of development with different degrees of democracy These 
objectives are important since they have direct implications for cooperative 
organisation and development, and for the kinds of services required and 
provided to such enterprises Finally, the third objective is to compare the 
enterprises studied with one another and, especially to compare the South 
African cooperative context and experience with that in Zimbabwe This 
comparison is important to illustrate the different stages of development of 
the enterprises and the lessons to be learned from the Zimbabwean 
experience 
In an attempt to attain the first two objectives, I begin with a focus 
on theories of participatory democratic organisation I also note significant 
insights on cooperative development as process This theoretical focus 
enables the development of concepts with which to understand the 
empirical material The key concept used is participatory-democratic 
organisation (PDO) An ideal-type model for this type of organisation is 
outlined and the limitations of existing theory are highlighted 
A focus on theory also enables one to pose specific questions to the 
empirical material Two sets of key questions, each related to the respective 
research objectives, are explored 
1.3.1 Key Questions 
Set A 
With reference to the first objective regarding the degree of participatory 
democracy in each of the enterprises studied, I ask the following 
(a) To what extent were the co-ops studied democratic in their practices9 
(b) Were these enterprises progressing towards démocratisation9 
(c) Did the cooperatives have the potential to develop into organisationally 
effective PDOs in the long-term9 
Set В 
With reference to the second objective, namely, whether cooperative 
development is a process involving various stages of development and 
different degrees of democracy, I ask the following 
(a) Is cooperative development a process involving different stages with 
different degrees of democracy9 
(b) If so, what were the stages of development of the enterprises studied9 
(c) What are the entena which charactense these stages of development9 
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(d) What are the implications for cooperative organisation, development 
and services^ 
1.4 Field of Inquiry 
This is a qualitative sociological analysis of cooperatives as participatory-
democratic organisations (PDOs) It is concerned with the development of 
co-ops as PDOs in the context of a developing economy This context is 
characterised by features which have significant implications for 
cooperative development These include the following 
(a) low per capita incomes, 
(b) low levels of skill and education, 
(c) illiteracy and innumeracy, 
(d) relatively high levels of structural unemployment, 
(e) low levels of technological development and 
(f) severe shortages of finance and skills 
Furthermore, considering that South Africa is characterised by 
predominantly capitalist social relations, this work is concerned with the 
development of producer cooperatives in capitalism 
Various types of co ops are to be found in SA, namely, agricultural 
marketing co ops, consumer co-ops, credit unions, and producer co-ops 
This study focuses exclusively on the development of producer 
cooperatives among the marginalised population of SA More specifically, 
it is concerned with processes of organisational démocratisation with an 
emphasis on participatory démocratisation A key underlying assumption is 
that successful cooperatives, like any other type of economic venture, have 
to be economically viable 
The two key goals of a producer co-op include economic success 
and democratic organisation From a sociological perspective, the 
organisational form of a co-op must perform two roles firstly, it must 
support and not hamper economic viability, secondly, it must be of such a 
nature as to justify the name 'cooperative' Indisputably, economic viability 
is the fundamental priority of a producer co-op, for without economic 
viability, there can be no co-op It is important to recognise, however, that 
the form of democratic organisation adopted has significant implications 
for success as a cooperative economic unit Hence the focus on democratic 
organisation 
1.5 Operative Definitions and Assumptions 
1.5.1 The 'Ideal-Type' Cooperative 
A producer cooperative is essentially an alternative form of social, work 
and economic organisation, that is, alternative to authoritarian and 
bureaucratic forms of organisation generally found in conventional private 
and public enterprises 
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For the purposes of this research I define an 'ideal-type' producer co 
op as a form of participatory-democratic economic and work organisation 
in which the members are simultaneously the owners, managers and 
workers In PDOs the members participate in planning, organising and 
decision-making Such enterprises are characterised by collective 
ownership and control of assets In larger organisations of this type 
representative democracy through the election of delegates and 
participatory democracy are often combined for the purposes of efficiency 
Assuming that a surplus is produced and realised, part of it is in some cases 
equitably distributed, while other parts are reinvested in the cooperative 
and/or invested in the community in which the co-op operates 
Cooperatives are democratically organised in that each member has 
equal voting power and is accountable to his/her fellow members The 
practice of democracy in a co-op involves, among other important aspects, 
accountable management It is in the light of this definition of a co-op and 
with the realisation that real co-ops do not meet all these requirements that 
I assess organisational democracy in the enterprises studied 
1.5.2 The Successful Producer Cooperative 
Form and Practice 
It is important to recognise that people, active human agents, constitute 
every form of social organisation This reality has particular implications 
One of these is that any form of social organisation has two essentially 
interrelated components (1) a notion of what it is supposed to be and (2) 
the practical activity of what it is These components are interrelated 
because one does not organise simply on the basis of an idea, nor does one 
organise without an idea of what one is doing "We all have an ideology of 
organisation even though many people do not realise it (Anonymous 6) 
So, people constitute organisations What they do is the practice of the 
organisation It is the dialectical relationship between form and practice 
which makes for a successful producer cooperative 
Judgements of Success 
I would agree with Ehrlich (1979 100) that "judgements of organisational 
effectiveness [success] depend on one's social [and political/power] 
position" in relation to the organisation For example, the organisational 
success of a producer cooperative from the point of view of most donor 
agencies and/or service organisations would be seen primarily in terms of 
quantitative economic success - whether revenues exceed costs A political 
organisation would define such success mainly in terms of a co-ops' 
contribution to political mobilisation of its members In apartheid SA such 
organisations were generally engaged in anti-apartheid and sometimes anti-
capitalist movements Cooperators would define success in terms of the 
extent to which their work in a co-op improves their material conditions 
and thus enables them to raise their standard of living 
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I would argue that there are two crucial demands on a producer 
cooperative Firstly, in order to be successful as an economic unit a co-op 
has to prove to be economically viable An economically viable co-op 
performs competitively in the marketplace, controls its costs, and 
effectively manages and invests its resources over the short, medium, and 
long term (ICOM, 1987 1) If a co-op does not succeed in delivering the 
material goods required by its members it has failed as an economic unit 
Secondly, in order to be successful a producer co-op must survive as a 
democratic organisation The survival of any form of organisation depends 
on the reproduction of that organisation 
Essentially, then, the effectiveness of a co-op as a form of social 
organisation or, expressed differently, its success is determined, 
foremostly, by its ability to deliver the material goods required by its 
members, and by its ability to reproduce itself as a democratic organisation 
People cannot eat politics, and gross revenue tells one nothing about 
distribution In terms of one's subjective evaluation of the success of a 
cooperative both economic success and political mobilisation are 
important In terms of the process of development of a co-op, however, 
economic success is a more fundamental issue and logically prior to 
political mobilisation, though these two processes are often interlinked In 
this respect I would agree with Samuels who states that 
[t]o use the cooperative as a place for encouraging political 
awareness and sensitivity is noble in itself and should be 
retained as a priority It will be problematic though if the 
basic needs of the members are not met appropriately (1988 
6) 
Democracy, Efficiency and Empowerment 
Organisational effectiveness/success is also defined in terms of the degree 
of goal achievement The goals of an organisation being, presumably, 
"what the organisation through its policy-makers is trying to do" (Erblich, 
1979 100) With regard to cooperative and/or participatory-democratic 
forms of organisation effectiveness/success also depends on the degree to 
which all participants have been involved in formulating the goals of the 
organisation In this respect a further requisite is that member participation 
be real rather than token By this I mean that members be involved in day-
to-day decision-making to the extent that it does not negatively affect 
efficiency, as well as in decisions regarding policy-making In order to 
participate effectively, however, members need to be informed about issues 
relating to their enterprise They need to be sufficiently powerful and 
confident to articulate their ideas and, they need to trust their own thinking 
Democratic participation can only take place when each participant is 
powerful Furthermore, a co op needs mechanisms/structures to ensure 
efficiency, member participation, control, and accountability 
5 
Cooperative Activity as Praxis 
In terms of my definition of a producer cooperative as a form of social 
organisation constituted of active human agents I would argue the 
following Firstly, a notion of what a producer cooperative is supposed to 
be is an insufficient condition for the justification of the existence of a co-
op The people who constitute the cooperative structure need to engage in 
cooperative activity in order for a cooperative to be said to exist Social 
organisation is essentially practical Secondly, cooperatore need to 
conceptualise the notion of what a co-op is supposed to be in order for 
them to begin to practice cooperation 
The social and production relations of organisation experienced by 
people in SA are essentially capitalist, agist, racist, and patriarchal In order 
for people to engage in cooperative production and social relations they 
need to unlearn the afore-mentioned relations of organisation and to learn 
new cooperative relations of organisation The process of cooperative 
activity should inform the notion of what cooperation involves, and vice 
versa People leam as they do, put differently, people leam through 
experience Hence, one requisite for organisational effectiveness/success 
among co-ops is that cooperators not only understand cooperation but also 
practice it 
To take over and run a complex organisational structure 
requires both theoretical understanding and practical 
expenence, the two are not separable, they form a praxis 
(Anonymous 7) 
1.5.3 Cooperative Consciousness 
The notion of cooperative activity as praxis implies that the development of 
a cooperative consciousness among cooperators is an integral part of 
cooperative development The underlying assumptions of this study in this 
regard are that 
(a) the expenence with which people enter a cooperative has an important 
influence on the development of their cooperative consciousness, 
(b) actions and consciousness are limited and/or enhanced by the particular 
socio-political and historical context, 
(c) cooperative consciousness cannot develop simply through imposing 
cooperative forms upon people or through exhorting people to be 
cooperative, 
(d) people have to have experienced a successful co-op (successful in terms 
of providing for their material needs) for them to come to accept fully a 
cooperative consciousness and 
(e) simultaneously, in order for people to build a successful co-op, people 
need, not a fully formed, but at least some conception of cooperation 
On the basis of these assumptions, 1 examine the effects oí 
cooperators previous work experiences on their perceptions of their 
cooperative 
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1.6 Research Methodology 
1.6.1 The Theory 
The process of producing knowledge necessarily involves abstraction This 
is because evidence is not self-explanatory In order to interrogate evidence 
it is necessary to formulate specific questions It is impossible, however, to 
ask all possible questions about a situation Thus, one has to choose 
particular questions out of all the potential questions Further, the questions 
asked will influence the evidence chosen to answer them The process of 
choosing questions, and thereby choosing evidence, cannot be arbitrary 
One has to have some entena for selecting questions and evidence The 
only way to develop such entena is through processes of abstraction and 
providing a theoretical framework 
Such processes involve developing concepts which express, at a 
theoretical level, qualities which are common to a range of objects, 
processes, or situations This process of formulation of concepts is itself a 
process of dialogue between conceptual development and empirical 
studies The abstractions one develops are based on previous engagements 
with empincal matenal The theory referred to in this study has developed 
in a dialectical process of interaction between theoretical and empirical 
work This work is in itself essentially part of this dialectical process 
Through this research I engage both with existing theoretical matenal and 
with a new body of empirical evidence In this way I hope to contribute to 
knowledge related to cooperative organisation 
With reference to contextual issues, I recognise that the level of 
capitalist development in a society will influence the political, economic, 
and ideological context in which cooperatives emerge Co-ops in Western 
Europe, Britain and the USA have emerged in different political, economic, 
and ideological contexts to those in former Eastern Europe, Asia or Afnca 
For this reason one cannot uncntically 'apply' theory based on the practical 
expenences of cooperatives in the West to co-ops in former Eastern 
Europe, Asia and/or Africa Co-operative theory must incorporate 
categories and variables which can handle significant differences in the 
overall context, as well as the general similarities 
In the light of the significance of the social context of cooperatives, I 
have chosen a specific method in approaching cooperatives in South Afnca 
and Zimbabwe Before going into the field, I was equipped with 
knowledge, both theoretical and empirical, of co-ops in Europe, Britain and 
the USA I thus had a general awareness of issues facing co-ops 
Recognising the importance of the specificities of the Southern African 
context, however, field expenence was allowed to inform the theory This 
particular approach enabled me to highlight some of the weaknesses of 
existing theories of participatory democratic organisation 
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1.6.2 The Case Studies 
The bulk of this research was done in the Western Cape region of South 
Africa, with one case study located in Harare, Zimbabwe In the Western 
Cape, the cooperatives studied were situated in two areas of the region, 
namely, the Cape Flats and South East Sector of the Cape Peninsula, and 
the town of Montagu in the Breede River region, about 250 kilometres 
north east of Cape Town 
The Spinning Project (the first case study reviewed in Chapter Five) 
was situated in Langa, the oldest African township in the Western Cape at 
the edge of the Cape Flats Some of the African women involved in this 
project lived in surrounding shanty areas in Langa, while others lived in the 
shanty areas of Crossroads and Khayehtsha Launisma Bnckmaking 
Cooperative (the second case study reviewed in Chapter Six) was located 
in Phihppi Industrial Area Its members were predominantly male and 
African most of whom lived in the shanty town of Crossroads Members of 
the Spinning Project and Launisma Bnckmaking were predominantly 
Xhosa speaking 
Montagu Carpentry Cooperative (the third case study reviewed in 
Chapter Seven) was located in the town of Montagu Its members, mainly 
men, were drawn trom surrounding Coloured townships, with the 
exception of one who lived in the African township of Zolani in Montagu 
The predominant language spoken here was Afrikaans 
Finally, Fencing Services Cooperative Society, the fourth case study 
reviewed in Chapter Eight, was based in Harare, Zimbabwe Its members 
were predominantly African, male and Shona-speaking 
Figure 1 indicates the geographical locations of research Figure 2 
indicates more specific areas referred to in this study 
My decision to study the Langa Spinning Project and Launisma 
Bnckmaking Co-op was based on issues which were raised during initial 
visits to these enterprises and were relevant to the research questions Lack 
of finance, low levels of organisational development, and the particular 
managerial structures of these enterprises helped develop criteria for 
selecting other enterprises which could provide interesting comparative 
material for the study For example, the Spinning and Bnckmaking 
cooperatives each had different forms of centralised management by 
managers who were not co-op members Montagu Carpentry Co op was 
chosen because of its more advanced level of organisational development 
and its appointment of a manager as a co-op member 
Fencing Services Co-op was chosen for its involvement in the 
Collective Self Finance Scheme (CSFS) established by co-ops in an 
attempt to counter dependency on donor aid The financial problems of co-
ops in SA and relationships of dependency with service organisations 
and/or donor agencies made the study of such a scheme significant as an 
example to other co-ops in the region This particular study, more 
especially its involvement in the CSFS and its relationship with the 
Zimbabwean state, provides lessons from which South African 
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cooperatives can learn It also provides the basis for comparing a 
cooperative experience in Zimbabwe with those in South Africa 
The in-depth case studies of processes of cooperative development 
presented in this work are useful in providing qualitative empirical 
information The examination of generally similar enterprises which 
exhibit specific differences is enhanced by the comparative analysis 
Furthermore, the similarity in themes selected for examination in both the 
case studies and the comparative analysis provides for continuity in the 
dissertation 
1.6.3 Research Techniques 
In the Spinning Project and Launisma Bnckmaking Cooperative the key 
techniques used were participant observation and semi-structured in depth 
interviews The former included observation of work processes on the 
shopfloor, of organisational processes and of power relationships within 
these enterprises This was done by spending time on the shopfloor 
engaging with people as they produced, asking questions about the process 
of production and the problems they experienced while working, 
participating in weekly general meetings where production, organisational 
and financial issues were discussed, and participating in special meetings 
held to discuss problems in these areas The interviews were with 
cooperators, managers, co-op advisors and key informants in the support 
organisations concerned Interviews were done after a period of 
observation with questions based on issues arising from observation In 
addition, informal discussions outside the workplace with co-op advisors 
yielded valuable information and helped to contextualise observations and 
interview information 
In the Spinning and Bnckmaking enterprises it did not occur to me 
to ask whether I could participate in the production process, nor did 
cooperators invite me to do manual work In the case of Montagu 
Carpentry Cooperative, however, part of cooperators agreement to allow 
me to study the enterprise included that I work with them I was thus 
provided the opportunity for a more direct form of participant observation 
In this particular cooperative I was able to do manual work with 
cooperators in the sanding department on the assembly line This 
experience gave me a sense of the rhythm of a working day and of the 
nature of relationships between members in different departments on the 
assembly line 
Furthermore, just as in the other two enterprises, semi-structured ïn-
depth interviews were conducted with cooperators, the manager and the 
director of the support organisation concerned, and meetings were 
attended Importantly, unlike in the other enterprises studied, I stayed with 
one of the members of Montagu Carpentry Cooperative during my 
research This gave me a sense of members' lives outside the workplace 
and provided valuable opportunities for informal meetings and discussions 
after work Again, unlike the Spinning Project and Launisma Bnckmaking, 
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this cooperative had accessible business records Minutes of meetings, 
financial reports and other relevant documents were examined These 
helped piece together historical processes in this cooperative 
In the case of Fencing Services Co op (FSC), the research 
techniques included firstly, literature surveys (using material in the CSFS 
library) of both the Collective Self Finance Scheme (CSFS) and Fencing 
Services This gave me an opportunity to familiarise myself with 
developments in both the Scheme and the Co-op On the basis of this 
knowledge, semi-structured interview schedules were prepared 
In-depth interviews were conducted with the field staff, coordinator 
and chairperson of the CSFS, with member managers and producers in 
Fencing Services Co op, and with a government official of the Ministry ot 
Cooperatives of Zimbabwe, Mr Manyanya Additional research techniques 
included observation of workprocesses undertaken by staff of the CSFS 
both in its offices and in the field, that is, with its member cooperatives 
Workprocesses both on the shopfloor and in the management offices of 
Fencing Services Co-op were also observed Furthermore, a Management 
Committee meeting of FSC and one of the CSFS staff meetings were 
attended These meetings gave me some idea of the organisational 
processes and power relationships within these enterprises 
At the end of the research period a brief report was submitted to the 
CSFS stating my research observations and recommendations 
1.7 Reflections 
1.7.1 Gaining Access 
I engaged in an active process of investigating access to producer co-
operatives for the purposes of research By the time research in the co ops 
began, an increasing emphasis developed on the relevance of research to 
the political struggle for liberation in South Africa at the time On the one 
hand, since I had no formal links with any community organisations at the 
time, the difficulty of gaining access was compounded On the other hand, 
in the event of my having had already established links with a community 
organisation, political credibility of that organisation would have either 
prevented or facilitated access to only particular producer co-operatives 
thus placing limitations upon the scope of the research 
1 gained access to two producer co-operatives through contacts made 
with the Unemployed Workers' Movement (UWM)1 at a workshop on co 
operatives held in Johannesburg The UWM, support organisation for a few 
co ops at the time, facilitated research in Launisma Enterprises and 
Buthisizwe Cooperative, the first co-operatives to agree to participate in 
my research The UWM also contributed to my learning process about the 
1
 The Unemployed Workers Movement (UWM) has since merged with the 
National Unemployed Workers Coordinating Committee (NUWCC) to form the 
Western Cape Unemployed Workers Union (WECUWU) 
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nature of relationships between co-ops and different types of support 
and/or political organisations. 
Research in Montagu Carpentry Cooperative and the Langa Spinning 
Project was facilitated by the service organisations linked to these 
enterprises, namely, Montagu and Ashton Gemeenskapsdiens (MAG) and 
the Catholic Welfare Bureau respectively. Access to Fencing Services 
Cooperative Society was gained through the Collective Self Finance 
Scheme. 
1.7.2 Petty-Politics and Objective Research' 
Although I had access to Buthisizwe Cooperative and a substantial amount 
of research time was spent in this enterprise, it is not included in this work 
as a case study. This is because I was later prevented from continuing 
research in this enterprise due to conflict between the co-op and the UWM 
and on the assumption that I was employed by the organisation. 
The context of this conflict was complex. Suffice it to say that on 
Buthisizwe's request, the UWM employed a full-time skills trainer, Mr 
Isaacs, to work with this co-op. In spite of the urgency of Buthisizwe's 
request and long hours spent in meetings discussing the provision of a 
trainer and its implications, there was a sense of resistance on the part of 
the co-op towards Mr Isaacs. It is difficult to pin point the source(s) of this 
resistance. Mr Mohammed, the co-op organiser for the UWM at the time, 
suggested that among the reasons for this resistance was that co-op 
members were surviving on "hand-outs", that is, aid from the British 
Council and World Vision and that for this reason they did not show much 
enthusiasm for training (Interview 2.7). It is, however, difficult to accept 
this as a complete explanation for Buthisizwe's resistance. 
Nevertheless, during the first few weeks of his presence at 
Buthisizwe, Mr Isaacs discovered that the co-op had received funds from 
the American Embassy. Without consulting the co-op, he reported this 
matter to the UWM who did not approve of American funding for political 
reasons. A discussion of these reasons is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. The UWM's response was to suspend Buthisizwe from its 
services until clarity was gained on the nature of the relationship between 
the co-op and the US Embassy and its implications for the co-op's 
affiliation to the UWM. This suspension was done without prior 
consultation with Buthisizwe. This action on the part of the UWM led to 
counter action from the co-op. Consequently, Buthisizwe told the trainer to 
leave. I was told that I could no longer continue my research since I was 
regarded as affiliated to the UWM and could not be entrusted to the co-op's 
domestic affairs. 
Simultaneously, the National Unemployed Workers' Coordinating 
Committee (NUWCC), another organisation involved in organising the 
unemployed at the time, was competing with the UWM to mobilise 
members of the co-op concerned. In addition, the South African Labour 
and Development Research Unit (SALDRU), a support organisation 
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financially better endowed than the UWM was able to offer Buthisizwe 
more funds and probably more skilled support In the context of severe lack 
of funds and skills, Buthisizwe opted for SALDRU's support 
The linkages, if any, between these processes and contests all 
happening at the same conjuncture are unclear Nevertheless, this situation 
highlighted the contradictions involved in seemingly associating oneself, as 
researcher, with a particular organisation In a sense organisational 
affiliation or association is required to gain access to co-ops for the 
purposes of research In times of conflict between the organisation and the 
co-op involved, however, researchers and voluntary service workers who 
are not necessarily affiliated to or employed by the organisation are 
excluded along with the support/political organisation 
The kinds of political struggles into which one is drawn as a 
researcher raises important questions about the possibility of 'objective' 
research in the social sciences as defined in research methods books 
Furthermore, the legitimate demands for research relevant to the political 
struggle in South Africa at the time and for accountability on the part of 
researchers to the organisations and people being studied puts to question 
the possibility of engaging in 'objective' research 
1.7.3 The Researcher in Context 
The varying socio-political and cultural contexts of the cooperatives chosen 
for this research highlighted the importance and implications of the 
researcher's identity when engaged in qualitative work The Langa 
Spinning Project and Launisma Bnckmaking Co-op were both located in 
African townships with their membership predominantly African, Xhosa-
speaking and drawn mainly from shanty town communities Montagu 
Carpentry Co-op was located at the edge of a Coloured township with its 
membership mainly Coloured and Afrikaans-speaking Being Coloured 
myself, and in the historical context of centuries of racial segregation in 
South Africa it was difficult for me to stay with the African cooperators 
who spoke a different language, were part of a community historically 
defined as 'inferior' to Coloureds, and relatively less well off than their 
Coloured counterparts in Montagu In the context of Montagu Carpentry 
Cooperative, however, my Coloured identity allowed me to stay with a co 
op member in the community for the duration of the research In this case 
my fluency in the language spoken facilitated research 
In the case of Fencing Services Co-op, I was unfamiliar with the 
language spoken and had the status of an outsider in the sense that 1 was 
from a different country 
1.7.4 Strengths and Limitations 
Regular visits to the cooperatives studied proved to be useful for learning 
about the issues and problems confronting them and the internal dynamics 
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of the enterprises Special meetings and weekend workshops helped to 
place these issues and problems in broader perspective Regular contact 
and in-depth informal discussions with co-op advisors, managers and 
cooperators proved to be valuable in gaming some historical perspective on 
the problems and internal dynamics of both the enterprises and their service 
organisations 
In the cases of the Langa Spinning Project and Launisma 
Brickmaking Cooperative an interpreter assisted with interviews since I am 
not fluent in the Xhosa language This probably resulted in some loss of 
information Choosing and finding an effective interpreter whose presence 
would interfere as little as possible with the interviewees' responses was 
not an easy task Furthermore, financial constraints placed limits on access 
to more experienced interpreters Nevertheless, the interpreter chosen 
proved to be helpful since she had experience of interviewing people with 
broadly similar everyday life experiences Moreover, similarities in cultural 
experiences facilitated a relatively relaxed and safe relationship between 
the interpreter and the interviewees This enabled cooperators to share with 
me some valuable information 
In the case of Montagu Carpentry Cooperative, my fluency in 
Afrikaans, home language of most members of the Coloured community in 
Montagu, facilitated gathering information and understanding the nuances 
of members' expressions 
Staying in the community in Montagu where most of the co-op 
members lived, and being hosted by the family of one of the co op 
members greatly facilitated the learning process about the co-op itself and 
especially about the people who predominantly constituted the co-op My 
host was an active member of the church and of church based organisations 
responding to particular needs (for example, creches) and problems (for 
example, alcoholism) in the Coloured community Informal conversations 
with him provided valuable insight into the issues facing the community 
and the main perceptions which constitute the consciousness of most 
people with whom contact was made This insight was further enriched by 
conversations with the hostess while assisting with daily domestic chores 
in the evenings after working in the cooperative 
Furthermore, since most members of Montagu Carpentry Co-op 
lived in close proximity to each other contact outside of production time 
was made with various members Such contact proved to be useful in 
building open and trustworthy relationships with most of the members 
which, in turn, facilitated their ability to share with me their experiences in 
the co-operative workplace 
In the case of Fencing Services Co-operative in Zimbabwe, my lack 
of language proficiency in Shona and the lack of finances to employ an 
interpreter made me unable to interview most worker-members As a 
result, only four workers were interviewed These were chosen with the 
assistance of the factory-manager on the basis of their command of 
English Although no generalisations can be made from these interviews 
some valuable information was gained The interviews indicated a few 
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different opinions of worker-members on the workings of the co-op It is 
on the basis of these interviews that I was able to tap into some of the 
problems in FSC and the CSFS The limitation of this case study, however, 
remains information was gained predominantly from interviews with FSC 
member-managers and CSFS staff making it in some way biased 
1.8 Structure of the Dissertation 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two starts at the general level 
of theories of participatory democratic organisation and of conceptualising 
co-op development as process In this chapter I review some ot the works 
oí ICOM (1987), Rothschild and Whitt (1986), Abell (1981), Bernstein 
(1976, 1983) and Brecker (1988) This helps develop the argument that 
there is a model for participatory democratic organisation and there are 
entena which distinguish such forms of organisation from others These 
criteria, which include among others participation in decision-making, the 
development of a cooperative consciousness and accountable management, 
are later used to assess the degree of démocratisation in the enterprises 
studied This chapter also introduces insights into cooperative development 
as a process with various stages, namely, the pre-cooperative, non-viable, 
potentially viable and viable stages These are expanded during the course 
of the dissertation 
Chapter Three proceeds with a focus on specific practical constraints 
faced by co-ops in capitalist environments For analytical purposes, I 
distinguish between external and internai' constraints The former refer to 
obstacles in the environment in which co ops operate while the latter refer 
to issues from within the organisations which hinder processes of 
démocratisation These constraints highlight the need for education tor 
democracy / cooperation which embodies both the values and practices of 
democracy Effective cooperation, however, requires not only educated, 
competent participants but also participants with a cooperative 
consciousness and/or at least the potential to develop such consciousness 
This chapter explores some aspects of the basis for the development of 
cooperative consciousness It closes with a focus on the importance of 
support structures in sustaining cooperative values and practices, possible 
functions for and dilemmas faced by such structures, and some cautions 
about state support tor co-ops 
Chapter Four begins with a the general context tor the renewed 
emergence of co-ops in South Africa in the 1980s This is followed by an 
overview of cooperatives in South Afnca in that decade Since there is no 
established and organised cooperative movement in this country, clusters 
of co-ops in different provinces are bnefly reviewed These are separated 
into those linked to service organisations and to trade unions This chapter 
also gives a general profile of emergent co-ops with information on the 
constraints they face The debate at the time of research about the role of 
co-ops in building socialism is briefly reviewed This should be seen in the 
context before the collapse of actually existing socialism in former Eastern 
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Europe Finally, the chapter sketches the range of perspectives influencing 
service organisations which initiate and/or support cooperatives 
Chapter Five marks the beginning of the empirical work for the 
dissertation The establishment of the Langa Spinning Project as a 
cooperative experiment by the Catholic Welfare Bureau (CWB) is explored 
in this chapter Its development and the beginnings of its transformation 
into a cooperative under the direction of a manager employed by the CWB 
highlights some of the problems with a top-down approach to cooperative 
development 
In Chapter Six the case of Laumsma Bnckmaking Co-op provides an 
example of how the poor become trapped in a cycle of poverty in a context 
of competition for scarce resources This study also points to negative 
consequences of aid Significantly, it suggests that in contexts of scarce 
resources and struggles for daily survival, practices of participatory 
democratic cooperation become all the more difficult 
Chapters Seven and Eight tend to be more hopeful The 
organisational development of Montagu Carpentry Co-op clearly indicates 
increasing démocratisation of the enterprise accompanied with the 
increasing empowerment of its membership through collective control over 
production A significant feature of this enterprise is the appointment of a 
white member-manager who is accountable to the producers This study 
shows how producers challenge racist power relations at work and in this 
way begin to develop a cooperative consciousness 
The study of Fencing Services Cooperative Society in Chapter Eight 
begins with an introduction to the Zimbabwean context and the history of 
the cooperative movement in this country The role of the state in 
supporting cooperatives and the disjuncture between its promises and its 
actual practice is briefly dealt with Following this contextual introduction, 
I proceed with an account of the development of Fencing Services 
Cooperative Society This study highlights some of the difficulties workers 
face when taking over capitalist firms in an attempt to save their jobs In 
this particular case these include mainly taking over a firm with large 
amounts of accumulated debt and very little liquid capital, as well as 
inheriting the capitalist management structure and practices of the previous 
enterprise A significant aspect of this study is the establishment of the 
Collective Self Finance Scheme (CSFS) organised and democratically 
controlled by its member-cooperatives The operational structures of the 
CSFS, its development policy and practices, and its relationship to donor 
agencies provide important examples for other cooperatives of possible 
methods towards self-reliance In the context of donor dependency and 
severe shortages of finance among cooperatives the CSFS provides 
important lessons to leam from 
The Zimbabwean case study closes the empirical work of the 
dissertation and leads into Chapter Nine which provides a comparative 
analysis of the enterprises studied and the South African and Zimbabwean 
experiences This chapter outlines the general similarities and specific 
differences among the four cooperatives studied Differences in the 
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organisational development, levels of cooperative consciousness and 
degrees of démocratisation in the enterprises suggest that each is at a 
particular stage of cooperative development 
It is in Chapters Nine and Ten that I attempt to integrate the 
reviewed theory and the empirical work done for the dissertation In the 
closing chapter I categorise each of the case studies in terms of the stages 
of cooperative development reviewed in Chapter Two The Langa Spinning 
Project is categorised as a pre-cooperative, Launisma Bnckmaking Co op 
is non-viable, while both Montagu Carpentry Co-op and Fencing Services 
Co-op are classified as potentially viable cooperative enterprises This 
chapter expands on the most likely characteristics of each of these stages 
Importantly, however, it points out that the stages of cooperative 
development noted represent only theoretical constructs which enhance our 
understanding of this process In reality this process is not as smooth as the 
stages appear to be Furthermore, no single cooperative perfectly fits any 
one stage The practical implications of conceptualising cooperative 
development as a process are explored This chapter closes with a 
presentation of the research findings and related conclusions 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORIES OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRATIC 
ORGANISATION 
2.1 Introduction 
There are Iwo reasons for this focus on theories of participatory democratic 
organisation Firstly, for the purposes of this work a cooperative is defined 
as a form of participatory-democratic economic and work organisation 
which is alternative to capitalist and bureaucratic forms of organisation 
This definition demands some indication of what is meant by participatory 
democracy and of the practical significance of such organisation Secondly, 
among the cooperatives studied for this work, democracy was 
predominantly defined in terms of what it is not 'in co-ops there are no 
white bosses, there are no managers and supervisors as in the faetones' 
This highlights a need to define what democracy is/can be and what it 
actually entails in the context of a cooperative This review attempts to 
address this need 
2.2 No Single Model 
I begin with an examination of a publication by the Industrial Common 
Ownership Movement (ICOM, 1987) This work is based on co-operator 
and trainer experience gained during an ICOM Pilot Training Programme 
(IPP) which involved four larger1, economically successful cooperatives 
based in London, United Kingdom The aim of IPP was to clarify existing 
models of co-op organisation and to develop new models with specific 
reference to issues of participation, growth, economic survival, and 
management (ICOM, 1987 3) ICOM's argument involves some crucial 
underlying assumptions which must be tested Firstly, cooperative 
development is viewed as a process Secondly, co-operative success is 
defined in terms of economic performance and participatory democratic 
organisation Thirdly, co-op members must be well-informed in order to 
participate effectively (ICOM, 1987 1, 2) 
None of these crucial assumptions, however, are clearly explained 
and/or developed Among the tasks of this dissertation are thus (a) to 
justify the description of cooperative development as a process, (b) to 
define the 'successful co-operative' clearly, and (c) to explain why co-op 
members must be well-informed 
The ICOM work emphasises the diversity of forms of participatory 
democratic organisation and management On the basis of this emphasis 
the authors conclude that there is no single model for democratic 
organisation and management in larger co-ops 
1
 Larger co-ops are defined by the authors as having more than twenty members (ICOM, 1987 15) 
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In spite of this emphasis on diversity, however, the work does reach 
some 'general' conclusions-
(a) no single model of co-operative success and organisation exists 
[wjhile it is relatively straightforward to measure commercial 
performance, there are as yet no objective measures for 
'cooperative success' (p 91), 
[t]here are no clear guidelines to follow or models of good 
practice to which the cooperative can aspire (p 93), 
(b) larger co-ops require more complex organisational structures and must 
be open to structural change as they grow, these co-ops are likely to 
experience difficulty with participatory decision-making because 
[increasing size makes it difficult for every member of the 
workforce to have a direct voice in the running of the 
cooperative (p 95), 
(c) management is important for the commercial success of a co-op, co-ops 
must therefore move away from 
the rigid trap of consensus [management on the basis of one 
регчоп one vote! if ¡hey are going to grow and succeed (p 
96) 
Nevertheless, it is argued that cooperators themselves, if given the 
opportunity, are perfectly capable of learning to manage Networking with 
other cooperatives is seen as an effective training method in this regard All 
of these conclusions are certainly potential elements of a 'general model' at 
some level, but the authors fail to pursue this 
Because of this failure, there are major weaknesses in ICOM's work 
Firstly, ICOM does not achieve its goal, to develop new models of 
cooperative organisation and management This occurs despite clear 
indications of some common elements in the experiences of the tour co-ops 
under IPP training Secondly, the authors conclude that co-ops must move 
away from consensus management if they want to grow into successful 
enterprises, but do not offer any guidelines to alternative forms of 
management for co-ops Thirdly, ICOM's case study material clearly 
indicates that difficulties with member participation in larger co-ops do not 
prevent cooperators from developing structural mechanisms to deal with 
such difficulties Yet the authors fail to generalise from this practical 
experience A fourth weakness is the argument that there are no measures 
for cooperative success Surely something must justify use of the 
descriptive term 'co-operative"7 The source of these weaknesses is ICOM's 
failure to articulate the theoretical implications of the common practical 
experiences of the co-ops under study, and their inconsistent and limited 
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'definition' of a successful co-op (refer to ICOM, 1987 1, 2, 94 for the 
latter) 
In my view, these authors confuse real, practical paths to democratic 
organisation, management, and success with theoretical models of these 
processes At the level of practice, I agree with the authors that no single 
model of these aspects of cooperation 'exists' Models never 'exist' in 
practice I am of the view, however, that modelling is possible - indeed 
inevitable - at various levels of abstraction Some such 'model' is implicit in 
the very act of defining and studying a 'co-operative' what else justifies the 
categorisation9 
One can only assess co-operative practice by conceptualising what a 
'co-op' is, what 'participatory democratic organisation' entails, what 'co-op 
management' involves, and what 'cooperative success' means, even if this 
understanding is modified or rejected in the process of analysis This 
implies that at the most general level of abstraction there must be a single 
'model' In fact, a general model of cooperative organisation and specific 
models of each aspect of cooperative work are both necessary and useful 
for the purposes of differentiating co-ops from other forms of enterprises 
In spite of the above criticisms, ICOM's general findings are 
valuable, some of which will be followed up 
The remainder of this chapter attempts to develop a theoretical 
approach or model of cooperative organisation to be tested in empirical 
work I continue with the theory presented by Rothschild and Whitt (1986) 
and proceed to consider the work of Abell (1981) This sequence allows 
progression from the former authors' uni-dimensional view of cooperative 
organisation to Abell's more realistic theoretical insights 
2.3 Rothschild and Whitt (1986) - A Model of Participatory 
Democratic Organisation 
Unlike ICOM, Rothschild and Whitt (1986) make a first step in the 
development of such a model2 The book examines the nature, possibilities, 
and limits of direct democracy in cooperative organisations It is based on 
empirical research done m collective organisations involved mainly in the 
provision of services a 'free' school, a law collective, a 'free' clinic, and a 
newspaper collective The authors develop a theory of democratic 
organisation and indicate how this theory applies to a wide range of 
directly democratic and related organisations 
The book has two main aims The first is to construct a model of the 
organisational properties of cooperative organisations The second is to 
identify the conditions that undermine and/or support what is seen by the 
authors as the most essential characteristic of cooperatives participatory 
democratic decision-making procedures (1986 2) Meeting these goals 
involves two central arguments The first is a comparison of participatory 
2
 I call it a first step since this work has severe limitations, especially for Southern 
Africa 
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democratic organisations (PDOs) with bureaucratic organisations The 
second consists in testing the authors' central hypothesis that the creation 
of organisational democracy is conditional (1986 3) These arguments are 
based on both empirical evidence and related field research by others 
Rothschild and Whitt's (1986) theory of democratic organisation is 
based on one of Weber's forms of rationality, namely, substantive or value 
rationality, as opposed to the formal-legal-rationality which forms the basis 
of bureaucracy and of Weber's theory of bureaucracy Thus, whereas the 
basis for authority in a bureaucratic form of organisation is formal-legal-
rationality, authority in a cooperative is based on substantive rationality 
The ideal, polar forms of bureaucracy or democracy are never 
achieved except at the level of abstraction "In practice, organisations are 
hybrids" (Rothschild and Whitt, 1986 50) In the light of this the authors 
adopt a Webenan approach and develop an ideal-typical model for 
participatory-democratic organisations The purpose of this model is to 
'delineate the form of authority and the corresponding mode of 
organisation" (ibid ) This approach, they argue, will facilitate 
understanding of participatory-democratic organisations not only in terms 
of their differences from conventional bureaucratic organisation (what they 
are not), but in terms of their unique characteristics (what they are in their 
own right) 
It is further argued that the use of an ideal-type allows one to classify 
actually existing organisations along a continuum (1986 50) This avoids 
forcing a particular categorisation upon an organisation Instead, it allows 
features within an organisation to determine its 'type' in terms of the model 
This approach allows one to speak of 'degrees' of participatory-democratic 
organisation This is significant in view of the second objective of this 
work, namely, to explore whether cooperative development is a process 
involving various stages corresponding to various degrees of democracy 
and economic viability 
Rothschild and Whitt identify eight distinguishing characteristics of 
participatory-democratic organisation and/or collectivist organisation in 
contrast to the general features of bureaucratic organisation These concern 
authority, rules, social control, social relations, recruitment and 
advancement, incentive structure, social stratification, and differentiation I 
consider each in tum and provide critical comments afterwards 
(a) Authority 
In a bureaucracy, authority resides in individuals by virtue of their office 
and/or expertise, and is manifested in the form of hierarchical organisation 
Individuals in such organisations are ultimately accountable to universally 
defined and fixed rules implemented by those in office By contrast, in 
participatory-democratic organisations (PDOs) authority is vested in the 
collectivity as a whole Authority is sometimes, though rarely, delegated 
Delegated authority is only temporary and subject to recall Ultimate 
accountability/compliance is to the consensus of the collective which is at 
all times open to negotiation 
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(b) Rules 
Rules in bureaucracies are formalised, fixed, and universal Decisions are 
made on the basis of these formally written rules and regulations In PDOs, 
however, stipulated rules are minimal and decisions are taken primarily on 
an ad hoc basis 
(c) Social Control 
In bureaucracies social control over organisational behaviour at the bottom 
of the hierarchy occurs mainly through direct supervision and standard 
rules and sanctions At top levels such control is exercised through the 
selection of ideologically homogeneous personnel On the contrary, in 
PDOs social controls are primarily based on personalistic or moralistic 
appeals and the selection of ideologically homogeneous personnel at all 
levels 
(d) Social Relations 
Social relations in bureaucratic organisations are essentially impersonal 
These relations are based on the roles of individuals in the organisation and 
are segmental and instrumental Such relations in PDOs are whohstic, 
personal, and of value in themselves 
(e) Recruitment and Advancement 
In bureaucracies individuals are employed on the basis of their specialised 
training and formal certification of such training In addition, employment 
constitutes a career with promotion based on seniority and achievement In 
PDOs, however, employment is based on friendship, social-political 
values, personality, and informally assessed knowledge and skills In such 
organisations there is no concept of career advancement nor is there a 
hierarchy of positions 
(f) Incentive Structure 
In bureaucracies remunerative / monetary incentives are primary, whereas 
in PDOs such incentives are secondary with normative and solidarity 
incentives being primary 
(g) Social Stratification 
Social stratification in bureaucracies is based on differential rewards in the 
form of prestige, privilege, and power on the basis of positions in office 
The organisational hierarchy legitimises inequality On the contrary, PDOs 
are egalitarian with reward differentials, if any, strictly limited by the 
collective as a whole 
(h) Differentiation 
Bureaucracies are characterised by maximal differentiation in the division 
of labour with clear distinctions between mental and manual work, and 
between administrative and performance tasks In addition, there is 
maximal specialisation of tasks and functions with technical expertise 
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exclusively held by experts In PDOs, on the other hand, there is a minimal 
division of labour with the mental/manual division reduced and the 
administrative and performance tasks combined Tasks and functions are 
usually generalised with all individuals involved in all tasks at some time 
This contributes to the démystification of expertise in such organisations 
(1986 62,63) 
On the basis of their comparative analysis as summarised above the 
key features of Rothschild and Whitt's ideal-type model for participatory-
democratic organisation can be summed up as follows 
(a) authority is vested in the collective as a whole with the possibility of 
temporarily delegated authority subject to recall, 
(b) minimal rules with decisions taken mainly on an ad hoc basis, 
(c) social control and organisational cohesion is primarily based on 
personahstic and moralistic appeals and the selection of ideologically 
homogeneous personnel, 
(d) social relations are essentially whohstic and personal, 
(e) there is no hierarchy of positions, employment is based on political 
beliefs and informally assessed knowledge and skills, 
(f) material incentives are secondary while normative and solidarity 
incentives are primary, 
(g) egalitarian compensation and rewards or strictly limited reward 
differentials, and 
(h) a minimal division of labour 
Among the many strengths of this work is the authors' recognition ot 
the need for a model for PDOs (unlike the ICOM work discussed above) 
for the following valid reasons to provide firstly, a model toward which 
PDOs can aspire and secondly, one by which they can evaluate their impact 
and success (1986 72) A further strength is their success in actually 
producing such an ideal type model Furthermore, the implications of this 
ideal-typical model tor practice, namely, that such organisations are 
'hybrids' on a continuum of degrees of democracy is a strength in itself 
In its ideal-typical form, however, this model has serious limitations 
especially when dealing with co-ops in developing countries such as South 
Africa, and also for larger co-ops in all contexts 
Firstly, for larger co-ops delegated authority, clearly defined rules, 
planned and clearly divided decision-making processes, and a clear 
division of labour with corresponding rewards, are often necessary, it not 
crucial, for the purposes of efficiency and survival Secondly, with 
reference to co-ops in developing countries where people form or join co-
ops mainly tor material reasons, organisational cohesion is primarily 
materially based rather than 'moralistic' as suggested by the model In 
addition, employment in such co-ops is also mainly materially based 
(based on the need for employment) with political beliefs of prospective 
members being a secondary issue The common political experiences of 
members and prospective members of co-ops in such contexts, for 
example, unemployment and retrenchment, are essentially material as 
opposed to the ideological commonalities expressed in the model 
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Thirdly, in the context of this predominance of material factors in the 
formation and cohesion of co-ops in developing countries, material 
incentives are primary with normative and solidarity incentives taking 
second priority Finally, many developing societies are characterised by a 
highly unequal distribution of basic education and skills This means that 
current and prospective co-op members in such societies are often 
unskilled, illiterate, and innumcrate, with very little education In this 
context, education and training is crucial for long-term co-op success In 
the meantime, a clear division of labour is also necessary Economic and 
organisational efficiency demand that members perform functions for 
which they are most suited, including 'mental' tasks 
A further basic assumption contributing to the weakness of this 
theory and model is that maximising efficiency is not an important 
objective for cooperatives Furthermore, the theory allows for delegated 
authority, however, the authors fail to develop this idea, to provide 
practical examples of it and to indicate possible variations in such forms of 
authority In addition, the Webenan concept of substantive rationality upon 
which it is claimed this theory is based also remains undeveloped 
In the light of these limitations of the ideal-typical model for PDOs 
presented by Rothschild and Whitt (1986), this model is not universally 
applicable Instead, both their theory of democratic organisation and the 
model which they provide are limited to small cooperatives formed 
primarily for ideological reasons and comprised of members who are 
affluent, well-educated, often skilled, and often with no family 
responsibilities Furthermore, the theory is based on the assumption that 
direct democracy and consequently, decision-making by consensus through 
a one person one vote system is the ideal form of organisation for all co-
ops irrespective of their size and the context m which they exist More 
basically, the authors assume that democracy is the only goal and need of a 
cooperative They ignore both economic goals and needs and the need for 
good management 
These limitations of the theory and the resulting model of 
organisation are reflections of the limits within the empirical material on 
which this work is partly based service cooperatives formed mainly for 
ideological reasons and comprising members motivated mainly by such 
reasons and who are generally affluent and well-educated 
2.4 Abell (1981) - Principles of Democratic Organisation 
Abell (1981), goes beyond the work of Rothschild and Whitt (1986) He 
provides one with a broader definition of direct democracy 
a situation afone participant one vote on all organisationally 
relevant decisions - or a fairly extensive system of 
representational (or delegate) democracy (1981 262) 
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He also sets out five principles underlying the concept of democratic 
organisation 
Dl The principle of political equality whereby all members 
of the organisation have the right to participate directly, on 
the basis of one person one vote, in all decisions affecting the 
organisation 
D 2 The principle of representation whereby members have 
the right to surrender all or part of their rights as embodied in 
D 1 to chosen representatives or delegates 
D3 The principle of specific or special competence 
whereby it is recognised that certain decisions call for 
specialised skills and thus become the proclivity of those with 
such skills 
Ό 4 The principle of efficiency whereby it is recognised that 
the concept of goal fulfilment is the raison dêtre of the 
organisation (Abell, 1981 262/3) 
In relation to these four principles the author notes that the question 
arises as to how D 2 to D 4 should, in a democratic organisation, constrain 
D l 9 In this regard he states that democratic theory suggests a further 
principle, namely, 
that the decision to surrender decision making autonomy 
through representation, competence or efficiency should itself 
be subordinated to principle D 1 (Abell, 1981 263) 
This decision is arrived at democratically and he calls it a "meta-
decision' (ibid ) Thus a fifth principle is added 
D 5 The principle of meta-democracy whereby D 1 is used 
to determine how D 2 to D4 may be allowed to constrain D 1 
(ibid) 
The author further notes that communication - defined as ' the 
generation and transmission of information" (1981 262) - is necessary 
within a democratic organisation for the purposes of coordination, control, 
and political participation (1981 263) 
Furthermore, Abell (1981) points to the implications of the above 
definition of direct democracy, the five principles of democracy, and the 
need for communication for democratic organisation These are, 
(a) that hierarchy is compatible with organisational democracy, 
(b) that hierarchy reduces costs, 
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(d) that "there is no reason to suppose a democratic organisation will 
operate with a consensus' (1981 263) and 
(e) that one should not equate democratic organisation with the demise of 
hierarchy (1981 264) 
Abell's (1981) conceptualisation of participatory-democratic 
organisation moves away from the limits of consensus decision-making 
and allows for a combination of direct and representative democracy 
through delegation It recognises the need for a division of labour m both 
decision-making and manual tasks for the purposes of efficiency, an aspect 
of cooperative organisation perceived as 'unimportant' by Rothschild and 
Whitt (1986) These aspects of Abell's conceptual framework are 
significant in that they enable one to deal with general features of both 
larger and smaller cooperatives and with co-ops characterised by a high 
disparity in skill and education among their membership, as is the case in 
co-ops in developing countries Further, these conceptual tools allow one to 
expand and modify the continuum of organisational forms as presented by 
Rothschild and Whitt (1986 71) The strength of this conceptual 
framework is that the locus of authority is still ultimately based in the 
organisation-membership as a whole - a central requirement for democratic 
organisation 
In similar vein to Rothschild and Whitt (1986), Abell (1981) also 
focuses exclusively on the democratic goal of organisations He does, 
however, present a more realistic view For the purposes of this work 
Abell's (1981) principles of democratic organisation are used as guidelines 
for cooperative organisation In this regard, degrees of democratic 
organisation within the co-ops studied and indications to increasing 
démocratisation in these enterprises are evaluated against these principles 
Having dealt with conceptual issues of democratic organisation, I 
move on to more specific, practical issues Bernstein's (1976, 1983) 
minimally necessary conditions for effective participatory démocratisation 
provide a good starting point and offer concrete conditions to be tested 
empirically 
2.5 Bernstein (1976,1983) - Minimally Necessary Conditions for 
Effective Participatory Démocratisation 
Bernstein (1976, 1983) attempts to build a model of the internal political 
dynamics of workplace démocratisation 'political' referring to questions of 
authority, decision-making, worker and management rights, and access to 
power (1983 10) His work is based on the practical experiences of several 
economically viable enterprises engaged in varied degrees of worker 
participation m decision-making The model he provides consists of six 
minimally necessary conditions for effective participatory démocratisation 
necessary not only individually but as a combination of elements One ot 
Bernstein's major findings is that "[a]ny empirical case of workplace 
démocratisation with less than this minimal group [of conditions] tailed to 
sustain itself for more than a few years" (1976 498) These conditions are 
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(a) participation in decision-making, whether direct or by elected 
representation, 
(b) full-sharing with employees of management level information and, to 
an increasing extent, management level expertise, 
(c) an independent board of appeal in case of disputes (composed of peers 
as far as possible), 
(d) a particular set of attitudes and values (type of consciousness), 
(e) guaranteed individual rights (corresponding, it turns out, to the basic 
political liberties) and 
(f) frequent feedback of economic results to all employees (in the form of 
money, not just information) (1983 9) 
1 proceed to discuss each of these conditions in tum 
2.5.1 Participation in Decision-Making 
Bernstein (1983) argues that various degrees ol worker participation can be 
distinguished along three dimensions 
(a) the degree of control employees enjoy over any single decision, 
(b) the issues over which that control is exercised, and 
(c) the organisational level at which il is exercised (J 983 47) 
Further, there is a continuum of degrees of participative decision 
making ranging from a suggestion box to joint management and through to 
self-management (1983 48) These varying degrees of participative 
decision making relate to the extent to which workers have control of 
decisions For example, the suggestion box technique allows workers no 
control over any decisions while in self-management workers enjoy full 
control over all decisions The kinds of issues over which workers have 
control, that is, the scope of their participation, can range from their 
immediate work-situation through the functions of the enterprise to the 
major policy-making and goal-setting activities of the enterprise (1983 52, 
53) 
The organisational level at which workers exercise such control, that 
is, the domain of their participation, can range from control at shopfloor 
level to the level of the board of directors of the enterprise (1983 54) 
The author's view of degrees of participation along a continuum is in 
line with his view of workplace démocratisation as a dynamic process of 
transformation toward greater democracy (1983 4) 
2.5.2 Sharing Information 
The author argues that sharing technical and economic information of the 
enterprise is a further condition for démocratisation 
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firms committed to démocratisation actively establish 
mechanisms to keep all participants informed and to assist 
their utilisation of this information" (1976 499) (emphasis 
added) 
Such mechanisms include the distribution of written reports on the 
performance ot each department and on the state of the whole enterprise, 
among others This refers to availability of information Just as important a 
factor, however, is the participants' ability to deal with the necessary 
information (1976 499) This points to the need for special training to 
preface and/or accompany any consciously implemented plan of 
démocratisation Referring to the USA, he notes that outside of on-the-job 
training, changes within the basic educational system is probably necessary 
to facilitate workplace democratization Furthermore, he argues that the 
experience of démocratisation itself can develop participants' abilities to 
understand and utilise the required information The success of this process 
in any specific case depends partially on the degree of commitment among 
workers' leaders and the firm's managers to developing all participants' 
business expertise and participatory skills (1976 499, 500) 
2.5.3 Independent Judiciary 
An independent judicial procedure is necessary when dealing with 
participants' disagreements with the implementation of decisions made 
collectively Such a procedure has three functions 
(a) the settlement of infringements on rules in a just manner, 
(b) upholding the basic political rights of participants and 
(c) protecting the constitution of the firm from violation by any member, 
manager or managed 
The fulfilment of these functions requires that the judicial system be 
independent of all parties in the firm It is, further, important that this 
impartiality be real in the eyes of the managed and that they have the last 
say over matters in order to promote their confidence in the fairness of the 
system Such advanced forms of démocratisation are still rare Among the 
most common sanctions applied in democratic firms are warnings and 
temporary suspensions from privileges, with expulsion being a last resort 
(1976 504) 
2.5.4 A Participatory Democratic Consciousness 
Practical experiences of démocratisation indicale that particular attitudes 
and values are necessary for effective participation by both those who work 
and those who manage in the joint operation of an enterprise In this regard, 
certain traits function together to equip participants with an ability to 
formulate policy and a capacity to resist manipulation The major traits 
include receptivity to new ideas, self-reliance, a capacity to compromise, a 
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questioning mind, an ability to think critically, an ability to conceptualise 
differences between means and ends, an expectation of multiple causation, 
and an ability to actively organise (1976 505, 506) 
Furthermore, in addition to the above-mentioned traits adequate for 
the general membership of a firm, those in leadership and/or management 
positions require specific traits These include egalitarian values, 
reciprocity, an awareness of own fallibility, leading and managing on the 
basis of ment, explanation, and the consent of the general membership, 
confidence in fellow participants and a willingness to listen and to delegate 
responsibility, and a policy of educating the general membership and 
providing open access to information (1976 508) 
In sum, the consciousness of those in leadership positions in a 
participatory-democratic firm must be that of leaders "not only [as] 
decision makers, but also educators, not only managers but also 
democratisers (ibid 507) Thus, the responsibility of leaders and 
managers in such firms "is not only to accomplish the economic task of the 
enterprise but also to develop the participants' ability to be more 
democratic" (ibid ) This is best achieved through the daily behaviour of 
the leaders and managers through their interaction with the rest of the 
general members with reference to both mundane manual and general 
policy tasks (ibid ) 
The traits mentioned above represent tendencies toward which 
people actively involved in the self-management of their enterprise have 
been seen to develop (1983 93) In cases where both the managed and the 
managers have developed a democratic consciousness, that is, a 
consciousness comprising the relevant traits, the quality of relations in the 
firm can be said to be more cooperative' than those prevalent in 
conventional enterprises Cooperation, however, does not imply the 
absence of conflict Instead, it reduces conflict polarised into capitalists 
and workers interests (1983 100) 
2.5.5 Guaranteed Individual Rights 
Practical examples of attempts at workplace démocratisation indicate that 
beyond the need for participants to have access to firm information and an 
ability to use it, they must be protected against retaliation for using the 
information to criticise current and/or proposed policy Such protection 
must be absolute, agreed upon by both managers and the managed, and 
guaranteed in writing with the ultimate guarantor of these rights being the 
managed (1983 79,80) In addition, they must be free to differ with fellow 
participants on current issues (1976 501) Further, a system of 
participatory democracy must be supported by all rights commonly 
associated with political democracy freedom of speech and assembly, 
petition of grievances, secret balloting, due process and the right to file 
appeal in cases of discipline, immunity of rank-and-file representatives 
from dismissal or transfer while in office, and a written constitution 
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alterable only by a majority or two-thirds vote of the collective (1976 
502) 
This system of rights is both politically necessary for the participants 
and "cybemetically valuable" (1976 502) for the enterprise as a whole For 
instance, free speech does not just protect individuals, it also provides the 
enterprise with a diversity of views regarding its performance (ibid ) These 
rights also imply the right of worker-members to form or belong to a trade 
union 
2.5.6 Guaranteed Return from the Surplus 
Considering that people generally take on employment in order to receive 
income, it is not unusual for them to demand a share in any surplus 
produced when participation results in higher productivity Irrespective of 
the form of this return beyond wages - whether as individual annual 
bonuses or a collective requirement, for example, a creche - certain 
guidelines need to be followed if it is to support the démocratisation 
process Considering that such return has particular motivating effects on 
participants the guidelines are significant 
Firstly, "the return must be directly related to what the [members] 
themselves have produced and can control" (1976 510) Secondly, it 
must belong to the members by right If such return is allocated arbitrarily, 
it can be manipulative and paternalistic, in this way reducing the values of 
reciprocity and responsibility crucial to participatory democracy Thirdly, 
such return from the surplus must be made to the whole group of 
participants, including managers Rewarding the group as a whole 
promotes and strengthens group solidarity On the contrary, individual 
rewards divide workers on the basis of competition and bolster the 
manager-worker division (1983 64) Group rewards also help worker-and 
manager-members to see that they are dependent on one another for future 
income, hereby facilitating the convergence of management and worker 
goals (1983 67) 
Fourthly, this economic return must be separate from the basic 
remuneration This is necessary because return on the surplus fluctuates 
with the performance of the firm and thus provides feedback from 
changing productivity and profits If such fluctuations "fall above a secure, 
guaranteed level of income, then the return can retain all its reinforcing 
aspects for démocratisation" (1976 511) Fifthly, the return has an 
important function, beyond its monetary character, as an "informational 
feedback" (ibid ) If the return is allocated frequently, that is, monthly or 
quarterly, it informs participants of the immediate results of their efforts 
Thus, when the surplus declines, it is a signal to look for problems causing 
this, when it rises, it indicates the relative success of their joint effort 
(1976 511) 
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2.5.7 Ownership 
Bernstein's (1976) analysis of empirical cases indicates that formal 
ownership can facilitate démocratisation but is not absolutely necessary 
On the other hand, there are entirely worker-owned firms which lack 
democracy These findings question the common assumption that private 
ownership must first be abolished before workers' power can increase (p 
512) 
The concept of ownership involves a package of rights and 
functions 
legal title to property, control over how that property is to be 
used (that is, its management), the right to dispose of that 
property, and first claim on any income accrued through use 
ofthat property (such as profits from production) (1976 512) 
Two of the six conditions identified by Bernstein (1976) as 
minimally necessary for démocratisation contain rights conventionally 
reserved to owners The first condition, participation in decision-making, 
makes an inroad into the owner's right to manage the firm at his/her sole 
discretion, and the condition of economic return on the surplus violates the 
owner's right to have first claim on the surplus Among various forms of 
non-private ownership are nationalisation, worker take-overs through 
purchasing a firm, community ownership through the state, employee 
shared ownership, individuated common ownership, and collective 
common ownership 
In addition to identifying the above necessary conditions for 
effective participatory démocratisation, Bernstein (1983) points to possible 
problems with some of these conditions and offers possible solutions I 
now turn to these problems and solutions 
2.5.8 Necessary Conditions: Problems and Solutions 
In relation to sharing technical and economic information, Bernstein (1976) 
raises potential problems with the practical implementation of this 
condition and suggests possible solutions Among these are the problem ol 
industrial secrecy assuming that workers' control is implemented in a 
market economy, firms may need to prevent certain technical information 
and future financial plans from being available to other firms in order to 
retain a competitive advantage A possible solution is for management to 
suggest what should be withheld and for workers to have ultimate power to 
release such information 
A further problem is a reluctance on the part of managers to abandon 
their former habits of prerogative and secrecy The author notes that "[t]his 
is especially likely in the early stages of democratization when old habits 
and fears are still governing a great deal of managers (and others') 
behaviour" (1976 500) Part of the solution, he notes, "lies in the 
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consciousness of those occupying managerial posts" (ibid ) Another 
problem is that of "managers' continually greater expertise on certain issues 
in contrast to the managed, even when full information is provided" (1976 
501) In this regard, the author notes the inevitability of this situation as a 
result of the division of labour and time required in complex organisations 
Possible solutions to this are (a) rotation of managerial posts, (b) a 
workers' council (political structure) superior to specialised managers in 
organisational hierarchy and comprising members with expertise almost 
equivalent to that of the managers, but who continue to work on the 
shopfloor, and (c) the employment, by the managed, of expert staff of their 
own to advise on matters where full-time managers have greater expertise 
(1976 501) 
Bernstein (1983 102) further points to possible tensions within a 
participatory democratic consciousness One of these is the tension 
between maximising economic goals on the one hand, and maximising 
democratic goals on the other He further notes that the managed must have 
an understanding of democracy and must be sufficiently active in calling 
their managers to account if démocratisation is to survive in an enterprise 
(1983 103) With reference to the development of a participatory or 
democratic consciousness among both managers and the managed, "the 
experience of participation" (Pateman, 1970 cf Bernstein, 1983 106) can 
begin this process 
The maintenance of such a consciousness requires that participatory-
democratic behaviour be reinforced in practice Such reinforcement or, on 
the other hand, the erosion of the process of gaining a democratic 
consciousness, can be influenced by external factors such as the dominant 
culture in the society, the ideology underlying the education system, and 
the natures of the technology employed and the labour process engaged in 
the enterprise concerned (Bernstein, 1983 106,107) For example, 
Blauner found that craft industries (like printing) and continuous-
process work (like petro-chemical operations) are conducive to 
participatory consciousness On the other hand, machine-tending jobs and 
assembly-line work tend to breed attitudes of cynicism, low self-esteem, 
and fear - attitudes which would inhibit the worker from taking part in 
démocratisation (Blauner, 1964, cf Bernstein, 1983 107) 
In addition Bernstein (1983 503) notes that one of the key problems 
with the implementation of members' guaranteed individual rights is the 
conflict between individual and collective rights, and the difficulty with 
finding a careful balance between these principles One means of finding 
such a balance is a supporting system of adjudication, one of the necessary 
conditions for démocratisation mentioned in the section above 
With regard to ownership, Bernstein (1983) states that whatever the 
form of non-private ownership, consideration of its effect on the economy 
as a whole and the well-being of the general population is important In this 
regard the state may be involved "to assure regulation of the firms in the 
interest of the overall good But too great an accumulation of economic 
control in the hands of the state can lead to inequities and injustices The 
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other extreme - little or no state control over worker-owned firms - can 
create parochialism or enterprise selfishness, as Yugoslavia has noticed 
Also in a purely market run economy, development may become 
unbalanced" (1983 514) The integration of "intrafirm aspects of worker 
participation in management with the macroeconomie questions of 
planning, market, and social role of the enterprise" (1983 515) is thus 
important This subject is, however, beyond the scope of this work 
Bernstein's (1983) necessary conditions for participatory 
démocratisation as well as the problems with implementing some of these 
conditions are significant for this work One of the tasks of this dissertation 
is to examine the extent to which these conditions exist within the co-ops 
studied This entails identifying both the conditions present and those 
absent in these co-ops Such an examination will enable one to evaluate the 
possibility of these co ops developing into sustained and effective 
participatory democratic organisations A further task is to identify the 
problems experienced by each of the enterprises studied in its attempts, if 
any, to implement any one of the necessary conditions highlighted by 
Bernstein (1983) 
When considering démocratisation and organisational development 
as processes, it is questionable whether all Bernstein's conditions are 
necessary at one time in order for an organisation to be participatory and 
democratic in the long term This questions whether Bernstein's necessary 
conditions are minimal or maximal 
2.6 Brecker (1988) - Theoretical Insights on Cooperative 
Development as a Process 
Thus far I have focussed on theories oí democratic organisation based on 
cooperative experiences in advanced industrial society These theories have 
been concerned mainly with models of, and principles and conditions for 
participatory democracy Here I shift to Brecker's (1988) theoretical 
insights on cooperative development as a process involving various stages 
development Unlike the previous theorists dealt with in the literature 
review, Brecker's insights are based on cooperative experiences in 
Zimbabwe, a developing society These insights are valuable to the 
examination of co op development as a process Here I give an exposition 
ot Brecker's contribution in this regard In the conclusion I show how these 
insights are enhanced by the empirical work for this dissertation 
Brecker (1988) notes that it is 
a mistaken belief that cooperatives, if given an equal chance, 
will in general grow at a more or less even pace (like a slowly 
rising plateau), rather no two co-ops are the same and they 
grow at different paces require different levels of inputs, and 
reach "take off' at different times (1988 7) 
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His view is that cooperative development is a process involving 
different stages and likens these to stages in the educational system He 
refers to 
the need for separate primary, secondary, and later, university 
educational institutions, or specialist institutions and 
polytechnics each with their own clientele and very special 
packages (1988 9) 
In this regard, he argues that 
[m]uch harm has, and will continue to be done, to the 
cooperative movement by those who refuse to recognise the 
realities of categories and transitional stages in the 
development of cooperatives (1988 9) 
Significantly, Brecker (1988) also notes that conceptualising 
cooperative development as a process involving stages has key 
implications for the kinds of services to be provided for co-ops at different 
stages of development He identifies four such stages 
(a) the pre-cooperative stage, 
(b) the non-viable or start-up stage, 
(c) the potentially viable stage and 
(d) the fully-fledged cooperative stage 
He also briefly outlines the specific kinds of services required by co-
ops at different stages I proceed to outline his ideas 
2.6.1 The Pre-Cooperative Stage 
Brecker (1988 7) defines a pre-cooperative as follows 
a group in the early stages of basic cohesion, still primarily individual 
producers, and therefore only capable of cooperative production on a small 
scale (1988 7) 
He argues that 
(a) pre-cooperatives require very basic training in cooperative ideology and 
practice, 
(b) such enterprises also require basic skills training and skills provision, 
(c) financially, such enterprises require aid and soft loans with which to 
slowly begin to expand their production (Brecker, 1988 8) 
Furthermore, according to Brecker (1988 8), this early stage of 
cooperative development often entails a shift from individual or family 
production to collective or cooperative production 
Such enterprises, he argues, should be serviced by agencies who 
channel donor aid towards nurturing pre-cooperatives He emphasises that 
this should be done in ways that do not breed dependency and undermine 
viability (1988 8) 
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2.6.2 The Non-Viable Stage 
Brecker (1988 8) defines what is commonly known as start-up co-ops as 
enterprises in the non-viable stage of development In general, these co-ops 
are characterised by insufficient management skills and material resources 
in the form of assets and reserves In addition, they have not yet 
"sufficiently consolidated their production structures" (1988 8) For these 
reasons, such co ops are characterised by subsistence levels of income 
Such enterprises are "not yet capable of generating a surplus sufficient to 
both sustain members and reinvest in expanded production [n]or [are they] 
capable of adequate planning towards this end (1988 8) 
For Brecker, non-viable co-ops require different kinds of support 
from pre cooperatives Such co-ops, he argues, require assistance in (a) 
sustaining their members during economic crises, (b) skills training and (c) 
establishing credit-worthiness He further argues that providing such 
assistance is a delicate task requiring specialised attention to assist them 
[non viable co ops] in the transition from subsistence to market production 
(1988 8) 
2.6.3 The Potentially-Viable Stage 
According to Brecker (1988 8) cooperatives at this stage of development 
have overcome the basic weaknesses of pre cooperatives and non viable 
co-ops He argues that potentially viable co ops are more capable of 
planning towards producing a surplus because these enterprises have 
established a minimum level of management capability and of 
organisational and production structures required to achieve sufficient 
surplus from planned productive activity 
Such enterprises are actively engaged in production for the market 
The major problems facing potentially viable co-ops are related to 
enterprise growth and discrimination from conventional financial 
institutions This discrimination causes such co-ops to have difficulty in 
obtaining the necessary finance and technical assistance needed for 
development He argues that in many cases, the financial requirements of 
co-ops at this stage of development are outside the scope of individual 
service organisations and/or donor agencies (Brecker, 1988 8) 
The author further argues that co ops at this stage of development 
need more specialised training and more sophisticated management skills 
These needs call for specialised services and support structures which are 
able to assist such co-ops in making their crucial transition into completely 
viable, fully-fledged cooperative enterprises (1988 9) 
2.6.4 The Fully-Fledged Cooperative Stage 
For Brecker (1988 9), cooperatives at this stage of development are 
capable of obtaining financial assistance on the open money market in the 
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form of credit, loans, and/or bank overdrafts. Such enterprises are 
profitable and economically viable in the long-term. 
Brecker's insights with reference to cooperative development as a 
process are enlightening and useful for the purposes of analysis. His 
insights enhance and confirm existing theories on democratic organisation. 
In the light of (a) Rothschild and Whitt's (1986: 50) conceptualisation of 
PDOs as 'hybrids' along a continuum of degrees of democracy and (b) 
Bernstein's view of workplace démocratisation as a dynamic process of 
transformation toward greater democracy (1983: 4), Brecker's (1988) 
identification of specific stages in cooperative development is well 
founded. Significantly, his argument that co-ops at specific stages of 
development require specific types of services and support is particularly 
enlightening. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONSTRAINTS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND SUPPORT 
STRUCTURES 
3.1 Introduction 
In practice, the ideal form of participatory democracy / cooperative 
organisation can only be approximated It cannot be attained in its entirety 
Moreover, from the history of cooperative organisation it is evident that 
once some form of PDO is established there are several obstacles to its 
survival This points to constraints on participatory democracy / 
cooperative organisation and to the need to reproduce or sustain such 
organisation 
While constraints to cooperative development are often due to the 
circumstances in which PDOs arise and the environment in which they 
operate, they also derive from practices within the organisations 
themselves On the basis of these respective origins I focus on key 
'external and 'internal' constraints for analytical purposes 
The information in this chapter is drawn from the works of 
Rothschild and Whitt (1986 64 71), Gamson and Levin (1984), Cornforth 
(1989), and an ILO report on cooperatives (1988 ch 6) Rothschild and 
Whitt (1986) draw our attention to some constraints time, emotional 
intensity, non-democratic habits and values, environmental constraints and 
individual differences Gamson and Levin (1984) point to the absence of a 
common culture of democratic work, a lack of democratic norms for 
decision-making, and a lack of appropriate skills The work of these 
authors is based on empirical studies of co ops in the USA Cornforth 
(1989) draws on empirical studies of co ops in the UK, France, Italy, and 
Spain and focuses specifically on barriers to the formation and growth of 
such enterprises The ILO report, on the other hand, focuses on constraints 
specific to co-ops in East, Central and Southern Africa 
3.2 External Constraints 
3.2.1 The Marginality of Cooperative Sectors 
Cornforth (1989 110, 114, 115) notes that in western industrialised 
countries today, cooperatives are being formed at a time when capital (in 
the form of financial and productive resources) is highly centralised, and 
when decisions about the allocation of capital are dominated by large 
corporations and the state In such a context, small enterprises such as co-
ops are generally limited to sectors dominated by large firms or to sectors 
which serve fragmented and extremely competitive markets This 
limitation further restricts the ability of small firms to gain control over 
market conditions Moreover, opportunities to move out of the small 
business sector through enterprise growth are low considering that 
expanding small firms are often taken over by larger ones Like most small 
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businesses, then, co-ops are otten formed in highly competitive, low capital 
intensive, and marginal sectors of the economy Consequently, their 
potential for growth is often thwarted 
On the other hand, considering recent international developments in 
political economy, specifically, processes of informatisation and moves 
towards 'flexible specialisation' in the post-Fordist era, small-scale 
enterprises may very well occupy the centre stage in future economic 
development The concept 'flexible specialisation' refers to changes in the 
organisation of economies and production from Fordist mass production to 
the growth of economic activities and structures with organisational 
adaptability and technical innovativeness 
Among the key features of 'flexible specialisation' are 
a) a move away from rigid mass production of standardised goods on 
assembly lines using semi-skilled labour, towards a more craft-like 
tradition with emphasis on innovativeness, quality and adaptability and the 
production of diversified goods, 
b) the flexible use of new technology and of labour, 
c) a move away from specialised tasks and skills to multi-tasking and 
multi-skilhng, 
d) workers are given more responsibility and management becomes less 
hierarchical, 
e) the growth of regional economies specialising in particular products and 
operating as integrated economic systems, 
f) the placing of small firms at the centre of economic development, 
g) an emphasis on the clustering of small firms, and 
h) a shift in the attitude towards labour from labour as a cost to be 
minimised to labour as a resource whose potential should be maximised 
(Kaplmsky, 1990b 6, 7, Rogerson, 1991 18 - 20) 
The argument is that small enterprises with flexible production 
techniques incorporating multi-skilhng are more resilient to market 
changes than large, mass-scale, deskilled Fordist production techniques 
The seminal work on this subject is that by Piore and Sabel (1984) 
3.2.2 Absence of Ideology of Democratic Organisation 
Non-democratic habits and values are a further constraint on cooperative 
organisation These are embedded in people's previous experiences of 
organisation at school, at work, and at home in the context of a 
predominantly bureaucratic, capitalist, and patriarchal forms of social 
organisation In the case of cooperatives operating in such societies, 
cooperators' everyday experiences outside of work are, more often than 
not, contradictory to the way they ought to behave at work This 
disjuncture between the ideology of cooperative organisation and the 
context in which cooperatives exist makes it difficult to sustain cooperation 
thereby constraining the development of such forms of organisation 
For any form ot social organisation to function and survive, "there 
must exist a common set of norms, values, and expectations about 
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organisational functions and operations that are accepted by all or most of 
the members of that organisation" (Gamson and Levin, 1984 223) Unlike 
the well established ideology at work in conventional capitalist enterprises 
which is reinforced by institutions and practices beyond the workplace 
(school, family, media), the ideology necessary to sustain the democratic 
workplace is relatively undeveloped 
To the extent that there is an ideology of democratic organisation, it 
is presented as a rejection of conventional forms of organisation and 
control Generally, such rejection is accompanied by an acceptance of 
broad, abstract notions of equality, democracy, and freedom There is as 
yet little concrete understanding of appropriate behavioural norms for 
democratic workplaces, leaving many such enterprises in a state of anomie 
As a result, PDOs are often unable to deal with behaviour destructive to 
their survival (Gamson and Levin, 1984 223-227) 
3.2.3 Absence of an Appropriate Legal Structure 
The lack ot a facultative legal framework within which co-ops can operate 
is a key constraint for co-ops in most countries With specific reference to 
East, Central, and Southern Africa, cooperative legislation is often 
inherited from colonial times and thus is generally outdated and irrelevant 
to the prevailing conditions and requirements of cooperative development 
in these regions Furthermore, the predominance of agricultural 
cooperatives in countries in these regions has resulted in legislation biased 
towards such enterprises and yet applied to all types of co-ops Like most 
legislation, cooperative laws are written in obscure language rendering 
them inaccessible to most African cooperators who, more often than not, 
are illiterate 
In addition, the incongruence between cooperative legislation and its 
practical implementation on a daily basis is a further constraint to 
cooperative development Finally, such laws often stipulate conditions for 
registration of cooperative societies without considering economic viability 
as one such condition This often leads to the formation of co-ops with 
little or no chance of survival (ILO 1988 106, 107) The failure of such 
enterprises has contributed to the history of generally negative conceptions 
of co-ops among ex , and potential cooperators in these regions 
With reference to Britain, Comforth (1989 113) notes that the legal 
system concerning business is geared mainly to meet the requirements of 
conventional capitalist firms and is often unsuited to the needs of co-ops In 
addition, the mam piece of co op legislation in Britain, the Industrial and 
Provident Societies Acts, is designed primarily to meet the requirements of 
friendly societies and consumer co-ops thereby excluding producer co-ops 
In this way, producer co-ops which are in the minority among cooperative 
enterprises are left with little or no legal support 
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3.2.4 Discrimination against Co-ops 
The practices of conventional financial institutions generally do not cater 
for cooperative forms of organisation and the problems specific to them 
This often leads to the exclusion of co-ops from opportunities for financial 
support resulting in severe economic constraints to their development and 
growth And, often co-ops have to deal with conventional capitalist 
enterprises for supplies or sales transactions In the context of a 
competitive capitalist market and a predominantly capitalist environment 
the politics of dealing with such enterprises can constrain the development 
of a co-op For example, suppliers can delay and/or withhold supplies 
(Comforth, 1989 113) This points to the vulnerability of co-ops in a 
hostile environment 
3.3 Internal Constraints 
3.3.1 Time 
Drawing from their empirical work in collective organisations Rothschild 
and Whitt (1986 64, 65) note that democracy takes time and that this is 
one of its major constraints Often the large amount of time spent in 
meetings leaves little time for the tasks of the organisation This leads to 
inefficiency and hinders the process of reaching the objectives of the 
organisation 
3.3.2 Absence of Democratic Structures, Norms, and Procedures 
With specific reference to decision-making, Gamson and Levin (1984 
230) note the lack of democratic norms and cooperators' lack of experience 
of such processes given the predominance of authoritarian forms of 
organisation in broader society They also note cooperators' limited 
experience with democratic organisation and the consequent absence of 
skills and knowledge necessary for effective democratic participation, for 
example, the productive use of meetings 
The authors further point to an absence of structure in such 
organisations and a tendency to minimise the importance of administrative 
and managerial tasks This tendency is often manifested in managers' 
complaints that they have "responsibility without authority" (Gamson and 
Levin, 1984 233) Comforth (1989 111) also notes that the ideology 
behind cooperation often leads co-ops to deny the legitimacy of 
management and to underestimate the value of management skills 
In addition, Gamson and Levin (1984 231) point to the legitimate 
exercise of authority and obtaining accountability from members as 
common problems in democratic decision-making They note that while 
conventional forms of organisation are "usually relatively clear about 
who has responsibility for what [, democratic work organisations can 
rarely make this claim" (Gamson and Levin, 1984 231) Part of this 
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problem lies in participants' confusion between responsibility and 
authority 
In PDOs, the emphasis on minimising differences in power and 
influence often leads to a reluctance in giving legitimate authority to a 
specific position or ïndividual(s) This lack of clarity, confusion and 
reluctance is linked with a general absence of structure in PDOs One of 
the consequences of these constraints is an unequal distribution of 
influence in favour of more articulate and better educated participants, and 
ineffective managerial practices (Gamson and Levin, 1984 232, 233) 
3.3.3 Interpersonal Conflict 
Rothschild and Whitt (1986 65) argue that, in the context of a collective 
characterised by face-to-face relationships and a need for consensus, 
intense conflict among members can constrain participatory / cooperative 
organisation The authors maintain that conflict "is a structurally induced, 
inherent cost of participatory democracy" (1986 66) 
In my view, conflict becomes a constraint mainly when it is viewed 
as something negative and when there are no mechanisms to deal with it 
constructively With appropriate mechanisms for dealing with conflict and 
with a view ol conflict as inevitable, but not necessarily negative, among 
humans with different ideas and interests, it does not have to be a major 
constraint to participation The reality lies somewhere inbetween, namely, 
that conflict can be potentially constructive or destructive Approaches of 
participants and mechanisms for resolving conflict tend to determine 
whether it will be constructive or destructive 
Gamson and Levin (1984) support this view These authors view 
conflict as "a central feature of democratic decision making" (p 235) since 
participatory democracy is designed to allow for freedom of expression 
The question confronting democratic workplaces, however, is "how to treat 
such conflict as a normal part of the decision making process by using it in 
a productive way to explore and select among alternatives" (ibid ) This 
question is raised in response to practices within co ops aimed at 
suppressing conflict Such practices derive from general conceptions in 
broader society of conflict as a negative phenomenon - essentially non 
conformist/deviant and uncooperative 
Such conceptions and practices, however, are incompatible with 
democratic decision-making With freedom of expression as an essential 
feature of democracy, conflicting points of view are bound to become 
manifest The suppression of disagreements within the context of PDOs is 
more likely to be a constraint in the long run "Thus the goal of a 
democratic organisation should not be to suppress conflict, but to welcome 
it and use it productively [Hence it is] necessary to create a format in 
which conflict and its resolutions are expected [my emphasis] and can be 
addressed systematically" (Gamson and Levin, 1984 236) 
This brings one back to the need for democratic organisational 
structures, norms, and procedures, specifically, the productive use of 
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meetings (Gamson and Levin, 1984 236) In close association with the 
productive use of conflict is the productive use of membership meetings In 
PDOs membership meetings represent the central locale for raising, 
addressing, and resolving problems confronting the organisation, and for 
decision-making Cooperators', unfortunately, often lack experience in 
utilising meetings to these ends Often an over-reliance on and ineffective 
use of meetings in PDOs engender irresolution, ('I cannot proceed unless I 
check with everyone'), apprehension, ('You can't proceed before consulting 
with the group'), and cynicism ('All we ever do is have meetings') (Gamson 
and Levin, 1984 237) The productive use of meetings entails planning an 
agenda, setting a time limit for addressing each item, and effective 
facilitation of the discussion (ibid ) 
3.3.4 Individual Differences in Skill and Experience 
Individual differences among co-op members anse as a result of people's 
different skills, education, experience and knowledge Such differences 
often give rise to inequalities of influence within democratic organisations 
In such organisations, however, unequal influence based on expertise can 
be checked through the authority of the organisation as a whole Such 
influence based on more intangible attributes such as ability to articulate 
ideas and no fear of taking responsibility, however, is more difficult to 
check and tends to persist in PDOs when all participants are not equally 
competent (ibid ) 
3.3.5 Lack of Appropriate Skills 
The constraint of inappropriate skills in most co-ops originates mainly in 
the reasons for their formation to secure employment in the face of firm 
closure, to provide employment in times of crisis, and to create a work 
environment based on democratic principles It is only by rare coincidence 
that co-ops end up with exactly the right combination of people skilled in 
the various tasks and activities they must perform (Gamson and Levin, 
1984 238) This constraint is further reinforced by a general tendency 
among co-ops to disregard the need for skilled people This is especially 
prevalent with regard to managerial and administrative skills In addition, 
the general practice of pay parity in co-ops tends to make it difficult for 
such enterprises to attract people with appropriate skills Furthermore, co-
ops often lack the resources to train existing members to fill positions 
requiring specific skills (ibid 239-241) 
3.3.6 Finance 
Some cooperative principles, for example, a limited return on capital 
(which restricts the rate of return on dividends and the increasing value of 
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shares), and shareholding restricted to members only, impose constraints 
on methods by which such enterprises can raise funds Consequently, most 
co-ops are forced to rely on loans and reinvested profits for the purposes of 
investment A dependence on loan finance usually results in high debts 
among most co-ops while it often takes a few years for small enterprises to 
reach the stage when profits are actually produced 
Often co-op members are from the unemployed and thus have little 
or no money or assets against which bank loans can be secured This is one 
reason why co-ops start off with meagre capital structures Moreover, once 
co-ops begin to expand, difficulties in raising finance capital through 
issuing equity increase (Comforth, 1989 110, 111) The initial under­
capitalisation of most co-ops effectively excludes them from access to 
other forms of finance such as credit facilities and loan finance These 
factors hinder the development of co-ops as economic units 
3.3.7 Internal Limits to Growth 
Co-ops often indicate some ambivalence towards growth Commitments to 
democracy, and more specifically, direct democracy often lead co-ops to 
limit their size in order to facilitate decision-making processes (Comforth, 
1989 113) Often this commitment to direct democracy is the flipside of a 
rejection of hierarchy 
The constraints discussed above point to the need for education on 
the operation and requirements of an economic enterprise, for example, 
why growth and financial soundness is indispensable Most of the 
constraints highlight the need for education for democracy/cooperation 
which embodies both the values and practices of democracy Furthermore, 
the importance of a support network in sustaining such values and 
practices, and m providing shared resources, services, ideas, training, and 
personnel also emerges from the above discussion Such networking is 
especially important in the face of a hostile socio-political and economic 
environment, both in terms of providing support and in terms of building a 
social force sufficiently powerful to challenge legal and other constraints 
3.4 Education and Cooperative Organisation 
3.4.1 Education and Competence 
Szell (et al, 1989 ν) in their collective work on the state and self-
management in various countries, note that with the trend towards more 
participatory work environments has emerged the need to consider the 
issue of creating and maintaining education and competence sufficient for 
the purposes of sustained and viable democratic organisation Here I briefly 
address the role of education and competence in the advance ot more 
democratic organisation 
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For the purposes of defining the concept 'education' as used here I 
refer to Motsumi's distinction between education and training (1988 3) He 
points out that training and education are not quite the same thing training 
involves acquiring saleable skills required for a specific task, for example, 
book-keeping, education, on the other hand, is more general and much 
broader than traimng and includes acquiring new knowledge especially 
about the context (economic, political, ideological) in which a co-op exists 
The hypothetical example he cites is that of a cooperator who has not 
experienced going to the bank and thus does not know what s/he is 
supposed to do in a bank Once this cooperator, however, has been 
educated about banks and the services they offer, banks can become useful 
in his/her daily life (ibid ) It is in this broad sense, both practical and 
theoretical, which I use the concept 'education' 
With regard to 'competence' I refer to Heller's definition (1983, cf 
Avasthi, 1989 322) 'competence' includes skill, experience, know-how, 
and access to information 
From the above definitions it is clear that education, competence, 
and training are intricately linked For it is "self-evident that competence is 
gained primarily through education, be it formal education or the self-
education of direct experience and reflection" (Blyton, 1989 301) 
3.4.2 Education: 'Political' Requisite for 'Real' Democracy 
Writing on a few experiences of South African co-ops, Etkind (1989) notes 
that "[ljiteracy and numeracy are essential political questions - their 
absence attacks the very roots of democracy" (p 59) These roots are 
embedded in "the democratic self-determination of the producers 
themselves" (Wood, 1988 22 cf Etkind, 1989 59) Without such basic 
skills, "it may be possible to preserve the appearance of democracy but not 
its substance" (Etkind 1989 59) Furthermore, "[t]o fail to educate is to 
fail in the political task of a co-op" (Etkind, 1989 59) 
In addition, it is my view that beyond the basic skills of literacy and 
numeracy, co-op members require conceptual skills in order to understand 
the interrelated functions of their enterprise Such skills are important in 
enabling cooperatore to make informed decisions and to effectively 
challenge and control those to whom they may delegate certain tasks and 
decisions Moreover, depending on the political dynamics within a certain 
co-op, more educated and/or more competent co-op members can 
monopolise certain knowledge and information This would lead to a 
dependence on such members, in this way inhibiting the self-determination 
of others, and thus failing in the 'political task' of the enterprise Hence the 
central role of education and competence among all co-op members, 
alongside training in marketable skills 
According to Szell (et al, 1989 12), self management is only 
possible with few experts, and in the context of a general level of 
competence among participants (emphasis added) which is maintained 
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through continued education, it is this maintained competence which 
facilitates effective control by participants 
Thus "[t]he 'right consciousness' is not sufficient for participation, 
workers' control, and self-management ' (ibid 12) Instead, a general level 
of competence in combination with the 'right consciousness' is necessary 
for effective cooperation Put differently, the subjective condition for 
cooperation - the 'right consciousness' - without the objective condition of a 
specific level of education, competence, and skill on the part of all the 
producers is insufficient for effective cooperation 
3.4.3 The need for Continued Education 
Vanek (1977), on the basis of his work on Yugoslavian self-management, 
supports the argument of Szell (et al, 1989) for continued education and 
points to some practical ways of implementing such continuity 
Vanek (1977) emphasises the importance of continuous education 
throughout the existence of the firm even if it is in altered forms This gives 
new members a chance to learn the rules of the game and allows old 
members to remain in "continuing living contact with the enterprise" (p 
23) This facilitates all members' constant contribution, through dialogue, 
to shaping the enterprise, and facilitates enterprise adaptation to change 
Continuous education is thus necessary for the continuity of the firm as an 
organisation 
The Mondragon Group of Cooperatives based in the town of 
Mondragon, Spain provide a practical example of continuous education as 
perceived by Vanek These world famous cooperatives were initiated by 
the Catholic priest, Arizmendi, and a few of his engineering students 
Today these enterprises are supported by a set of schools for training, both 
technical and in the ethics of cooperation (Bradley and Gelb, 1983 12 14) 
In sum, education is a political requisite for 'real' democracy 
Acquisition and effective use of education and competence among 
participants in democratic organisations has an important role in facilitating 
participants' control over fellow members endowed with specialised 
knowledge, and to whom specialised tasks are most likely to be delegated 
There is thus an important link between education, competence, and 
control 
There is also an important link between education, competence, and 
effective decision-making, for education and competence are required if 
participants are to make informed decisions about their enterprise In 
addition, the continued education of participants in democratic 
organisations is necessary for the maintenance of control and effective 
decision-making Continued education also provides tor continuity of skills 
and competence in an organisation, thereby indirectly contnbuting to the 
continuity of the organisation itself Alongside training, education and 
competence thus have a central role in sustained and viable democratic 
organisation 
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3.5 Experience and Cooperative Consciousness 
Historically, cooperatives are formed in times of hardship and struggle 
There are intricately linked internal and external factors which contribute 
to the emergence of co-ops during times of struggle The external factor 
which predominantly leads to the formation ot co-ops all over the world is 
mass unemployment This social phenomenon gives rise to internal reasons 
for the emergence of such enterprises, namely, personal hardship as a result 
of unemployment and a particular psychological condition induced by such 
hardship Bate and Carter (1986 60) refer to the ideas and actions which 
arise out ot such psychological conditions caused by hardship as 
"ideational factors" 
Bate and Carter (1986 60) give us some valuable insight into 
people's initial frame of reference to cooperation Writing on producer 
cooperatives in Britain, they argue that apart from environmental factors 
contributing to the emergence of cooperatives there seem to be "immediate 
and personal considerations" involved in people's decision to form or join a 
cooperative My experience in the field confirms these authors' observation 
that 'personal hardship' - unemployment, retrenchment, firm bankruptcy - is 
a recurring and underlying reason for the emergence of co-ops and for 
people's decision to join a co op Furthermore, the authors' concept ot 
'ideational' factors proves valuable in identifying factors which contributed 
to cooperators' predisposition to forming and joining the co-ops which 
form the basis of this study 
The authors further argue that 
Personal hardship may be one of the necessary conditions but 
it is not sufficient in itself, it is important to identify the 
particular psychological condition induced by hardship which 
may predispose people to choose the cooperative path (Bate 
and Carter, 1986 60) 
They claim that a variety of "ideational" factors are involved in 
people's predisposition to form or join a co-op (ibid 60) These factors can 
include (a) people's ideological commitment to particular political or 
religious beliefs which might find expression in their attempt to establish a 
form ot work organisation which conforms more closely to those beliefs, 
(b) people's experience of alienation when engaged in traditional forms of 
work organisation, and/or (c) people's experience of a strike and/or 
retrenchment and the psychological effect of such experience upon those 
involved Whichever one of the aforementioned factors it may be, Bate and 
Carter state that 
it is important to emphasise that 'ideational' is broader than 
'ideological' cooperatives are by no means exclusively 
dominated by people committed, for example, to radical, anti-
capitahst principles, or to some wider intellectual movement 
Bitterness, resentment, and insecurity are m themselves quite 
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capable of exercising considerable influence over people's 
minds (1986 60) 
'Experience' is thus an important factor shaping the consciousness of 
those involved in cooperative organisation More specifically, experiences 
in broader society previous to participation in a cooperative provide points 
of reference to cooperation at the micro-level (at the level of the firm) and 
shape the development of a cooperative consciousness at this level Such 
experiences or broad points of reference usually result in the definition of 
cooperation in terms of 'what it is not' On the other hand, over time, 
experiences of participation in a cooperative organisation which result in 
the success of such organisation provide the basis for the development of a 
cooperative consciousness, at the level of the workplace, defined in terms 
of 'what cooperation is' 
With reference to cooperators' previous experience, actions and 
consciousness are limited by the socio-political and historical context in 
which they exist Cooperative consciousness at the enterprise level cannot 
develop simply through exhorting people to be cooperative People have to 
have experienced a successful co op (successful in terms of providing for 
their material needs) for them to come to fully accept a cooperative 
consciousness Simultaneously, in order for them to build a successful co-
op, people need some frame of reference to cooperation Broader 
experiences are thus necessary in the initial conceptualisation of 
cooperation at work, while experiences specific to cooperation at the 
workplace are imperative in the formation of a cooperative consciousness 
at this level 
Other authors on the broad subject of workplace democracy 
(Pateman, 1970, Bernstein, 1983, Gamson and Levin, 1984, Rothschild 
and Whitt, 1986, Greenberg, 1986) also emphasise the role of experience, 
practical and/or ideological, in the development of a cooperative ideology 
and consciousness Unlike my argument, which is workplace-specific, 
these authors, in particular Pateman (1970), argue that in the context of 
capitalist social relations people's experience of cooperation, participation, 
and democracy at the workplace serve as important learning grounds for 
such values and practices at a broader societal level 
3.6 The Role of Support Structures in Cooperative Development 
3.6.1 Importance of Support Structures 
In the light of the range of economic, ideological, and organisational 
constraints faced by co-ops in capitalist society several authors (Comforth, 
1989, Rothschild and Whitt, 1986, Gamson and Levin, 1984, Greenberg, 
1986, Thomley, 1981) point to the importance of a cooperative support 
network 
Writing on co-ops in the UK, Comforth (1989 122) argues that the 
development of a significant cooperative sector is only possible if it has its 
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own support structure to meet the sector's specific needs, to encourage 
mutual support among co-ops, and to facilitate the mobilisation of public 
and political support Rothschild and Whitt (1986 128) suggest that 
collective democratic organisations that maintain an identification and link 
with a broader social movement are less likely to lose sight of their original 
goals In the same vein Gamson and Levin (1984 243) note that 
networking among co-ops at both regional and national levels is an 
important means by which democratic workplaces can combine to share 
scarce resources, ideas, skilled personnel, and training programmes 
Writing on the Plywood Cooperatives in the USA, Greenberg (1986) 
concludes that 
without powerful countervailing forces to the market 
mechanism [wjithout a working class party a cooperative 
or egalitarian culture, a socialist ideology, a revolutionary 
movement, or a government committed to economic 
democracy [that ¡s ] without a conducive context, self-
managed enterprises might well survive and prosper, but they 
are not likely to play a significant role within a movement for 
social change (p 168) 
Finally, Thornley (1981 108) concludes that cooperatives closely 
linked with trade union and cooperative movements, engaged in trade links 
beneficial to both supplier and customer, and which have developed an 
integrated structure of production and distribution have been generally 
more successful than those operating in isolation 
In addition to this broad acknowledgement of the need for support 
networks, the empirical evidence provided by the experience of self-
management in Yugoslavia, the kibbutzim in Israel, the Mondragon 
Cooperatives in Spain, the Scandinavian and Italian cooperative 
movements, and the Breman confederation of self-managed firms in the 
Netherlands reinforces the view that cooperative support structures are vital 
to the sustained success of cooperative enterprises 
3.6.2 Possible Functions 
Comforth (1989 115) is one among few authors on the subject who goes 
beyond simply identifying the importance of support structures for co-ops 
He points to some possible functions of such structures and suggests that 
such functions can be divided into three main areas 'externally' directed 
functions aimed at improving the environment in which co-ops operate, 
functions directed 'internally' by providing services required by co-ops, and 
functions aimed at maintaining and extending the support structure itself 
He argues that the first major externally directed function of support 
structures is to develop a strong worker cooperative movement with links 
to other social movements, the local community, and political 
organisations which share similar ideals The second function is to ensure 
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that co-ops are treated fairly and thus not discriminated against by other 
institutions such as banks and the state More specifically, in relation to the 
state, support structures ought to ensure that co-ops are treated fairly in 
legislation The third function is to promote the idea of cooperation in 
broader society (1989 116) 
Among the internally directed services of support structures 
Cornforth (1989) highlights the provision of advice and assistance in the 
operation of cooperative enterprises to existing co-ops as well as to those in 
the process of formation The latter form of assistance is particularly 
important considering that most people forming co-ops are relatively 
inexperienced at operating their own business and at working in a 
cooperative setting A second important service is the identification of 
training needs in co-ops and ensuring that such needs are met Thirdly, 
support structures should encourage and facilitate links between co-ops in 
an attempt to centralise functions and, often scarce, resources 
Examples of functions that can be effectively centralised in the 
material interests of co-ops are the purchase of raw materials, marketing 
finished products, and negotiating contracts Resources that can be 
centralised to this aim include financial resources and specialised skills 
such as accounting, market research, and so on The centralisation of such 
resources through networking among co-ops can be beneficial in providing 
protection from broader market forces A further major role of support 
structures is to examine trends in the broader economy in order to facilitate 
optimal market entry, product choice, and production decisions by co-ops 
Finally, support structures should help provide suitable forms of 
finance for co-ops This entails enhancing access to conventional sources 
of finance such as those provided by banks and assisting in the 
development of a co-op bank through which such enterprises can use their 
own funds (Comforth, 1989 116/7) The bank of the Mondragon 
Cooperatives, as well as the Cooperative Self-Finance Scheme (CSFS) in 
Zimbabwe are examples of cooperative organisations providing such 
services 
In this work, the importance of support structures is acknowledged 
Our specific focus in this regard is on the implications of some of their 
functions and methods of support for cooperative development 
3.6.3 Methods and Dilemmas of Providing Support 
Comforth (1989 118) further points to two basic methods or approaches to 
providing support to co-ops (1) the 'top-down' method, and (2) the 
'bottom-up' method These constitute basic approaches towards 
'development' and are commonly known among people in the field of 
development and/or community work This distinction refers to the nature 
of the relationship between the support structure and the co-op(s) receiving 
support 
The key features of the 'top-down' method are ( 1) the idea of forming 
a co-op comes from the support structure, (2) the people involved in 
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providing support play a direct role in initiating and developing the 
enterprise and provide the absent skills, and (3) these initiators work with 
the leaders of the cooperative who eventually take over their role By 
contrast, the key features of the 'bottom-up' method are (1) the idea for 
forming a co op originates among the potential cooperators, (2) the role of 
those providing support is to facilitate and assist the cooperators in 
developing the skills required to run their enterprise, and (3) those 
providing support work with the entire group (not just the leaders) in the 
process of co-op development (Comforth, 1989 118/9) 
The predominant approach among those involved in development 
work in the UK is the 'bottom-up one It is argued by supporters of this 
approach that the success of a cooperative depends mainly on the 
commitment and involvement of its members based on their voluntary 
decision to embark on such a venture, and that success is unlikely among 
co-ops initiated by development workers Similarly, it is argued that 
developing democratic practices among cooperators is more difficult in a 
context where the development worker makes most major decisions (1989 
119) The failure of several co-ops formed by 'top-down' methods has 
reinforced this view (Thomley, 1981 87) 
In theory, this distinction between the desirable and less-desirable 
approach is useful in pointing to possible pitfalls in co-op development In 
practice, however, Comforth (1989 119) nghtly argues that it may not 
always be possible or desirable to uphold a purely 'bottom-up' approach 
Often in the context of immediate needs to create and/or secure 
employment, for example, in the case of worker take-overs, a direct role on 
the part of people in support structures in planning the development of a 
co op and negotiating with external agencies might be necessary In the 
light of this observation the dilemma facing support structures is thus to 
provide useful advice and assistance, without hijacking the initiative for 
forming the co-op from the potential cooperators and without fostering 
dependency on the part of the co-op This is in tandem with Szell's (1989 
10, 11) suggestion that the intervention of outside experts be aimed at 'help 
for self help' in the context of a long-term, intensive relationship of 
confidence between the outside agency and those concerned 
Aside from the practical difficulty of a purely 'bottom-up' approach, 
there are further problems with it One of these is that support structures 
tend to promote the idea of cooperation and then wait for groups to 
approach them for help This often leads to an ad hoc process of co-op 
development resulting in the formation of many small co-ops in a diverse 
range of sectors In addition, since support structures are often financed 
through public funds, particularly in the UK, they then feel obliged to 
service all these types of co-ops The formation of co-ops in a wide range 
of sectors in combination with the obligation on the part of support 
organisations, which often have limited resources, to help all those who 
request assistance often results in the formation of barely viable co-ops 
which are highly susceptible to changes in the economic climate and 
environment Comforth (1989 120) 
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According to Comforth (1989 120) 'the dilemma facing 
Cooperative Service Organisations (CSOs) in the UK is how to develop an 
integrated [cooperative] sector, which will require planning and 
coordination, given [the] small size [of co-ops] and [their] decentralisation 
and without incurring the problems associated with [the] 'top-down 
[approach to development] ' He suggests some ways of resolving this 
dilemma (1) promotion of the idea of cooperation within selected, suitable, 
and viable sectors only, (2) building trading links between existing co ops 
concentrated in specific sectors, (3) building informal links between co ops 
on a social level, or concentrating such enterprises in particular areas in an 
attempt to develop mutual assistance and trading links, and (4) to 
institutionalise cooperation between co-ops through a contractual 
relationship between each co-op and their central bank as is the case with 
the co-ops in Mondragon, Spain (1989 120) 
In addition to the 'top down' and 'bottom-up' methods of providing 
support, Comforth (1989 121) points to decentralised and centralised 
methods The author notes that co-op support in the UK is highly 
decentralised This is mainly as a result of the predominant source of 
funding to CSOs coming from local government, and the effects of the 
'bottom-up' approach highlighted immediately above The key advantage of 
decentralised support is the availability of support in a large number of 
areas and a wide range of industries The disadvantages, however, are that 
local CSOs seldom have sufficient staff, skills, and financial resources to 
help develop large co-ops Further, there are seldom sufficient co-ops in 
one sector in an area to develop an economically integrated sector More 
centralised support, such as regional support structures for the purposes of 
complementing the work of local CSOs is one way of resolving the 
deficiencies of decentralised support 
In addition to the dilemmas facing CSOs on the basis of the methods 
they choose when providing support, such organisations face a further 
dilemma CSOs generally have to serve more than one set of interests 
With reference to the Mondragon co ops, for example, the bank has to 
serve the interests of the member co-ops as well as those of the community 
which invests in the co-ops In the UK CSOs which are funded by the 
government have to serve the interests of the co-ops as well as those of the 
state Often the interests of the parties concerned are contradictory leaving 
the CSO in a dilemma Furthermore, over time a conflict of interests may 
anse between already existing and potential co-ops In this regard, the 
resources of CSOs in terms of skills, staff, and finance need to increase 
with the growth of a co-op movement (Comforth, 1989 121) 
3.6.4 The State as a Support Structure 
The extent to which the state supports and/or fosters cooperative 
development and the relationship developed between the state and co-ops 
varies extensively from society to society Rothschild and Whitt (1986 
167) suggest that logically, the state can take four stands in relation to co-
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ops: (1) it may attempt to repress co-ops, (2) it may be indifferent and 
inactive with regard to their development, (3) it may encourage and 
facilitate the formation of individual co-ops, or (4) it may be directly 
involved in forming and supporting such enterprises. 
It is my view that each of these possible approaches on the part of 
the state to co-op development depend on the nature of the state itself, the 
history of political struggle in the society concerned, the level of industrial 
development and the extent to which the contradictions of such 
development have begun to be manifest, the balance of class forces, and 
the political strength of the co-op movement in relation to these forces. 
At this point it is revealing to note examples of state support for co-
ops and the benefits of such support to both the state and the co-ops 
concerned. I begin by looking at Thomley's (1981) work which deals 
briefly with the role of the state in relation to British co-ops in comparison 
to the situations in France and Italy. According to Thomley (1981: 130), 
most of the recently developed British co-ops, particularly those 
established in the mid- and late seventies, have received state aid in various 
forms. These include direct aid from the central government, aid from 
central government channelled through independent bodies promoting co-
ops, and aid form local authorities. The author argues that as a result of this 
state assistance the number of co-ops in the UK has increased since 1980. 
Many of these recent ventures, however, have collapsed and those still in 
operation are not commercially sound. 
Judging from Thornley's examination of the state's job creation 
programmes, among the unintended consequences of government support 
for co-ops has been the containment of possible resistance by unemployed 
workers through keeping them in touch with 'the disciplines of work' 
(Thornley, 1981: 114). 
The author further argues that though state assistance to co-ops has 
been negligible in comparison with that given to private enterprises, it has 
been significant for the development of co-ops in Britain. Of the 
approximately 300 co-ops registered in 1980 more than 100 had received 
direct and indirect assistance from the state. Apparently the number of jobs 
created and/or saved because of state intervention reached 900 in total. 
This amount is equal to more than half of all the jobs created in co-ops 
since 1970. 
Despite this increase in the number of jobs created, however, the 
author argues that the future of producer co-ops in Britain is very uncertain 
since state assistance to co-ops has been far too inadequate to enable them 
to be of any distinct and lasting value to economic development ( 1981 : 111 
- 130). She further notes that British co-ops have been highly dependent on 
state funds and have been supported by "the mechanism of pump-priming" 
(1981: 176). This mechanism has been used by the state in some cases to 
support commercially unsound enterprises, and can be perceived as a waste 
of financial resources. Despite some of the negative unintended 
consequences of state support, the author maintains that the future of the 
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British co-op movement depends heavily on continued state assistance 
(1981 174) 
In support of her emphasis on the need for state assistance, Thomley 
(1981) points to the experiences of co-op movements in Italy and France 
In contrast to the situation in Britain, she notes, the state in France has 
supported co-ops as viable commercial enterprises rather than as part of job 
creation programmes This support has come in the form ol the provision 
of markets lor co-ops since 1888 for products and services essential to the 
economy This support in combination with the practice of giving state 
contracts to co ops, has been provided on the basis of the economic 
performance of the enterprises In addition, the French government has set 
up a co-op bank to provide more substantial sources of finance for both 
new and expanding co-ops Further, the central government has helped 
develop an effective legal, administrative, and financial framework within 
which co-ops can operate and has seldom provided direct financial aid to 
such enterprises This support has been a major factor in the success, 
survival, and growth of the co op movement in France Furthermore, the 
efficiency and reliability of these enterprises made them suitable for the 
provision of infrastructure for the economy houses, roads, bridges, and so 
on (Thomley, 1981 131-150) 
With reference to Italy, the author highlights the fact that co-ops here 
have been supported by political parties since the last century The three 
major co-op federations in Italy are each closely linked to a different 
political party Though state support of co-ops in Italy has been more 
limited than in France, it has come in the form of loans on favourable terms 
to co ops and the provision a legal framework (Thomley, 1981 151 -167) 
Rothschild and Whitt (1986) draw our attention to the supportive 
political role of the Basque Nationalist Party, affiliated with the trade union 
movement of the region, in establishing a cooperative economy in 
Mondragon in the context of the Spanish Civil War The authors also point 
to the contradictory role of the Polish state in promoting co-ops for job 
creation and ultimately attempting to take control of them State control of 
the co-ops in Poland eventually led to members decreased motivation to 
work They further note the contradictory practices of the Khuomentang 
political party in China in the 1930s this party established several credit, 
agricultural, and producer co-ops in the 1930s until these enterprises began 
to threaten the economic position of the party s political support base -
urban and rural property owners, on this note the party withdrew its 
support for co-ops and became antagonistic toward them (1986 172/3) 
From the historical experiences of state support for co-ops in France, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Poland, and China, Rothschild and Whitt (1986) conclude 
that 
Both capitalist and socialist societies want to capture the 
economic benefits of cooperation, but they want to control it 
For the capitalist country, an economically vital cooperative 
sector would compete against private enterprise for the 
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socialist country it would compete against state enterprise 
Because worker cooperatives are neither fish nor fowl, they 
can make both sides edgy At the same time, they cannot be 
rejected easily by either side (p 177) 
Finally, the authors conclude that the role of the state in promoting 
co-ops can only be limited This is so since the experience of co ops in the 
countries studied (by Rothschild and Whitt, 1986) and elsewhere suggests 
that the democratic character of such enterprises can be maintained only il 
they are grass-roots formations The state can only facilitate their 
development through the provision of loans, contracts, start-up funds, 
technical advice, and/or tax incentives Co-ops themselves should build 
federations to provide each other with mutual support in their efforts 
towards self-help Considering that democratic control is an essential 
feature of cooperation outside agencies like governments, banks, unions, 
and/or service organisations have the potential to restrict the autonomy of a 
co-op and its members (1986 177) 
While the formation of cooperatives in Western industrialised 
societies is linked specifically to the need for jobs, co-ops in developing 
countries have been given a somewhat broader function that of social and 
economic development In a report on cooperatives in East, Central, and 
Southern Africa the ILO (1988) notes that the role of governments in the 
promotion of co-ops and the relationship between the state and co ops is of 
fundamental importance in the African context In the light of a general 
recognition, especially among developing countries, of co-ops as 
instruments of social and economic development, particularly in the rural 
areas, co-op development has been incorporated as part of most national 
development programmes in the regions 
According to ILO recommendations regarding co-ops in independent 
developing countries, governments in such countries ought to formulate 
and implement policy under which co-ops receive economic, financial, 
legal, technical, and other forms of aid and encouragement The reality, 
however, is that most countries in these regions indicate some level of state 
interference in co ops as opposed to encouragement Such interference 
ranges from open hostility, through indifference, to paternalism which 
often entails direct state involvement in the management, supervision, and 
control of such enterprises Moreover, economically unsuccessful co-ops 
are generally ignored and kept in operation artificially through large state 
subsidies A positive approach on the part of governments in these regions 
towards co-ops is apparently rare The Director-General of the ILO notes 
that 
[t]here is ample evidence that cooperatives are becoming 
increasingly subject to government intervention and in some 
countries are completely controlled by the state the 
danger is that cooperatives may become a governmental 
instrument and not an instrument of self-help of the people 
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Indeed such control defeats the democratic principle on 
which cooperatives are based (ILO, 1988 20) 
This is confirmed by the studies of Dominelli (1989) in Algeria, and 
Kamden (1989) in Cameroon Dominelh's (1989) work focuses on the 
impact of state intervention on workers' control in Algeria, referred to there 
as 'autogestion' This author concludes that 
The state was responsible for curtailing the growth of 
autogestion by physically cutting its size, destroying working 
class organisation, and diverting resources to the petroleum 
sector Moreover, the bureaucratic structures it introduced 
through the 1972 Agrarian Reform'! increased centralised 
control of the autogestion sector's activities at the expense of 
democratic decision-making by workers (1989- 297) 
State control over co-ops in Africa is further confirmed by the work 
of Holmen (1990 39-48,62) Holmen (1990 50-52), however, goes beyond 
identifying the reality of extensive state control of co-ops in Africa, and 
attempts to provide some reasons for such action on the part of the state 
These are located in the nature of the Third World' state which the author 
describes as overdeveloped and centralised Among these are external 
reasons the inheritance from the colonial period of already autocratic state 
institutions, the importance of external recognition at the lime of liberation 
often linked to development aid, the effects on class formation (in the 
recipient country) of methods of providing aid, a heavy reliance on external 
financial support and advice, the emphasis on urbanisation, 
industrialisation, modernisation, the perception of a cooperative network as 
a suitable channel for development, and the resultant need for a 
bureaucracy to receive and utilise development aid 
Internal reasons for the centralised nature of the state and its 
resultant control over co-ops, on the other hand, include the absence of an 
economically strong 'middle-class' and their resultant 'latching on' to the 
state bureaucracy for employment, the emphasis placed on making national 
development plans of symbolic rather than practical value, and often to 
attract foreign capital and to demonstrate (at the level of rhetoric) state 
legitimacy, and the perceived need to build a state as a means towards 
building a nation (Holmen, 1990 52/3) 
It is these internal and external forces which contribute to the 
concentration of power and wealth on the one hand, and to the highly 
centralised form of the 'Third World' state (ibid 53, 54) Furthermore, this 
feature of the state in this context contributes to extensive state control of 
co ops as part of development programmes which fit into national 
development plans 
In cases where some form of state support is rendered to co-ops in 
the East, Central, and Southern African regions, the state, apart from 
providing a legal framework within which co-ops can form and operate, 
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channels resources through ministries and/or departments for services to 
co-ops These include formulating development policies, providing 
education and training for department/ministry officials, budget preparation 
for co-ops, auditing, accounting, and management services, and in the case 
of the production of cash crops, central marketing authorities have been 
established Further services that governments may provide include the 
provision and/or improvement of rural infrastructures, agricultural 
extension services, supply of seeds and other inputs, banking services, and 
credit facilities Furthermore, governments can influence co-op 
development through their fiscal policy and foreign exchange regulations 
(ILO, 1988 19-21) 
Considering the effects of increasing state intervention in co-ops in 
these regions on the one hand, and the importance of the services the state 
can provide to co-ops in the interests of their development, the relationship 
between the state and co-ops is a central issue I agree with Rothschild and 
Whitt (1986) that the role of the state can only be limited The expenence 
of cooperatives in Africa as documented by Holmen (1990), Kamden 
(1989), and Dominelli (1989), shows that too much state involvement can 
smother co-ops All the state can really do as a support structure is to 
provide a context - legal, economic, and political - conducive to co-op 
development 
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CHAPTER 4 
AN OVERVIEW OF COOPERATIVES IN SOUTH AFRICA IN THE 
1980S 
4.1 Introduction 
The work by Ruiters (1993) is among the first attempts to address the 
history of black cooperative formation in South Africa He examines the 
relationship between social movement support networks and the formation 
and decline of cooperatives He notes that blacks have been engaged in 
cooperative activity since the first decade of the twentieth century with the 
earliest reference to such activity traced to Cape Town in 1909 (1993 95) 
His work points to the political content of cooperative formation in South 
Africa and the way in which weaknesses of political and other 
organisations supporting and initiating co-ops are often reflected in the co-
ops themselves The latter tendency is also revealed in the case studies 
reviewed later in this dissertation 
Ruiters (1993 352-362) penodises the upswings and downswings of 
cooperative activity in South Africa 
(1) 1900-1930 is marked by low levels of cooperative activity, 
(2) 1930-1955 is characterised by an upswing despite attempts by churches 
and the state to contain the politicisation of co-ops by limiting them to 
certain activities, 
(3) 1950-1970 marks a decline in cooperative formation in tandem with the 
general decline in social movement activity during the 1960s, 
(4) 1970-1984 features low levels of cooperative activity but the growth of 
a conceptualisation of co ops as political agents of transformation, 
(5) 1984-1990 is characterised by an upswing in cooperative formation 
The case studies in this dissertation are of cooperatives formed in the 
period 1980-1990 Among the authors on such activity in the 1980s are 
Philip (1988), Etkind (1989), Jaffee (1988; 1990), Lupton (1991) and 
Ruiters (1990, 1993) This revival of cooperative activity must be seen in 
the context of the history of political struggle against Apartheid in South 
Africa In this context, cooperatives cannot be seen simply as small 
businesses serving as means of survival for the unemployed and 
economically marginalised black population The history of widespread 
political resistance and mobilisation in South African during the 1970s and 
1980s points to the political content of these enterprises 
4.2 Reform, Repression and Resistance: 1970s and 1980s 
After the 1960s era of repression and the resultant lull in political 
resistance, the 1976 Soweto uprising marked a turning-point in South 
African political history Swilling (in Frankel et al, 1988 1-12) penodises 
this history of the 1970s and 1980s into three phases 
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(1) 1976-9, marked by township resistance followed by repression in the 
context of internal conflicts within the state between pro-reform verhgtes 
and more conservative, anti-reform verkramptes 
(2) 1979-84, characterised by the beginnings of the state's contradictory 
policies of reform and repression, and popular resistance to these policies 
Among the initial reformist strategies were the Wiehahn recommendations 
for reform in labour relations and the complementary Riekert Commission 
recommendations on urbanisation policy The key aim of these strategies 
was to divide blacks into 'urban insiders' - those with permanent urban 
residence rights and the right to work in white urban areas - and 'rural 
outsiders' those who were resident in bantustans with temporary 
employment contracts and thus nghtless and 'illegal' in white South Africa 
While the labour reforms attempted to exclude migrants from the right to 
form and join trade unions, the Riekert reforms implied stricter controls 
over the movement of Africans from rural to urban areas, but more 
mobility for those blacks with permanent urban residence rights and local 
representation for these residents in Black Local Authorities The national 
political rights of urban Africans were, however, restricted to their 
specified bantustans 
Squatter movements and resistance to forced removals on the basis 
of 'illegal' residence contributed to the eventual failure of the Influx 
Control laws The resurgence of mass-based political mobilisation as 
shown in the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 
bore testimony to the extent of popular resistance to the state's reformist 
initiatives and its attempts to manipulate divisions among the black 
population for its own political ends The emergence of a strong 
democratically organised trade union movement and the formation of 
COSATU in 1985 was one manifestation of resistance to state attempts at 
dividing the black working class 
(3) 1984-6, marked a multi dimensional crisis in the South African social 
formation This was clear from the widespread, mass-based popular 
resistance, deepening economic recession, political and economic isolation 
of South Africa, rising tensions between reformist and conservative wings 
of the state, increasing violence and poverty, and increasing repression as 
shown m the two states of emergency declared by the state in this period 
Although many organisations in the national resistance movement were 
weakened, they survived this repression 
Price (1991 191, 192) points to the political manifestations and 
implications ot this crisis He refers to this period as the ' insurrection" in 
the sense that state power was being nullified in the ungovernable black 
townships and a new structure of authority was taking its place He notes 
that the distinguishing feature of this period was that 
multiple forms of mass resistance and protest interacted and 
reinforced each other Simultaneous waves of school boycotts, 
political strikes, consumer boycotts, rent strikes, and huge 
community rallies combined with escalating armed sabotage 
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by the ANC and determined street battles by young comrades 
to turn protest and resistance into insurrection (ibid 193) 
The new order bom out of this insurrection was manifested in the 
growth of grass-roots based organisations of political leadership, for 
example, street committees and people's courts (ibid 202, 204, 209) 
Although this insurrectionary process was not free of political division and 
weaknesses, it did fundamentally challenge the reform process and white 
minority rule (ibid 216, 217) and brought the state to consider the political 
incorporation of blacks 
4.3 Some Indicators of the Crisis 
Much research has been done on empirical evidence of this crisis (Kaplan 
1987, Cassim 1987, Innes 1986, Gelb 1991, Archer et al 1990, Lewis 
1991) Among the indicators is the rise in unemployment from about 20 
per cent in 1982 to approximately 30 per cent in the late 1980s Archer et 
al (1990 167, 171) note an increase in the estimated number of 
unemployed from 3,3 million in 1980 to 6,5 million in 1986 Lewis (1991 
245) notes a 30 per cent estimate of unemployment in 1980 and a predicted 
estimate of 54 per cent by the year 2 000 Furthermore, Gelb (1991 1) 
notes estimates of inflation of over 13 per cent per annum in the 1980s 
Among the general effects of the recession on the African working 
class were low real wages, rapidly increasing unemployment, and a decline 
in living standards (Keenan, 1984 137) Further, according to Cassim 
(1987 542), the cnsis precipitated a high rate of insolvency among firms 
and decreased output in manufacturing These processes were associated 
with a long-term downswing in industrial employment and increasing 
overall unemployment in the economy The manufacturing sector in 
particular, the country's key generator of employment, indicated a net 
decline in employment From 1980 to 1986, just over 150 000 jobs were 
created in the formal sector while the labour force grew by about 1,5 
million While 185 000 jobs were created m the public sector over this 
period, about 30 000 jobs were lost in the private sector Furthermore, the 
recession marked an increase in the trend towards economic concentration 
with small firms being merged with bigger ones (Kaplan, 1987 528) This 
process of rationalisation usually results in a loss of jobs making it difficult 
for the unemployed to find jobs and for those in jobs to hold onto them 
4.4 Organising the Unemployed 
In this context of growing structural unemployment, strong possibilities 
were opened for struggles within the working class between the employed, 
the ex-employed or retrenched, and the long-term unemployed Such 
struggles became real as the threat of unemployment and of almost 
immediate replacement with scab labour in the event of dismissal was 
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used to discipline the resistant labour force (Jaffee, 1986 58) It is in the 
light of such straggles that cooperatives became part of a strategy of 
organising and mobilising the unemployed as well as providing some 
source of income Trade union initiatives in this regard emerged around the 
mid-1980s Unemployed workers' committees were established by some 
unions These structures were usually organised around issues such as 
Unemployment Insurance Funds, social security, consumers' and 
producers' co ops, education, and skills development among other issues 
(Jaffee, 1986 63, SALB, 1987 36-38) 
In 1987 organisations - from the Transvaal, the Western and Eastern 
Cape, and the Border region - involved in organising the unemployed met 
and agreed to establish the National Unemployed Workers' Coordinating 
Committee (NUWCC) (SALB, 1987 37) The NUWCC was later affiliated 
to COSATU who committed itself to the 
systematic support of the recently formed National 
Unemployed Workers' Co-ordinating Committee to achieve a 
national organisation and build a cooperative movement that 
serves the interests of the working class (Resolution of the 
Second National Congress ofCosatu, cf Jaffee, 1988 3) 
According to Philip (1988), the strategies of unemployed workers' 
organisation were threefold 
firstly, they blame[d] capitalist relations and the apartheid 
government for unemployment, and their long term solution to 
unemployment [was] to end apartheid and to build socialism, 
secondly their organisational priority [was] to find ways of 
creating jobs, and thirdly, they [saw] strategies around 
welfare, advice and provision of services as a way of building 
their organisational support and strength (1988 33) 
The author notes that among these organisations' strategies for job 
creation, were demands for a ban on overtime, a shorter working week - 40 
hours, the public works campaign, and the establishment of cooperative 
enterprises (Philip, 1988 34) 
Until the late 1980s and early 1990s, the strategies adopted by 
unemployed workers' organisations involved mainly ensuring preferential 
access to jobs for the ex-employed/retrenched rather than the creation of 
new jobs Although such strategies helped build the organisation of 
unemployed and foster unity between the organised unemployed and trade 
unions, they have not challenged unemployment (Philip, 1988 35) In the 
light of this reality, Philip notes that cooperatives have a potential role to 
play as means of creating jobs 
To start a co-op, however, requires resources ranging from financial 
to technical, as well as organisational and administrative resources and also 
skills Often the lack of access to these resources and skills among the 
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unemployed makes it difficult to start a co-op Where the unemployed have 
been able to gain access to some of these generally scarce resources, 
further limitations have faced them, for example, production for a 
competitive market dominated by monopolies, lack of access to loan 
capital for the purposes of expansion, among other limitations This points 
to the intensity of the struggle among the long-term unemployed to both 
find and attempt to create jobs 
4.5 The State and Cooperatives in South Africa 
An appropriate starting point for an examination of the role of the state in 
urban-based co-ops in the 1980s would be to consider its role in relation to 
urban unregulated or 'informal' economic activity among blacks 
Considering that most co-ops are unregistered, unlicensed enterprises 
which do not pay tax and are not subject to government regulation, the 
inclusion of cooperatives among unregulated enterprises is justified 
In the context of early urbanisation policies, the state's attitude to 
urban unregulated activity was repressive Changes in its urbanisation 
policy in the mid 1980s reflected a recognition of the permanence of some 
blacks resident in urban areas and of their need for employment and 
income through such activity Rogerson (1988 137) notes that until then, 
the majority of 'informal' operators faced repression in the face of attempts 
by national and local authorities to 'keep the cities beautiful' In the mid-
1980s, however, state policy on the 'informal sector' shifted from 
repression to tolerance (1988 137) 
The later 1980s marked a further shift in the state's attitude towards 
urban unregulated economic activity from mere tolerance to 
encouragement This was manifested in its privatisation and deregulation 
policies The former was aimed at promoting economic growth, reducing 
inflation, providing entrepreneurial opportunities, and promoting the small 
business sector The latter entailed the relaxation of regulations governing 
economic enterprises operating in the market Among the aims ot these 
policies were the promotion of the 'informal sector' for the purposes ot 
absorbing some of the unemployed in black communities 
In an indirect way, the state's privatisation and deregulation policies 
and its relaxation of restrictions on black trading rights in the 1980s created 
some space for the emergence of cooperatives This easing of restrictions 
fitted into the position generally held among government circles at the 
time that the 'informal sector' had great potential as a source of income and 
employment, and as an alternative for welfare provision This view tended 
to portray the 'informal sector' as a cheap solution to South Africa's 
unemployment and welfare problems 
Nattrass (1990 220) notes two key problems with this view firstly, 
it assumed that formal and informal small business sectors were able to 
create jobs on a substantial scale, and secondly, the use of this perspective 
was to justify and reduce the degree of unemployment in SA In this 
regard, people not engaged in formal employment were assumed to be 
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employed in the informal sector, rather than unemployed So, people 
engaged in informal economic activity as means of material survival were 
seen as employed, economically self sufficient, and thus fell outside of 
state responsibility for their welfare This was so irrespective of the reality 
of low wages and meagre economic returns which characterise the bulk of 
such economic activity in SA (ibid 220, 221) The average net monthly 
income for self-employed informal operators was recently estimated at 
R534 while the figure for employees in this sector was estimated at R342 
(Central Statistical Services, 1990 44,45) 
Nattrass (1990) notes that available evidence on the performance of 
small enterprises (both formal and informal) suggests a limited potential 
for employment opportunities and poor remuneration Dewar and Watson 
(1981, cf Nattrass, 1990 222), in their survey of the informal sector in 
Cape Town, found that only 4 per cent employed over 3 people Beavon 
and Rogerson (1982, cf Nattrass, 1990 222), found that a tiny minority of 
informal sector operators received incomes higher than the lowest wage 
scale in the formal sector As indicated later in this chapter, in the profile of 
and constraints faced by cooperatives, these limitations apply to 
cooperatives as well 
In the light of the state's attitude towards the urban 'informal sector', 
its relationship with co-ops as unregulated enterprises has been mainly 
indirect There was no specific legislation or fiscal policy to support 
cooperatives Instead, related changes in the state's policy towards 
urbanisation and economic growth m the light of the economic and 
political crisis provided an increasingly more tolerant, rather than directly 
facultative, context for urban unregulated activity, including cooperative 
activity 
The lack ot direct state involvement in cooperative development 
among the marginalised, mainly black, communities of SA can be 
attributed to the following reasons Firstly, the majority of cooperatore and 
potential cooperators in SA are from among the black working class and 
the unemployed Until April, 1994 which marked the first democratic 
election in this country, the exclusion of blacks from political 
representation and the state's efforts to keep its responsibility for their 
welfare to the barest minimum, provides part of an explanation for its non-
involvement in co-ops In addition, in the context of its promotion of the 
free enterprise system and its clearly articulated position that the private 
sector, and not the state, was first and foremost responsible for the creation 
of employment, state support for co-ops was contradictory 
In the light of the latest political developments m South Africa, 
however, the scenano of indirect and /or non-existent state involvement 
sketched above is likely to change In addition, an increasing recognition of 
the importance of the 'informal' sector, including co-ops, in creating jobs 
for the unemployed, albeit in a very limited way, is likely to change state 
attitudes and policy towards such ventures Rogerson (1988, 1991) 
suggests that in the context of growing unemployment and ongoing debates 
about post-aparthied economy and society, the 'informal sector' has to 
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assume some priority on the future policy agenda Furthermore, the 
recognition of the importance of state supported co-ops by the African 
National Congress (ANC), points to some acknowledgement of a role for 
cooperatives in the future South African economy In this sense there are 
rays of hope for co-ops in the future 
Following recent developments in thinking about 'informal sector' 
policy, both locally and internationally (Rogerson 1991, ILO 1991), and 
considering the severe constraints faced by co-ops in South Africa, a key 
task of the new state in SA in supporting such enterprises would be to 
develop and implement policies geared towards the provision of basic 
education, health, housing and other infrastructural services Without such 
assistance the majority of cooperators will be left destitute For the few co-
ops who show some growth potential, future state assistance should be in 
the form of credit provision, technical and managen al training and 
improved support networks The existence of (a) already established 
service organisations and, more importantly, (b) the increasing 
involvement of trade unions in co-ops and (c) the increasing local 
involvement of the Southern African Cooperative Support Network 
(SACNET) could provide bases for the development of an institutional 
framework for channelling state support to co-ops 
Furthermore, in the light of the beginnings of a post-Fordist era and 
moves towards 'flexible speciahsaton', policy towards enabling economic 
development in this direction would emphasise programmes to encourage 
collective efficiency and innovation amongst integrated small firms, and to 
elicit state support in creating a favourable environment of such forms of 
production and economic organisation (Rogerson, 1991 21, 22) 
Considering the scarcity of all kinds of resources among co-ops, the idea of 
collective economic and entrepreneurial activity may be valuable for such 
enterprises 
Rogerson (1991 18) suggests that 'flexible specialisation' is a special 
case of considerable relevance to developing policy approaches for the 
local 'informal' economy in the 1990s His optimism in this regard may be 
valid in terms of the need to foster economies of cooperation between and 
amongst firms With reference to skill adaptability and diversity, 
innovativeness, a higher degree of consent on the part of labour, and the 
need for less authoritative management, however, this optimism is 
somewhat shaky The relevance of 'flexible specialisation' for the South 
African 'informal' sector should be considered against the latter's 
background as a skill-starved refuge for the unemployed and marginalised, 
many of whom have been systematically prevented from developing 
technical and entrepreneurial skills 
4.6 Types of Cooperatives in South Africa 
There are two components to cooperative activity in South Africa (a) the 
agricultural marketing co-ops and consumers' co-ops established mainly 
among white farmers from as early as the 1890s with the sustained 
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development of marketing co ops since 1922 and, (b) producers' and 
consumers' co-ops established since the early 1900s among the 
marginalised population of SA, mainly blacks The first component of 
consumer co-ops was established mainly as means of relieving poverty 
among poor whites The marketing co-ops essentially provided 
mechanisms by which large white farmers secured a market by selling their 
goods at pnces subsidised by government support 
The second component, sometimes referred to as the 'progressive' 
co op movement, experienced a revival in the 1980s partly in response to 
growing unemployment and impoverishment in the face of the economic 
and socio political crisis in SA The case studies in this work are on 
producers' co ops in this era 
It is important to note that many cooperatives, today considered to be 
part of the progressive co-op movement, started off essentially as self help 
groups and/or income generating projects This is especially the case m 
rural areas where churches with mission stations, for example, the 
Moravian and Catholic churches, were actively engaged in initiating such 
ventures In many instances self-help groups and/or income generating 
projects have developed into, or at least laid the basis for producer 
cooperatives It would be distorting to ignore the links between such 
groups and projects and the eventual emergence of cooperative productive 
activity in SA 
There is no formally established progressive cooperative movement 
in SA today Instead, a diversity of producers' co ops at various stages of 
formation are scattered throughout the country Clusters of co-ops linked to 
service organisations and trade unions can be found in most provinces 
Since information about cooperative activity is as scattered as the co ops 
themselves, the following overview is by no means complete It does, 
however, give one an outline of key centres of co-op activity in the 
country 
4.7 Clusters of Producer Cooperatives 
4.7.1 Cooperatives Linked to Service Organisations 
The Northern Transvaal 
The vicinity of Ehm in the Northern Transvaal has a network of producer 
cooperatives These enterprises emerged in the context of the state's 
homeland' policy, the resultant forced resettlement and removal of people, 
the process of impoverishment of the reserves, and a dependence, 
especially among women, on meagre and often irregular migrant 
remittances Income generating projects which later gave rise to a system 
of cooperative production, provided a means by which mainly women in 
the area were able to establish an economic base in the local community 
Tiakeni Textiles Cooperative was among the first to be established in 
the Ehm area and also the first producer cooperative to be registered in 
1980 with the Department of Cooperatives in Pretoria The enterprises in 
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this network, namely, Tiakem, Sasekisa, Twananani, and Thlan, are 
engaged in craft production They are linked to a support-collective for 
cooperative organisation, Itsidu, established in 1978/9, which receives 
some of its funding from donor agencies Collins (1990) provides an 
account of the history of co-op development and networking m this area 
She notes that the co-ops in this area are small-scale and although they 
have provided their members with regular incomes, these are generally 
very low serving mainly as supplementary income 
The Eastern Cape 
In the Eastern Cape, more specifically, Grahamstown, a cluster of about 
seven co-ops, involved mostly in handicrafts, is in operation at the Old 
Power Station Five of these are producers' co-ops, one is a milk buying co-
op and the other, a cooperative management and marketing consultant for 
the producer groups, namely, Cooperative Development and Marketing 
(CDM) These enterprises have been in operation since 1984 (CDM 1988) 
The Western Cape 
In the Western Cape, groups of co-ops have been established mainly in the 
township and 'squatter' areas on the outskirts of Cape Town These are 
generally linked to service organisations funded by donor agencies. Some 
co-ops here are linked to the following service organisations the Quaker 
Peace Centre, Masizakhe, and the South African Labour and Development 
Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town In the late 
1980s and early 1990s unemployed workers' organisations such as the 
Western Cape Unemployed Workers' Union (WECUWU) began to take an 
interest in supporting and initiating co-ops The majority of these co-ops 
are not economically viable 
In Montagu, a town about 250 kilometres just north-east of Cape 
Town, a set of four co-ops, three of which are engaged in small-scale 
furniture manufacturing, and one involved in providing services to these 
producer co-ops, has been established These enterprises are linked to the 
Montagu and Ashton Gemeenskapsdiens (MAG), a community 
development organisation The producer co-ops in this area are potentially 
economically viable enterprises producing high quality goods for an 
exclusive market The case studies for this dissertation are drawn from 
these two sets of co-ops in the Western Cape (co-ops in the 'squatter' areas 
and in Montagu) 
4.7.2 Cooperatives Linked to Trade-Unions 
Some cooperatives emerged in the mid- and late-1980s in response to mass 
dismissals and retrenchments, for example, the Sarmcol Workers' 
Cooperatives (Sawco) and Zenzeleni in Natal, the National Union of 
Mineworkers' (NUM) co-ops in Phalaborwa, and Thusanang near Brits in 
the Transvaal These have been among the first such enterprises to be 
supported by trade unions in attempts to organise and mobilise the 
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unemployed The union involved in Sawco and Thusanang is the National 
Union of Metal Workers of SA (NUMSA, previously the Metal and Allied 
Workers Union (MAWU)), the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) is 
involved in the establishment of co-ops in Phalaborwa, and the 
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers' Union of South Africa 
(ACTWUSA), subsequently merged with the Garment and Allied Workers' 
Union (GAWU) to form the South African Clothing and Textiles Workers' 
Union (SACTWU), founded Zenzeleni 
The Sarmcol Workers' Cooperatives 
The Sarmcol Workers' Cooperatives (Sawco) are among the most well 
known in Natal These enterprises were initiated in November, 1985 during 
the course of the legal strike at BTR Sarmcol, in Howick, which started in 
May of that year The strike was in response to this British multi-national 
company s refusal to recognise the Metal and Allied Workers' Union 
(MAWU) The Sawto co-ops were iormed to support the striking workers 
and their families, most of whom were part of the Mpophomeni community 
in Howick 
Until the late 1980s this group of enterprises consisted of a T-shirt 
silk-screening co-op, one which provided health services to the local 
community, an agricultural co-op which provided food for the local 
community at reasonable prices, and for the purposes of supplementing 
strikers' food parcels supplied by the union, a buying co-op, and a cultural 
co-op involved in the production of plays depicting the strikers' struggles, 
and a choir 
A key feature of the Sawco co-ops is their direct link to NUMSA 
The union raised the capital required to start the T-shirt co-op (the first of 
the Sawco co-ops) and owns the equipment The enterprises are structurally 
linked to the union they are represented on shop steward and local union 
branch structures A further unique feature of the co-ops is that they started 
essentially as strike-support mechanisms, not as job creation programmes 
Participation in the co-ops during the strike thus entailed voluntary work 
By the second half of 1987, however, the strikers heard that they had lost 
their case against the company in the Industrial Court This news marked 
the end of the strike and a shift in the objectives of the co-ops from strike-
support to building economically viable enterprises (SALB 11/4, 1986, 
Philip 1988, Bernstein and Ross 1987) 
By 1988, none of the Sawco co-ops were producing a surplus The 
T-shirt co-op provided workers with some form of subsistence while the 
agricultural and buying co-ops continued to supplement the provision of 
food Both the Sarmcol strike and the formation of the Sawco cooperatives 
have been relatively well documented Bonin (1987) is a key work on the 
strike itself while Philip (1988) is one of the first case-studies of the co 
ops She examines the historical development and difficulties of the 
enterprises (SALB 11/4, 1986, Philip 1988, Bernstein and Ross 1987) 
With specific reference to Sawco, Philip (1988 140) concludes that 
the co-op's link to NUMSA provides an institutional barrier to its 
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degeneration into a capitalist enterprise because ownership of the means of 
production is vested in the union She further concludes that this link 
serves as a political barrier to degeneration by reinforcing co-op members' 
identification with the organised working class For Philip, this ownership 
structure anticipates a type of social ownership Ruiters (1993 251-263), 
however, points to the disadvantages of the relationship between Sawco 
and the union These include the mirroring of union structures in the 
cooperative which is a very different kind of organisation with different 
purposes and a dependency relationship with the union 
Zenzeleni 
In 1988 ACTWUSA discovered that Frame Group, the largest employer in 
the Southern African textile industry, intended to retrench three thousand 
workers from its workforce of twenty-two thousand These retrenchments 
were to take place over three years in response to rationalisation and 
restructuring processes in the local textile industry In the light of this 
retrenchment scheme, ACTWUSA negotiated an agreement with the 
management of the Frame Group to establish a job-creation project for the 
workers facing retrenchment Hence the formation of Zenzeleni in 
February, 1989 
The Frame Group Company agreed to make available R2,5 million 
to the union for the establishment of Zenzeleni, essentially a union-owned 
and controlled cooperative This amount was later reduced to R 1,4 million 
(Ruiters, 1993 277) The cooperative employs three hundred workers and 
is engaged in clothing manufacture, specifically, T-shirts for Cosatu 
affiliated unions and workwear such as overalls It is regarded as the largest 
co-op in both Natal and South Africa (Employment Law 1989, Cormack 
1990, Workteam 1990, Lupton 1991) 
Workteam (1990 6-10) points to some of the problems and struggles 
in the co-op around ownership and worker-management relations These 
relate mainly to the structure of the enterprise as union-owned and -
controlled The co op's major supplier is Frame Group Furthermore, the 
enterprise has been running at a loss mainly because of a decline in the 
market, specifically the solidarity T-shirt market Among the strategies 
adopted by the enterprise in response to this market decline has been to 
obtain large tender contracts with Edgars and Anglo American Corporation 
among other enterprises 
This strategy marked the co-op's entry into the clothing 
manufacturing market In turn, it had contradictory implications for 
Zenzeleni s relationship with the trade-union movement 
an increase m the cooperative's share of the market heralded 
a decrease in that of its competitors, some of whom employed 
union members (Lupton, ¡991 7) 
68 
Lupton (1991 10) concludes that Zenzeleni's experience of close 
links with a trade-union raises concern about the role and extent of trade-
union involvement in co-ops He argues that 
[t]'rade-union s, by virtue of their status as working class 
formations directed at struggling against capital and 
management, are placed in a contradictory situation when 
they become owners of the means of production For 
Zenzeleni, ownership clearly rests with the union and not with 
the worker members The possibility therefore exists for a 
divergence of interest between members of the cooperative 
and the union (1991 10) 
Furthermore, he concludes that Zenzeleni's experience presents a 
future government with the challenge of providing institutional support for 
co-ops (1991 10) 
The National Union of Mineworkers' Cooperatives 
According to Kate Philip, the projects coordinator for the NUM, this union 
helped ex-miners to start co-ops in the Northern Transvaal, the Transkei, 
Lesotho and Swaziland These workers were dismissed from Foskor after 
the mineworkers' strike in 1987 
The most well documented of these enterprises is the Phalaborwa 
Workers' Cooperative (Pawco) which produces T-shirts This co-op was 
formed after battles between the residents of Namakgale and the police 
during the miners' strike Pawco started with fifty members in March 1988, 
almost three years after the dismissals Due to practical constraints such as 
skills and capital shortages, the co-op struggled to survive initially 
Operations improved after education workshops on the specific skills 
requirements of the co-op 
Since the start of 1989, PAWCO has been financially self-
sufficient, it has paid back the loans given by NUM, it has 
paid wages consistently, and the wage rates in the co-op have 
steadily increased Workers earned an average of R400 a 
month over the last five months, and were able to pay 
themselves a Rl 000 Christmas bonus All 50 members ow 
work full-time (Philip 1990(b)) 
The NUM's support for co-ops is linked, firstly, to the need to 
develop a local economic base in the rural areas from which most of its 
membership is drawn The development of a local economic base is seen as 
necessary for creating jobs locally, in part, an attempt to lay the basis for 
halting the migrant labour system, historically the key feature of the South 
African mining industry Secondly, in the light of likely future mass 
retrenchments in the mining industry, and NUM's limited resources to deal 
with the resulting level of unemployment among its members, co-ops are a 
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potential form of job creation Philip notes that it is hoped that NUM's 
practical experience in building such models of job creation can provide a 
basis for policy formulation (Philip m Weekly Mail, 17-08-1990) 
The NUM's policy on co-ops stresses the need for co-ops to develop 
into economically viable enterprises, capable of surviving in a market 
economy and providing their members with job security and regular 
incomes Philip notes that NUM co ops have already had some success m 
reaching this goal the Phalaborwa Workers T-shirt Printing Co-op 
(Pawco), with a membership of fifty people, has been able to pay better 
wages than the minimum in the mining industry, for more than a year 
(Philip· WM, 17-08-1990, SALB 14/7, 1990) 
Thusanang 
The Thusanang Cooperative was initiated in 1984 by the Unemployed 
Workers' Committee (UWC) in Brits, a decentralised industrial area about 
ninety kilometres north of Johannesburg. This Committee was formed in 
the aftermath of two strikes one at B&S Engineering and the other at 
Autocable The workers at both these factories were organised by the Metal 
and Allied Workers' Union (MAWU) at the time These strikes and the 
subsequent dismissal of the entire workforce at B&S are significant in 
understanding the workers' solidarity out of which the cooperative 
emerged MAWU challenged B&S in the industrial court and won the 
reinstatement of only 275 workers This victory was, however, short-lived 
as the company closed down one of its plants shortly afterwards, leaving 
most workers unemployed once again. In the light of this closure and the 
scarcity of jobs in the area these workers, still highly organised, decided to 
create their own work by forming the co-op (Jaffee 1987, 1988) 
The co-op started with three production units a sewing co-op run by 
about fourteen women, a fencing co-op run by five men, and a 
bnckmaking co-op, also operated by five men Most of the time these 
enterprises were unable to produce a surplus Among the major problems 
were a lack of starting and working capital, a limited local market for their 
products, lack of education and training and inappropriate technology 
(Jaffee 1987, 1988) 
In the context of these problems, democratic organisation in the 
enterprises was being eroded One of the manifestations of this process was 
increased gender-based conflict among the members As a result, the 
production units separated within about eighteen months With a view 
towards expansion, the bnckmaking enterprise employed casual labour at 
low rates of pay Jaffee (1988) provides a detailed analysis of this process 
of degeneration of the enterprise She attributes this degeneration partly to 
the breakdown in the relationship between the union and the workers 
engaged in these enterprises (1988 37) 
The struggles and problems experienced by Thusanang are similar to 
those in most co-ops, both locally and internationally For Jaffee (1988 
39), despite these problems, the expenence of the Thusanang Cooperative 
suggests that in the context of extreme poverty, high unemployment, 
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limited social welfare, and oppressive formal work environments, co-ops 
can provide some benefits These include, firstly, enabling people to regain 
control over their lives through collective support, secondly, developing 
new skills, and thirdly, providing centres of debate about new forms of 
work organisation She further notes that union involvement in establishing 
co-ops for the unemployed can only be considered in the context of a union 
commitment to funding, skills training, political education and supportive 
services (1989 40) 
This brief overview gives some indication of the types of 
cooperative activity among marginalised communities in SA during the 
1980s The difficulties experienced by many of these enterprises and their 
high rate of failure has, however, meant a decline in co-op formation and 
initiation since 1990 
4.8 A Profile of Producer Cooperatives in the 1980s 
Philip (1988) attempts to provide a typology of producers' co-ops in SA 
(Philip 1988 161,162) Despite some omissions, the author provides a 
relatively comprehensive and useful list of the producers' co ops in SA, 
their productive activities, their age, membership size, and monthly 
income 
The South African co-ops of the 1970s and '80s are embryonic in 
character By 1988 most of them were in operation for about four to six 
years Furthermore, there is little variation in the products of these 
enterprises Among the predominant activities are sewing and craft work 
involving mainly women There is a tendency of rapid formation 
accompanied by equally rapid collapse among sewing co-ops This pattern 
reflects a tendency for co-ops to be formed without prior market research 
or economic feasibility studies (Philip, 1988 79) 
In addition, there is a variety of characteristic problems faced by 
sewing co-ops in SA Among the major ones are a very limited market and 
a reliance on domestic rather than industrial machines, adversely affecting 
viability and output, respectively The increasing number of sewing co-ops 
in the Western Cape is a reflection of processes of rationalisation and 
concentration in the clothing and textiles industry, resulting in mass 
retrenchments of female workers Members of sewing co-ops with 
experience in industrial clothing manufacture are generally at an advantage 
to those women who rely on their basic sewing skills They do, however, 
have to compete with both commercial prices and factory-shop prices, that 
is, shops which sell directly to the public at wholesale prices Furthermore, 
SA's clothing industry is highly competitive and exploitative leaving few 
sewing co-ops able to compete on the terms set by this industry (Philip, 
1988 80) 
Extremely tight competition in a limited market is thus a key factor 
contributing to the rapid collapse of sewing co-ops Nevertheless, sewing 
tends to constitute one of the prédominant activities among co-ops in SA 
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The next most common activity is cratt work While the majority of 
these enterprises are based in rural areas, their market is mainly urban-
based With fashions constantly changing, marketing strategies of craft co-
ops are often unreliable Furthermore, retailers often exploit producers by 
buying goods at very low prices and selling them at much higher pnces In 
response to such practices, Self-Help Associates for Development 
Economics (SHADE) initiated the National Craft Association in 1984 This 
association has twenty nine affiliates and provides collective marketing 
services specifically for craft co-ops (Philip, 1988 81) 
In addition to sewing and craftwork, other cooperative activities 
include bnckmaking, fence-making, furniture manufacture, weaving, motor 
and mechanical repairs, spray-painting and panel-beating, silk screening on 
T-shirts, toy making, pottery, candle-making, and futon production There 
are also a number of burial societies and credit groups Among the oldest 
and well known credit unions is the Cape Credit Union League based in the 
Western Cape 
The average monthly income in co ops as estimated by Philip (1988 
146), is R144 monthly, with R280 representing the highest monthly 
income She estimates the average membership of co-ops in SA to be 
eleven people (ibid ) This shows that co-ops provide jobs for only a 
fraction of the unemployed Most cooperatives in SA are dependent on 
external funding while very few have been able to provide their members 
with living wages Further, it is a common experience among co-operators 
in SA to receive irregular income For members this often means no 
income for periods of up to five months In the light of this evidence, a 
focus on the practical constraints facing such enterprises is in order 
4.9 Practical Constraints 
Here I draw on local case studies (of which there are only a few) and 
highlight the common problems and constraints faced by various co-ops 
The studies referred to include the works of Petre (1987), Bernstein (1987), 
Jaftee (1988), Mcintosh and Friedman (1988), Philip (1988, 1990), 
Cormack (1990), Lupton (1991), and Collins (1990) A further key 
reference is the publication by Jaffee (1988) 
Among the practical problems raised by these case studies are firstly, 
a severe shortage of financial resources, more specifically, starting capital, 
a lack of technical skills in general, and a specific lack of management 
skills Among managerial skills one can include entrepreneurial stalls, 
marketing, costing, accounting, ordering goods, conducting meetings, 
among others Further constraints are difficulties in penetrating the market, 
illiteracy and innumeracy, disciplinary problems, a lack of cooperative 
consciousness, inappropriate technology, a weak competitive position in 
relation to conventional capitalist commercial, financial, and industrial 
enterprises, low productivity levels, and in some cases, a lack of 
organisational experience 
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These constraints are obstacles to the development of economically 
viable and democratic cooperative enterprises Their origins are embedded 
in the history and structure of South African society People most likely to 
form and/or join co-ops in SA are mainly from the economically and 
politically marginalised population, mainly blacks In general, these people 
do not have access to substantial financial resources and have been denied 
opportunities for education and training Among the implications of these 
constraints are a dependence on donor funding and a high failure rate 
among co-ops This confirms the limited potential of co-ops to alleviate 
unemployment through job creation 
Philip (1988) examines this potential She notes that in the context of 
high levels of structural unemployment in SA and the immediate need for 
job creation, the NUWCC, the Congress of SA Trade Unions (COSATU), 
and the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) have expressed support 
for the establishment of producers cooperatives as possible means to create 
jobs, and simultaneously, as mechanisms for providing forms of work 
organisation alternative to capitalist enterprises (1988 2) 
The author concludes that the potential for co-ops to create jobs is 
contingent on their economic viability Her conclusion is based on 
evidence that none of the co-ops visited by her provided their members 
with a living wage, some provided irregular income for their members, and 
one was making a loss at the time She further concludes that this evidence, 
claimed as representative of the economic performance of co-ops in SA, 
indicates that such ventures have limited potential to provide alternative 
employment to wage-labour On this basis she notes that cooperatives in 
SA serve mainly as a means of survival and that the extent to which they 
can serve as survival mechanisms for the masses of unemployed in SA is 
debatable Her estimation of the average membership of co-ops as eleven 
people supports this conclusion (Philip, 1988 145, 146) 
This limited potential is confirmed by the real experiences of the 
Sawco co-ops 
But even when we had done all of this [set up several 
cooperative projects], Sawco involved only a small number of 
the strikers directly Even now, in 1988, there are about 80 
members of Sawco compared with the number of strikers, 
which is 1 000 We realised that it is impossible to create 
employment for all the strikers - we do not have the resources 
From this experience we have understood that co-ops cannot 
be a solution to the problem of unemployment There are 
millions of unemployed people in SA Co-ops cannot create 
jobs for all of them, just as we could not create jobs for all our 
striking members (Dladla Chairperson of Sawco cf Jaffee 
1988) 
In addition to these very specific practical constraints facing co-ops, 
the historical and socio-political context of their emergence stimulated a 
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focus on much broader issues One of these has been the debate about the 
role of co-ops in building socialism This debate occurred in the 1980s 
before the collapse of socialism in former Eastern Europe Philip (1988) 
and Etkind (1989) have dealt with this issue 
4.10 Cooperatives and Socialism 
Working class organisations in SA saw cooperatives as both a potential 
means for job-creation, and means for providing a democratic alternative to 
capitalist enterprises (Philip, 1988 2, Jaffee 1988, Speeches in Jatfee 
1988) 
Co ops are a transitional stage to socialism If you establish a 
co-op, in the long run it will topple capitalist industry (SA a 
member of the Soweto Local of the UWCC defining the role of 
co-ops m SA cf Philip 1988 68) 
Philip explores the potential for co-ops to fulfill these roles She 
rightly starts off on the assumption that "for co-ops to make any 
contribution at all, they have to be economically viable" (1988 2) A 
central theme of her work in this regard is that, in addition to being 
economically viable, co-ops with this particular political aim are more 
likely to make some contribution if they are directly linked to broader 
forms of democratic organisation in the society This theme is significant in 
the light of a general concern among the organised unemployed in SA that 
co-ops do not become ends m themselves, instead cooperators should 
continue to identify with a broader political programme ( 1988 4) 
With reference to the potential of co-ops to contribute toward the 
process of transition to socialism in SA, Philip (1988 68) rightly points out 
that "democratic control of production in co-ops does not in itself pose a 
challenge to the maintenance of capitalist relations of production at a 
societal level, co-ops operate within the framework of those relations" A 
perception of co-ops as 'vanguards of a socialist strategy' (in Philips terms) 
essentially ignores the fact that exploitation at work and unemployment is 
based on the maintenance of class relationships in broader society A 
transition to socialist relations of production thus requires processes of 
intense political struggle against class relations of domination in society as 
a whole, not merely at the point of production (1988 69) 
In support of her argument, the author quotes England ( 1987) 
Co-ops cannot solve the contradictions of the capitalist state -
nor can they adequately pick up the pieces They cannot 
LEAD the struggle towards a socialist order But, in certain 
circumstances, they may have the capacity to contribute 
towards that struggle in a meaningful way (England, 1987 
148 cited in Philip, 1988 69) 
74 
The question which logically arises is the following In what ways 
can co-ops contribute to the political struggle in SA7 In response, Philip 
(1988) suggests some such ways 
Firstly, the author suggests that cooperative production can be the 
learning ground for democratically organised production and planning The 
latter are processes central to democratic socialism (SA Metal Worker cited 
in Philip, 1988 69) The real potential for co-ops to play this role depends, 
however, on various factors including the size of the co-operative 
movement (1988 70) Secondly, she argues that, the growth of a 
cooperative sector can provide an ideological frame of reference for the 
support of socialism 
She further notes that co-ops may be the catalyst for the 
development of a socialist consciousness Here she refers to England 
(1987) who argues that this was the case in Zimbabwe, where both trade 
unions and political organisations were failing to lead the process of 
socialist transformation 
Thirdly, drawing on the work of Thomley (1981), she suggests that 
"part of the role of co-ops is to defend the working class from the excesses 
of capitalism" (Thornley, 1981 157 cited in Philip, 1988 71) Co-ops are 
thus a potential defensive component of a broader political strategy 
towards strengthening working class organisation (Philip, 1988 71) Hence 
the importance of links between co-ops and broader progressive social 
movements and processes of démocratisation in society 
In sum, then, co-ops cannot challenge capitalist social relations at a 
broader societal level They have limited potential as weapons against the 
maintenance of these relations, and cannot lead a transition to socialism 
On the other hand 
to ops can strengthen the potential of a broader socialist 
project by empowering workers, by building the skills 
needed for democratic control of production and planning, by 
prefiguring aspects of work organisation under socialism, and 
by defending the working class from some of the worst 
ravages of capitalism (Philip, 1988 72) 
Etkind (1989 54) supports Philip's (1988) conception of the role of 
co-ops in social transformation as limited He notes that the link between 
co-ops and socialism is only partial and that co-ops are not merely a 
microcosm of socialist society Furthermore, he correctly points out that 
co ops are isolated units of production and service which have 
a negligible impact on society or the economy as a whole 
(Etkind, 1989 54) 
The author further argues that co-ops, through their straggle to build 
the material conditions for real workers' control of the production process, 
provide important practical experiences from which political lessons about 
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the process and relations of production can be drawn. It is these lessons, he 
suggests, that are able to link co-ops to the broader class struggle in SA. He 
pertinently points out, however, that these lessons are not automatically 
learnt. Instead, drawing out political lessons from the practical experiences 
of co-ops requires "conscious political agency" (ibid.: 52). 
In the light of (a) increasing local experience of the limited potential 
of cooperatives as vehicles of social transformation; (b) local experience of 
the contradictions involved in engaging in successful cooperative activity 
in the context of competition with capitalist firms (Workteam 10, 1990: 
10); (c) developments in former Eastern Europe since 1989 and subsequent 
debates about the 'collapse' of socialism and (d) the new political climate in 
South Africa, working class organisations here may come to see socialism 
and the role of co-ops in transition differently. These debates are, however, 
beyond the subject of this dissertation. 
4.11 The Emergence of Service Organisations 
The increasing emergence of cooperatives over the last decade has been 
accompanied by the emergence of service organisations involved in both 
initiating new cooperative enterprises and providing support and services to 
already existing ones. The activities of such organisations encompass 
various services: acquiring funds for cooperatives; providing technical, 
educational, and managerial assistance; assisting in the marketing of 
products; and facilitating links with other cooperative enterprises and 
service organisations. 
A wide range of organisations support and initiate cooperatives: 
working class organisations for example, NUWCC and COSATU, and 
trade unions such as NUM and NUMSA, grass roots community 
organisations, organisations promoting black business development (for 
example, the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC)), 
multinationals (such as Shell and Mobil), foreign embassies, development 
agencies, and progressive service groups often comprised of intellectuals 
with close links to grass roots community structures. The goals and 
objectives of these organisations are about as varied as their origins. 
Jaffee (1988: 11-13) provides useful distinctions between the range 
of perspectives and combinations of perspectives among these 
organisations. These can be summarised as follows: 
a) The 'small is beautiful' perspective, held mainly by people in 
organisations linked to the state and the private sector, sees the cooperative 
as a form of organisation suitable for marginalised people as a form of 
income generation on a collective basis. People holding this view have not 
encouraged the linking of such collectives with broader social movements. 
Such organisations are mostly concerned with deregulation and the 
promotion of the informal sector as methods of solving particular economic 
problems. Examples of such organisations include the Urban Foundation 
and the Small Business Development Corporation. 
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b) The second perspective, an incorporationist one, is held mainly by black 
small entrepreneurs who see cooperatives as possibly playing an important 
role in admitting excluded and disadvantaged people to participation in the 
capitalist economy 
c) A third perspective, cooperatives as a means of uniting the working 
class, sees co-ops as creating links between the employed and the 
unemployed This is essentially a defensive strategy for dismissed workers 
and is advocated mainly by those organising the unemployed The 
offensive strategy within this perspective, held mainly by co-ops linked to 
trade unions, views such enterprises as potential learning grounds for 
workers and trade unions in workers' control and democracy These 
approaches see cooperatives as potential sites of and for working class 
control and power in the broader community, and recognise that such 
enterprises cannot bring about economic and social transformation on their 
own 
d) A fourth perspective, co-ops for national liberation, views such 
enterprises as a form of organisation with the ability to mobilise people 
into the struggle for national liberation in SA This position is also implicit 
in approaches (b) and (c) summarised above 
e) The final perspective, co-ops to build socialism, is somewhat value-
laden in its assumption that since co-ops are owned and controlled by the 
producers they represent, in microcosm, the form of socialist society A 
further position within this broad perspective holds that cooperatives, if 
linked to organisations with socialist goals, can contribute to the 
propagation of socialist ideology 
These perspectives on the long-term goals of cooperatives reflect the 
various priorities of cooperative initiatives in the late 1980s and early 
1990s It is important to note, however, that irrespective of the diversity of 
approaches all organisations promoting cooperative activity face the same 
structural difficulties presented by the South African social and economic 
order 
Following this contextual information, the next chapter presents the 
first of four case studies completed for the dissertation 
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CHAPTER 5 
AN EXPERIMENT IN 'TOP-DOWN' COOPERATIVE 
DEVELOPMENT: 
THE LANGA SPINNING PROJECT 
5.1 Introduction 
Leading figures in the Catholic Welfare Bureau (CWB), Mr and Mrs 
Templeton, initiated the Spinning Project (SP) in 1982 The project 
involved hand-spinning raw wool and was based in Langa, one of the older 
African townships in the Western Cape. It was started as an experiment in 
job creation for unemployed African women At the time of research it was 
an income generating project in the process of being transformed into a 
cooperative This chapter deals mainly with the SP's relationships with the 
CWB, its initiator, and the Sheep Shop, its supplier, customer, and 
essentially its employer at the time. 
This experiment was inspired by the success of the world famous 
Mondragon Group of primarily industrial cooperatives based in the town of 
Mondragon in the Basque provinces of Spain Several studies have been 
done on these cooperatives Among the more recent ones are Thomas and 
Logan (1982), Whyte and Whyte (1988), and Greenwood and Santos et al 
(1992) Considering that Mr and Mrs Templeton intended to base the 
Langa Spinning Project on the Mondragon experience, it is in order to 
provide a brief outline of some key aspects of these co-ops 
The Mondragon Group started off with one co-op, Ulgor, founded in 
1956 in the context of poverty after the Spanish Civil War (Bradley and 
Gelb, 1983. 12) Ulgor started off producing paraffin heaters and stoves 
and today it is among Spain's leading manufacturers of consumer durables 
such as stoves, refrigerators and washing machines (Campbell, 1978 32) 
This venture was initiated by the Catholic pnest, Anzmendi, and a 
few of his engineering students with the financial support of the local 
community It initially faced similar problems to those of co-ops today 
insufficient capital, lack of managerial skills and limited technology, 
among others In response to these problems, the founders started a savings 
bank through which local savings were channelled to provide investment 
capital for the co-op Attached to the bank today, is a group of specialists 
with entrepreneurial skills Over time, more industrial cooperatives were 
formed. Today the enterprises are supported by a range of second degree 
co-ops including among others the bank, a research and development team, 
a retail co-op and a set of schools for training This group of co-ops has a 
history of strong links with the local communities and a commitment to 
provide jobs (Bradley and Gelb, 1983 12-14) 
The organisational structure of the Mondragon Group includes a 
board of directors elected by cooperators and a management team 
appointed by the former Workers contribute shares on their entry into a co-
op These may not be sold and can only be withdrawn on leaving the 
enterprise Profits are allocated in such a way that funds are set aside for 
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reserve/investment funds and community projects making expansion 
possible and sustaining community links (Campbell, 178 27, 29) 
Although the Mondragon cooperatives are undoubtedly an important 
example of successful cooperation, it is important to acknowledge that this 
experience cannot simply be duplicated in another context Developments 
in the Langa Spinning Project bear testimony to this 
5.2 Why Spinning? 
The key incentive to start this project was the ready-made market provided 
by Elsabetha Rosenworth, owner of a high fashion coutouner house in 
Cape Town (Interview 2 3) This together with (a) requests for jobs from 
African women at the Langa Catholic Centre communicated to the CWB 
by the nun at the Centre, Sister Alfreda, (b) the CWB's interest in 
'experimenting' with employment creation and (c) Mr Templeton's 
fascination with the Mondragon co-ops and his interest in testing whether 
the Mondragon model could be transferred to South Africa resulted in the 
establishment of Cape Spinning and Knitting (CSK) of which the Langa 
Spinning Project was a part 
The Spinning Project formed part of a broader production, 
distribution and service structure under the auspices of the CWB as Cape 
Spinning and Knitting (CSK) This operation involved six key productive 
activities, one of which was spinning These included 
(a) Management provided and financed by the CWB Ms Walker, a former 
marketing manager of a private company, was employed by the CWB in 
September, 1988 to manage CSK as a whole This meant that she was 
responsible for managing both the Sheep Shop and the Spinning Project 
(SP) In relation to her role as manager of the SP she was responsible for 
buying and supplying carded, raw wool to the spinners, collecting the spun 
yam, calculating and packaging each spinner's wages from the production 
list compiled by them, for the viability of the enterprise, and for its 
transformation into a co-op 
(b) Carding of raw wool which was contracted out to private firms and/or 
individuals and sometimes done by hand by the spinners 
(c) Spinning done by the African women in Langa 
(d) Dyeing and designing done by employees of CWB 
(e) Knitting ol garments done by individuals at home, these were mainly 
Coloured women 
(0 And marketing and selling based at the Sheep Shop, an outlet run by 
CSK in Green Point, Cape Town, the Sheep Shop supplied raw wool and 
bought the spun yam from the SP (CWB 1990) 
5.3 The Initial Idea: Viable Business to Mondragon-Type Co-op 
The project was started with the idea that a viable business had to be 
established before it could be transformed into a cooperative along 
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Mondragon lines The founders decided that after three years of viable 
financial operation the enterprise would be transformed into a co-op This 
decision was influenced by their reading of the South African Co-operative 
Act in which this yardstick was used to justify the registration of a co-op 
According to Mr Templeton, when the project was initiated, several 
meetings were held during which the founders explained to those working 
in CSK. that everyone who joined the project would one day own it Those 
present were mainly knitters and people working in the Sheep Shop, the 
reason being that 'they were easier to get at" (Interview 2 3) The first 
group of spinners were either epileptic, mentally and/or physically 
handicapped and thus not so easily accessible when discussing the future 
cooperative structure of the project 
It is not clear how and when the composition of the spinning group 
changed from handicapped to non handicapped women Nevertheless, the 
women who constituted the spinning group at the time of research were not 
part of initial discussions about the future of the enterprise Mr Templeton 
merely suspected that the various managers of the project in the past (from 
1982 to 1988) might have spoken to these spinners about the future plans 
for the enterprise (Interview 2 3) 
The original well-intended goals of the CWB to establish an 
economically viable enterprise to be transformed into a Mondragon-type 
co-op, were not achieved Furthermore, after seven years of several failed 
attempts to make the project viable, the CWB was still willing to pursue 
the same experiment 
Among the obstacles to reaching this goal were firstly, the 
impossibility of establishing a Mondragon-type co op among the 
unemployed in South Africa because of the vastly different historical and 
socio-political contexts, the absence of community support in the form of 
financial assistance, as was the case in Mondragon, a severe lack of skills 
in the SP as opposed to the engineering skills of the first cooperatore in 
Mondragon, and the differences in the method of initiation The 
Mondragon co-ops were not initiated by a welfare organisation but by the 
cooperatore themselves with the assistance of the local community to 
whom the co-ops were eventually accountable 
A further obstacle was the fact that the range of productive activities 
which CSK embodied were geographically separated The spinning was 
done in Langa, dyeing, designing and selling were done in Cape Town, and 
knitting was done at individual's homes variously located on the Cape 
Peninsula This made it difficult to coordinate the various productive 
activities In addition, structural differences among the producers in terms 
of their positions in the racial structure of South African society may have 
provided a barrier to cooperation More specifically, the spinners were 
African women, the knitters were predominantly Coloured women with 
white women included, the dyer, designer, and salespeople were Coloured 
women, and the manager of the project was white 
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Considering the particular historical and ьосю-political context, it is 
difficult to believe that one could create a Mondragon-type cooperative in 
South Africa 
5.4 The Spinning Project in 1989 
At the time of research, the Spinning Project (SP) was a small-scale 
informal / unregulated enterprise producing hand-spun wool with wooden 
spinning-wheels supplied by the CWB It employed fifteen African 
women The spinners were unskilled and were being trained by Sister 
Alfreda, herself not a skilled spinner A notable feature of this project was 
its history of constantly changing managers, mostly inexperienced, 
recruited and employed by the CWB The SP was hosted in a building at 
the St Francis Xavier Catholic Centre m Langa Its overhead costs were 
covered by CWB tunds, part of which included Sheep Shop profits Sister 
Alfreda, assumed the position of supervisor on the basis that the women 
initially approached her for work and Ms Walker managed the project 
5.4.1 Piecework and its Implications: 'The more you spin, the more 
you earn' 
Spinners were paid per kilogram of yam This was evidence of piecework 
Wages fluctuated with the amount of yam produced In this context, the 
women tended to spin at an accelerated pace in order to produce as many 
kilograms of yam as possible so that they could earn more 
I used to fight with them to go slow, [to] do it properly, but at 
the same time [the spinners] were saying [they] must get a 
living out of it (Interview 2 2) 
Since the women were inexperienced, spinning at a rapid pace often 
meant producing badly spun yam The quality of yam also had 
implications for wages At the time of research, wages per kilogram were 
R 12,50 for well spun and Rl 1,50 for badly spun yam Depending on the 
amount and quality of yam, spinners' wages ranged from a meagre R80 to 
R200 monthly 
In addition to this lack of experience and skill, various other factors 
influenced the speed of work, the quality of yam and, importantly, wages 
Firstly, when carding could not be contracted out, spinners hand-carded the 
raw wool without additional payment This left significantly less time for 
spinning Secondly, the raw wool was often unwashed making it difficult 
to card and spin Thirdly, prewashed wool was often matted making 
spinning less easy All these bottlenecks resulted in (a) less time for 
spinning, the womens' actual source of income, and (b) the production of 
unmarketable yam for which spinners were paid This affected the viability 
of the project 
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we were losing on the other side [when trying to sell the 
yarn] The money went down the drain with the dirty wool 
and they [the spinners] got paid (Interview 2 2) 
Among the consequences of this situation was an accumulated 
amount (about 1 000 kilograms) of unmarketable yam in the form of 
stock Selling this yam was the key problem faced by Ms Walker with her 
appointment as manager in 1988/1989 
5.5 Strategies Adopted to deal with Unmarketable Yarn 
5.5.1 Improving Quality 
Among initial attempts to ameliorate this situation was the introduction of 
a quality wheel With this came the selection of a quality controller from 
among the spinners, payment of a quality bonus as an incentive to produce 
good yam, and training the women to spin well A further strategy was to 
market the bad quality yam at cost price Improving the quality of yam 
could not, however, be done overnight This would be a long-term process 
of training and constantly monitoring spinning methods Furthermore, the 
manager projected that accumulated stock would be sold by the beginning 
of winter 1989 This projection, unfortunately, proved wrong Hence, by 
Apnl 1989 drastic measures were taken to stop the production of more 
yam 
5.5.2 Temporary Retrenchments 
In May 1989, Ms Walker met with the spinners to inform them that the 
Sheep Shop, the Spinning Project s supplier, customer and effectively their 
employer, had no money to buy more raw wool, the yam was not selling 
well and thus, there was no work for them Each of the spinners was paid 
R200 and they had to find other work 
When asked whether the project was closed down since the spinners 
had effectively been retrenched, Ms Walker replied as follows 
It's making a surplus at the moment as long as we're not 
ordering [raw] wool our sales have never been better but 
we're still working on this massive backlog [of bad quality 
yam], so as soon as we can liquidate that [yarn], we'll be in a 
good [position, economically] (Interview 2 1) 
In her capacity as manager of Cape Spinning and Knitting (CSK) as 
a whole, Ms Walker here referred to the Sheep Shop, the marketing and 
sales outlet of CSK, as making a surplus In other words, even though the 
Spinning Project was no longer in operation, the Sheep Shop, it s supplier 
and customer, was still making a surplus 
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Furthermore, for the manager, this period of no production was seen 
as 
an ideal opportunity to initiate training m what a cooperative 
11 so that when [production] start [ed] again, they [the 
spinners] would be more prepared and see [the project] in a 
different light (interview 2 1) 
According to Ms Walker, "the project [was] going to be put on a 
new footing [during this period] which .would be a more realistic and 
democratic true cooperative" (Interview 2 1) The key tasks confronting 
her were selling the accumulated yarn and transforming the project into a 
cooperative 
Hence, for the month of May, 1989 the spinners were without work 
By June of that year, however, the manager started ordering raw wool once 
again and they commenced work All the spinners were 'reinstated', except 
one for whom Ms Walker found another job. According to the manager, 
sufficient raw wool had been ordered and the spinners were promised work 
until the end of 1990 
Towards the end of 1989, the spinners' remuneration per kilogram 
was raised from R12, 50 to R15 for well spun yam, and from Rl 1, 50 to 
R12, 50 for badly spun yam This increase was introduced by the manager 
"because their income was not sufficient" (Interview 2 1 ) 
The issues discussed thus far, more especially the lay-offs during 
May, illustrate the power relationships within CSK which directly affected 
the Spinning Project These had significant implications for the 
transformation of the SP into a co-op I proceed with an examination of 
these relationships 
5.6 Power Relationships 
Since its initiation, the spinners had no role in managing the project 
According to Ms Walker, one of the reasons for this was that 
[the SP] ha[d] never moved from the welfare start that it 
had the whole effort to market the products [knitted 
garments] and get the shop [Sheep Shop] running took 
precedence over the cooperative principles (Interview 2 1) 
As shown by the quotations below, this welfanst situation of 
sheltered employment was still firmly in place in 1989 
1 ) We never make any decisions about our work, we only do 
what we are told (Interview 2 4) 
2 ) We would always wait to get instructions from sister or 
from whoever paid us (Interview 2 5) 
3 ) Sister tells us what to do (Interview 2.6) 
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The strategies (discussed immediately above) adopted by 
management were implemented without consulting the spinners. This 
clearly indicates that the manager, rather than the spinners, was in control 
of decision-making The spinners had no say in the operation of the 
Spinning Project. 
The manager introduced the quality wheel: "it was just brought in" 
(Interview 2.2) without consultation. This was confirmed by the spinners. 
I.) Our employers said the quality wheel must be brought in 
(Interview 2.4). 
2.) We did not decide about the quality wheel ourselves. It is 
our employer who came up with the idea (Interview 2.6). 
Ms Walker was clearly aware of this situation: 
I'm so aware of the fact that they turn around all the time and 
ask what to do next, or they'll say 'you tell us what to do' 
(Interview 2 1). 
Their retrenchment was indicative of the power relationships at play 
in the project. Moreover, their responses to retrenchment pointed to their 
powerless position: 
J.) We were very depressed about the news that there was no 
work because we know it's difficult to find jobs. We didn't 
know how long the money we were given would last ..I do not 
know who decided to pay the R200. We were just greatful to 
get that amount because we probably would not have got 
anything anyway. We were actually thankful (Interview 2.4). 
2.) We did hear that the wool was not selling in town, w it 
wasn't a problem really at that time, but we were not aware 
that it would go asfar as us not having a job at all...it was the 
first time that we heard we would not have jobs. We were not 
expecting this. We thought that we would continue spinning. 
I don't know how the group could have prevented this 
[retrenchment] from happening. The problem is that we are 
just spinning here. We don't know what happens to the wool, 
we don't know what is happening about the sales; we are only 
told what is happening and we don't know what is happening; 
we only spin (Interview 2.5). 
3. ) We were disappointed but there was nothing we could do. 
Sister [Alfreda] used to tell us that the wool was not selling in 
town but we were not expecting that we would not have any 
work... I was only greatful for the R200 because I didn't expect 
it. I don't know how it was calculated (Interview 2.6). 
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For the spinners, the termination of production meant no work and 
no income Ms Walker, however, saw this period as an opportunity to 
initiate training the spinners in cooperative practice These diverse 
perceptions were indicative of the different positions occupied by spinners 
and management, respectively, in the structure of Cape Spinning and 
Knitting 
Furthermore, on the one hand the spinners were told that the wool 
was not selling, while on the other hand, the manager noted that sales had 
never been better In this regard, the spinners were given contradictory 
information 
Finally, Ms Walkers power to reinstate the spinners a month later 
and to promise them work for a year pointed to their dependence on her for 
earning their living She held the power of decision-making not only about 
the spinners material well-being but that of all Cape Spinning and Knitting 
(CSK) employees All the evidence indicates that Ms Walker occupied the 
most powerful position in CSK as a whole As manager of the Sheep Shop, 
she represented the interests of the Spinning Project's sole customer and 
supplier Simultaneously, as manager of the Spinning Project, she was 
supposed to represent the interests of the producers, the spinners As shown 
later in this chapter, the contradictions of this position came to a head with 
the transformation of the Spinning Project into a co-op, engineered by the 
same manager 
5.7 Cooperative Consciousness 
These power relationships were further reflected in the various perceptions 
of a cooperative The following quotations represent the diverse 
conceptions among some of the women involved in the Spinning Project 
The Spinners: 
/ ) People work together in order to move forward [the SP] 
is a co-op because we are all doing the same thing and we are 
all aiming to get money (Interview 2 4) 
2)1 don't know what a co op is (Interview 2 5) 
3 ) The whole idea behind my coming here was to do my work, 
4o I just wanted to get my job done and get my money 
(Interview 2 6) 
The Supervisor: 
/ don't have much idea about the co-op I've never worked for 
it or in it The little I know is that we pull together in common, 
we share in common, it's not mine, it's not yours, it's ours, we 
work for the same common good, each one must put effort in, 
common effort, what comes out of it should be commonly 
shared (Interview 2 2) 
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The Manager: 
/ am perhaps not totally committed to cooperatives because I 
don t know enough about them I ve got to learn about it and 
I've got to be shown that it can work I want people to make 
their own decisions I want them to grow ач people - both in 
education and in decision making I want them [the spinners] 
to benefit from their labours I dont want some anonymous 
shareholder or some board of directors or some management 
to benefit [The aim is to build] a successful project which will 
benefit the workers I want them to enjoy work (Interview 
2 1) 
The Catholic Welfare Bureau: 
The basic principles of the Rochdale pioneers and the 
methodology of the Mondragon system [are key to Mr 
Templeton's conception of a co op] [In addition] the 
cooperative model is a hard option where we're calling out 
hopefully the best in people We're calling them to be 
participators to be unified in their actions to be 
responsible m the way they conduct their financial 
affairs that they are conscious of their community 
responsibilities That we re all called together and that we 
must help each other and through this process we 
can become prosperous But I don't want to become 
prosperous at your expense, I want it to be a win, win 
situation 
I just feel that the cooperative harkens back to a much 
more gentle period, that hopefully we would want to have 
enough to live on but that we didn't need to take every 
conceivable cent that we could get That money was not the 
beginning and end of it all That there are other 
values community values cultural values So I see the 
cooperative as being a very valuable and a very important 
tool in drawing some of those old long nurtured human values 
back again (Interview 2 3) 
Some of the spinners had no conception of what a co-op is while for 
others the main aim was to get money The supervisor emphasised 
'exerting common effort for the common good' Both the supervisor and the 
manager had little experience of such forms of organisation The 
predominant aspects in the manager's conception included decision-making 
by and benefits for the producers, and a sense of enjoyment at work 
Finally, Mr Templeton expressed a romantic and idealistic view of a co op 
with material benefits being of secondary importance and community and 
cultural values being the core purpose of cooperation 
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5.8 Implications of these Conceptions for Co-op Development 
The diverse perceptions of a cooperative were related to the different roles 
and positions of those quoted above both in Cape Spinning and Knitting as 
a whole, and in broader society As unemployed women, the spinners 
emphasised material factors irrespective of the organisation of work 
environment They initially went to Sister Alfreda for a job, not to join a 
co-op 
This particular perception had implications for the transformation of 
the Spinning Project into a co-op The spinners were merely concerned 
about their material reward It made no difference whether they were paid 
from Catholic Welfare Bureau welfare funds or from profits of the project 
With regard to co-op development, this implied little concern among the 
spinners for the long-term viability of the project and its development into 
a self-sustaining economic unit able to provide them with relatively secure 
income Moreover, they were not concerned about the power relationships 
they entered into in their quest for income It made no difference whether 
they worked for an employer or for themselves as a collective 
The spinners' perceptions of the manager and supervisor were 
indicative of the nature these relationships 
Paddy [Ms Walker] and Sister [Alfreda] are the employers, 
but they tell us that they are not the employers, [instead,] the 
project is our own I don't understand what it means when 
they say they don't employ us, we do as we are told, we get 
instructions from Paddy and Sister 
At the meetings they [the employers] tell us about what has 
been happening [with the sales] and the income we would get 
and asfar as we are concerned we don't understand what they 
are talking about They write on the board how much money 
is made, how much money goes out and so on, so that's the 
way of making things easy, but still it's actually not necessary 
at all because we are not going to do anything about it 
(Interview 2 4) 
The fact that the spinners were 'not going to do anything about' or 
with the information given to them by the manager and supervisor 
confirmed that their main concern was material reward in whatever form it 
came In this regard the manager showed some insight 
/ don't think that they can appreciate [that I would like them 
to enjoy work] because I don't think that they earn sufficient at 
the moment to even want to have fun I think that their primary 
objective at the moment is subsistence And it's just to earn 
more money so that they could be a little more comfortable 
They could not actually care a stuff about having fun at the 
moment And I don't think that they could care about their 
fellow workers or their community I don't think that they 
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could, really I think everything is internally [individually] 
motivated which I can totally understand I mean, if I were 
earning R150/R180 a month, I d also say stuff having fun, give 
me more money (Interview 2 I) 
The manager s perception was clearly influenced by her position of 
power, her responsibility for the Spinning Project's economic viability and 
for transforming it into a co-op, and by her previous experience as manager 
of a private firm Her emphasis on benefits for the workers was influenced 
by her previous experience of working in a capitalist firm where 
shareholders derived benefits Her responsibility for the viability of the 
Spinning Project, on the other hand, demanded 'a business approach 
(Interview 2 1) This raised a key question with regard to the development 
of the Spinning Project into a co-op how would one ensure viability while 
simultaneously ensuring material benefits for producers7 According to Ms 
Walker, 
if we are serious about a cooperative, it has to be a viable 
operation which can compete in the market place, but it's also 
got to be good for the workers How you can bring those two 
things together I don I know, because you can be very viable 
in the marketplace by not paying them much (Interview 2 I) 
The implications of the manager's conception of a co-op raised the 
key problem of finding a healthy balance between material need, 
democracy and economic viability 
Mr Templeton's emphasis on values rather than material benefit was 
based on an idealistic view of the world in which peoples actions were not 
at all materially motivated This conception had serious implications for 
the reproduction of the project and for its economic viability A co-op 
which failed to provide for the material needs of its members would either 
suffer loss of membership or be left with members who had no other option 
for survival People cannot eat values, they need an income in order to 
provide for their subsistence 
5.9 Continuity and Change in the Spinning Project: The Initial 
Process of Transformation into a Co-op 
The initial process of transforming the Spinning Project into a co-op (from 
October 1989 and into the early months of 1990) began with an 
introductory meeting about cooperative production and principles The 
manager, Ms Walker, recruited the assistance of a free lance co-op advisor 
(Minutes 22 2 90) Issues raised at this meeting marked the beginning of 
contests around the redefinition of the power relationships discussed earlier 
(Minutes 22 2 90) 
88 
5.9.1 Changes in Division of Responsibility 
Among the key issues for discussion at the first meeting was the new 
division of responsibilities between the spinners and other production 
centres of Cape Spinning and Knitting One of these included the transfer 
of some of the manager's tasks to the spinners, namely, ordering raw wool 
and contracting out carding In addition, Ms Walker in her capacity as 
manager of the Sheep Shop, the spinners' sole customer, no longer 
prepared individual spinners' pay packages Instead, a bulk sum was paid 
for spun yam purchased and the spinners had to distribute these funds 
among them according to their individual production (Minutes 22 2 90) 
This new system of payment prompted them to air grievances about 
quality control They expressed little confidence m the quality wheel and 
the scale used to weigh skeins Their key concern was that uncertainties 
about quality translated directly into uncertainties about wages (Minutes 
22 2 90) It also raised questions about equal payment the spinners 
expressed confusion about how to divide their collective income since 
individual spinners produced different amounts and quality of spun yarn 
They agreed that a system of equal payment could not yet be introduced, 
payment per kilogram thus continued until such time that they were ready 
to make a more informed decision in this regard 
5.9.2 The Sheep Shop: Customer or Employer? 
The manager emphasised the new status of the Sheep Shop as customer 
rather than employer with decision-making power about spinners' wages 
Towards the end of April 1990, however, there were piece rate negotiations 
between the spinners and the Sheep Shop For three years since 1986 the 
spinners were paid RIO per kilogram of spun yarn In 1989 they were 
initially paid Rl 1,50 per kilogram for badly spun yam and R 12,50 for good 
quality yam Around April of that year, the rate per kilogram for good 
quality yam was increased to R15 per kg, while the badly spun yam cost 
R12.50 per kg By 1990, the spinners wanted R20 per kg considering that 
the raw wool they were spinning was dirty and had to be cleaned before 
being spun The Sheep Shop offered R16 per kg and the final decision was 
to pay the spinners R17 per kg of yam These negotiations around piece 
rates question the Sheep Shop's status as merely a customer 
5.9.3 Contests over Production Time Lost 
The spinners requested payment for production time lost in November 
1989 and January 1990 on the basis that they were 'not to blame" 
(Minutes 26 2 90) for either the unavailability of raw wool supplies at the 
time or the delay of discussions about the new cooperative approach to be 
introduced In addition, they complained that the raw wool was ordered late 
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resulting in a further loss of production and earnings The manager's 
response to this was as follows 
it was not possible for the shop to pay for wool that they [the 
spinners] had not produced, [the spinners} had agreed to 
have a meeting to sort out problems before beginning work 
again However, и was true that the meeting had been delayed 
by one week because it was difficult to contact [the spinners] 
(Minutes 26 2 90) 
5.9.4 Contests over Ownership 
Furthermore, by May/June 1990, the manager pointed out to the spinners 
that they did not own the wool Instead, the Sheep Shop owned the raw 
wool which the spinners had to buy Thus, the Sheep Shop was both sole 
customer and sole supplier of raw wool to the Spinning Project 
The question of ownership arose because the spinners were about to 
make yam for another customer, Camphill Village, recruited by Ms 
Walker Since the Spinning Project had no working capital, she suggested 
that the spinners apply to the Sheep Shop for a loan of R850 to buy the raw 
wool required for the order of 50kgs of spun yam from Camphill Village 
The loan was confirmed and the raw wool required was purchased Once 
spun, however, the spinners refused to release the yam unless they were 
paid cash immediately The Sheep Shop offered to pay for their labour the 
next day This was rejected Members from another co-op, Masizame, were 
called in to explain the normal procedures regarding invoicing and cheque 
payments The spinners still refused to change their decision not to release 
the yam. In the light of the delay caused by this action, the spinners agreed 
to cancel the order from Camphill Village (Minutes 15 05 1990) 
Ms Walker attributed this action to "mistrust and misunderstanding" 
on the part of the spinners (Undated Report by Ms Walker) For her, the 
incident was a turning point in her relationship with the spinners She 
withdrew her assistance until such time that the spinners requested it From 
her point of view, 
[t]his painful experience proved valuable in so far as they ¡the 
spinners] had their first real choice to make back to the old 
way of operating [namely, sheltered employment offered by 
the CWBJor a decision to take a very unclear rocky road [to 
forming a cooperative enterprise independent of the CWB and 
able to compete in the market] (Interview 2 1) 
This suggestion that the spinners had a choice between sheltered 
employment and deciding to take an 'unclear rocky road' towards forming a 
co-op contradicted her later acknowledgement that changes were not 
initiated by the spinners More importantly, from the perspective of the 
spinners, any choice which threatened to reduce or eliminate their income 
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would be irrational in the light of the continued possibility of sheltered 
employment 
Considering that (a) the spinners were drawn from the economically 
marginalised population, (b) they did not have savings to use as start-up 
capital, (c) they did not have either the skill or the experience of operating 
an economic enterprise, as shown in the incident with Camphill Village, 
and (d) that they were financially dependent on the Catholic Welfare 
Bureau since the initiation of the project, one could not expect them to 
'prefer' anything else but sheltered employment in their attempts to survive 
Their choices at the time could not be removed from their historical and 
material context 
Significantly, like the majonty of contests during the process of 
transformation, the spinners' demand for immediate payment was 
indicative of their emphasis on material reward 
In sum, previously, the spinners were passive producers they 
received carded raw wool from the manager who later collected the spun 
yarn and had each spinner's payment ready for her With the transformation 
of Spinning Project into a co-op, the spinners participated in ordering the 
raw wool required, arranging the delivery of spun yam to the Sheep Shop, 
in negotiations with other customers recruited by the manager, and in 
deciding their own remuneration Other changes included negotiations with 
the Sheep Shop for a loan Furthermore, they opened a bank account, 
elected office bearers and decided on a name for the co-op Masixole 
Ms Walker officially/formally resigned as manager of the Spinning 
Project She assumed the position of co-op advisor in the development of 
the project into a cooperative and directed her attention to the provision of 
services to other co-ops as well Her position as manager of Cape Spinning 
and Knitting and the Sheep Shop, however, remained in place The 
supervisor left the project This meant that the spinners were in charge of 
operations on the shopfloor Towards the end of the research, the 
possibility of spinners contributing shares to Masixole was under 
discussion The outcome of this process, however, is not included in this 
work 
Despite these changes, there remained much continuity especially in 
the nature of the relationship between the Sheep Shop and the Spinning 
Project The Sheep Shop remained the sole customer and supplier of the 
project, it continued to buy raw wool and so continued to take financial 
responsibility for supplies to the project, it continued to cover operating 
costs of the project, and advisors to the project, mainly Ms Walker, 
continued to dominate its management 
5.10 Old Relationships in New Form: Shifts in the Sites of Conflict 
while the Balance of Power remains 
The changes implemented in the relationship between the Spinning Project 
(SP) and Sheep Shop (SS) were minor Essentially, the structural 
91 
relationship between the SP and the SS remained the same the spinners 
continued to do piecework for the SS 
Though these changes were minor, they shifted the sites of conflict 
over quality and over wages Disputes over quality were previously 
between the supervisor and the spinners, thus initially located on the 
shopfloor After the changes were implemented, these disputes were 
located between the spinners and the Sheep Shop, a more powerful player 
in the web of relationships within which the spinners were caught 
Similarly, when the manager decided on individual spinners' wages 
based on production lists compiled by them and on the results of quality 
control, conflicts over wages were located between the spinners and the 
manager who for them represented an 'employer from the Sheep Shop 
With the spinners' new responsibility of deciding on the distribution of 
their collective income, the site of conflict over wages shifted to a new 
location among the spinners themselves 
It is important to note that disputes over quality and wages were 
intricately linked The matenal reward for good quality yam was higher 
and thus had a direct effect on wages Although interlinked, these disputes 
occurred at different locations 
Shifts in the sites of these conflicts had significant implications for 
the development of the Spinning Project into co-op, and for the power of 
the spinners in relation to their sole customer The site of conflict over 
quality shifted from the shopfloor to more direct conflicts between the 
spinners and the Sheep Shop On the one hand, this was significant because 
it brought the spinners in direct contact with their customer, a vital 
experience for them in learning how to deal with customers directly On the 
other hand, considering that the Sheep Shop was their sole customer as 
well as their sole supplier, the spinners' power to negotiate 'reasonable' 
prices for their yam was limited The Sheep Shop remained powerful in 
determining the price of spun yam thus ultimately determining piece rates 
and spinners' wages 
Furthermore, decisions about individual spinners wages no longer 
lay with the manager but with the spinners as a collective In this context, 
divisions among the spinners were highly likely when considering 
differential payment due to quality and speed differentials among spinners 
This potential for internal divisions weakened their power to directly 
negotiate better wages with the Sheep Shop 
Significantly, the shifts in sites of conflict as a result of transforming 
the Spinning Project into a co-op weakened rather than strengthened the 
spinners' power in relation to the Sheep Shop This was not surprising 
considering that the transformation was implemented by the manager of the 
Sheep Shop under the direction of the Catholic Welfare Bureau 
Any changes have not come from them I have initiated the 
change They are still not aware of the power that they 
have (Interview 2 1) 
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The transformation was clearly in the interests of the Sheep Shop 
rather than the spinners This situation is indicative of the consequences for 
producers of changes implemented 'from above' or on the initiative of a 
service organisation 
5.11 Conclusion 
In the light of Abell's (1981) five principles of democratic organisation the 
Spinning Project was not democratically organised and showed little 
potential tor progress towards increasing démocratisation The complete 
absence of the spinners' participation in decision-making makes Abell's 
first and fifth principles irrelevant in this particular case The absence of 
the principle of representation, and the location of special competence 
outside of the project as an organisation point to a low degree of 
democratic organisation 
Furthermore, none of Bernstein's (1976) minimally necessary 
conditions for effective participatory democracy were present in the 
Spinning Project This enterprise was unlikely to develop into a sustained 
participatory democratic organisation 
In terms of Brecker's (1988) stages of co-op development the 
Spinning Project was a pre-cooperative in the sense that it was a job-
creation project in the process of being transformed into a co-op It fitted 
his criteria for this stage of development 
(a) the spinners were primarily individual producers, this marked an early 
stage of cohesion, 
(b) they required basic training in skills, and cooperative ideology and 
practice and 
(c) the Spinning Project needed soft loans to help it find its feet 
In addition, people in different positions in the project, and with 
different roles in its formation had different priorities in terms of its 
development Some of these priorities were incongruent with others thus 
hindering the process of co-op development This was reflected in the 
spinners' concern for material survival on the one hand, and Mr 
Templeton's concern for the moral importance of co-ops, for example 
More importantly in material terms for the spinners, such incongruence 
was clearly reflected in the contradictory and powerful position of the 
manager who, in the end, acted in the interests of the Sheep Shop 
This case study gives one some insight into the specific issues faced 
by such projects It relied on management skills recruited by the service 
organisation from outside the co-op, and directly linked to its sole supplier 
and customer This meant no participation in management by the spinners 
and complete control by the manager over all aspects of the enterprise 
including its transformation into a co-op This relationship in the context of 
the employer/employee relationship between the Sheep Shop and the 
spinners indicates that the latter were essentially wage-labourers engaged 
in piecework The top-down approach to co-op development in this case 
highlights the negative implications of such approaches for the power of 
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producers. Moreover, the dependency relationship between the Catholic 
Welfare Bureau and the Spinning Project was not conducive to building 
self-reliance. 
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CHAPTER 6 
TRAPPED IN POVERTY: LAUNISMA BRICKMAKTNG 
COOPERATIVE 
6.1 Introduction 
The mushrooming of shanty towns, often referred to as squatter camps, in 
the 1970s and 1980s has been among the consequences of the South 
African governments severe legal restrictions on Africans, living and 
working in white urban areas These restrictions must be seen as part of the 
state's policy of creating African homelands In the context of these Influx 
Control laws, Afncans moving to cities in search of livelihoods chose to 
live 'illegally' in squatter settlements on city fringes Crossroads, situated 
on the edges of Cape Town, is among the internationally most well known 
shanty towns in South Africa The leadership and members of the 
cooperative reviewed in this chapter are drawn mainly from the Crossroads 
community This introductory profile of Crossroads is based on the work of 
one of the key authors on developments in this community. Cole (1987) It 
provides the socio-political context for the emergence of cooperatives like 
the Laumsma Bnckmaking enterprise 
6.2 Brief Profile of Crossroads 
A key feature in the history of the Crossroads community has been 
constant threats of forced removal in the context of the South African 
state's controls over the movement of Africans to white urban areas The 
early residents of Crossroads, forcibly removed from Brown's Farm 
squatter camp to Crossroads in the mid-1970s, consisted mainly of male 
migrant workers, petty traders, unemployed people and women with no 
legal right to be in the city of Cape Town (Cole, 1987 12) By the late 
1970s these people resisted renewed threats of removal from Crossroads 
which they considered to be their permanent home The study of this 
community by Cole (1987) illustrates the leading role played by women m 
the early struggles against removal 
It is these struggles which led to the legal victory against forced 
removal won by this community Crossroads was declared an Emergency 
Camp in 1976 This meant that rudimentary services such as water taps, 
and refuse and night soil removal were provided at a minimum fee (ibid , 
16) Crossroads had a unique position as a black community in the Cape 
Peninsula 
Unlike other black townships it was not subject to the 
constraints which operated in these areas - for example, 
lodger permits, trading licences and strict political control 
(Cole, 1987 17) 
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The struggles against forced removals marked the beginnings of 
Crossroads as a centre of resistance to the apartheid state In this context 
local community leadership structures developed These developed along 
clear gender divisions in the community with certain structures dominated 
by men while others comprised mainly women (Cole, 1987 20) In 
addition to and often intersecting these gender divisions, other key 
divisions in this community were (a) between residents with legal rights to 
live and work in white urban areas and those 'illegally' residing in the city 
and (b) between traditional and politically conservative residents and more 
militant youth These divisions formed the background against which 
struggles over political and economic control and political legitimacy 
within the Crossroads community were to take place later in its history 
Crossroads' legal status as an Emergency Camp meant that the state 
had to resort to indirect means to remove its residents These included 
mainly threats of removal, demolition of people's houses and evictions 
(ibid 21) In the context of the state's contradictory political programme of 
reform and repression Crossroads was the first black squatter community to 
be targeted by these reformist strategies which played into the existing 
divisions m this community Cole's (1987) study shows how these 
divisions provided the opportunity for divide and rule strategies on the part 
of local and central state authorities 
With the state's reformist strategies and its renewed attempts at 
implementing Influx Control, Dr Piet Koomhof, Minister of Plural 
Relations at the time, promised resettlement in a new township, later called 
New Crossroads, to those Crossroads residents with jobs and housing This 
promise came in 1978 after the more conservative wing of the government 
at the time threatened to demolish Crossroads In the context of what Cole 
(1987, 35) terms Crossroads' eventual "acquiescence" to this promise, 
struggles in the community shifted from a focus on forced removals to who 
would qualify for residence in the new township In addition, struggles 
evolved around who would lead the Crossroads community and maintain 
political control over its future (Cole, 1987 43) 
According to Cole (1987), although power struggles based on 
divisions within the Crossroads community were not new, they began to 
take on a different form soon after Crossroads became trapped in the state's 
reform programme (p 43 ) Mr Johnson Ngxobongwana, was elected 
chairman of the Executive Committee, a central leadership structure of 
Crossroads community at the time He had both a "dictatorial attitude" and 
a "tendency to pander to local state officials" (ibid 55, 56) His political 
support base within the community comprised mainly those residents who 
had arrived in the city recently and had no legal rights Despite the fact that 
most women were illegal nghtless residents, their leadership structures 
were excluded from the political realm when Mr Ngxobongwana rose to 
power In addition, his political practices marked the beginnings of 
endemic violent conflict within the community which resulted in the use of 
threats and fear as means of social control 
96 
Further attempts on the part of the state to implement Influx Control 
through its combined strategies of reform and repression continued In 
1983, Koornhof announced the establishment of yet another new township, 
Khayelitshd, for all legal residents of the Cape Peninsula This came in 
response to the growing squatter population around New and Old 
Crossroads 
In ¡982, the percentage of the population 'illegally' resident in 
the Western Cape was being conservatively estimated at well 
over 40% (Black Sash cf Cole, 1987 78) 
As a result of ongoing cycles of threats of removal the leadership of 
the Crossroads community joined forces with growing squatter 
communities in the surrounding areas It is partly through this process that 
Crossroads became part of the progressive resistance movement in the 
Western Cape The launching of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in the 
latter halt of 1983 and the intensified township-based political resistance to 
apartheid in the mid-1980s meant that the struggles of squatters became 
increasingly politicised (ibid 71) Mr Ngxobongwana, as leader of the 
Western Cape Civic Association, a key affiliate to the UDF at the time, and 
of Crossroads, the largest squatter community threatened with removal to 
Khayelitsha, became part of the vehement resistance to removals This 
active alliance between the UDF and Ngxobongawana later proved to be a 
mistake (ibid 82-87) 
While Ngxobongwana was seen as a popular leader by several 
leaders of UDF affiliates, residents of the Crossroads community were 
exposed to his economically exploitative practices 
'Taxes' continued to be collected for Ngxobongwana's 
'community' cars, his salary and those of a number of local 
'officials', and legal costs and bail money There was 
mounting dissatisfaction with the amount of money residents 
were expected to pay to Ngxobongwana and his headmen 
(Cole, 1987 87) 
These practices on the part of Ngxobongwana were among the many 
reasons which led to splits in the Executive Committee The power struggle 
within this Committee between Ngxobongwana and Memani, a member of 
the Executive Committee who attempted to mobilise dissatisfied residents, 
culminated towards the end of 1983 (ibid , 88) This was one manifestation 
of contests over political control and legitimacy within the community 
Conflicts among squatter communities were often sparked off by 
which squatter leader controlled what land Thousands of 
homeless people who streamed into the area during the latter 
half of 1984 found themselves under the authority of one of an 
estimated fifteen leaders for each of whom squatting became 
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a capital investment The more squatters one had on the land, 
the more money one could make (Cole, 1987 100) 
In the context of heightened political repression on the part of the 
state, an upswing in political resistance to this repression and a crippling 
political and economic crisis in South Africa, squatter camps became the 
"political Achilles heel of the Cape Peninsula" (ibid, 104) Since early 
1985 these camps had become one of the key centres of organised 
resistance to the South African state (ibid., 131) The squatters thus became 
a security threat to the state 
During a rental dispute in the midst of this resistance to removals 
and repression, Ngxobongwana was arrested Mr Sam Langa acted as 
chairman of the Executive Committee while he was in prison Mr Langa 
was among the leaders who resisted resettlement to Khayehtsha During his 
time in prison, Ngxobongwana changed his attitude towards the UDF and 
he later officially declared his disassociation with this organisation As a 
result, hostility arose between the UDF and Ngxobongwana When he 
realised that the more militant youth had mobilised some of his headmen 
against him and planned to oust him, he forged an alliance with certain 
members of the security forces 
In the wake ot this alliance, conflicts over political control over 
Crossroads and about the ways in which funds were raised and controlled 
in the community were manifested in the brutal battles between the 
'witdoeke' - Ngxobongwana's followers supported by security forces - and 
the 'comrades' - militant youth and progressive organisations The 
objectives of the state security forces to crush political resistance and those 
of the Ngxobongwana leadership to gain control over Crossroads 
coalesced In the aftermath of this violent attack on the progressive 
resistance movement, organisations within this movement battled to 
survive under the state's successive States of Emergency and in the 
resultant atmosphere of severe repression and of a local leadership co-
opted by the state These organisations were confronted with picking up the 
pieces and re-organising themselves politically (Cole, 1987' 106-118) 
Cooperatives formed a part of this attempt at political reorganisation at the 
same time as being economic survival strategies of the poor and dislocated 
community members Mr Sam Langa, was among the former Crossroads 
community leaders who initiated small enterprises and cooperatives in this 
context The Launisma Bnckmaking Co-op was among the enterprises 
initiated by him 
Launisma Bnckmaking Co-op (also LBC and Launisma 
Bnckmaking in the text) was located in Phihppi Industnal Area in close 
proximity to Crossroads It was one of a group of unregulated enterprises 
which formed the employment project, Launisma Enterpnses (also LE and 
Launisma in the text) These were conventional enterprises which 
nominally became cooperatives around mid-1988 
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6.3 Historical Development of Launisma Enterprises with Specific 
Reference to Launisma Brickmaking Co-op 
6.3.1 Formation of Launisma Enterprises 
Launisma was initiated in December 1986 in an attempt to 'formalise' 
economic ventures of a few informal' traders and to create employment by 
pooling their resources It was not until May 1987, however, that the 
founders, namely, Mr Langa and approximately five informal business 
operators, obtained premises from which to operate Mr Langa, a key 
figure in this venture, had a history of involvement in unregulated 
economic activity He once owned a grocery store in Crossroads, sold 
corrugated iron from his home, and operated a motor repairs service from 
his backyard 
For the founders, among the main problems for unemployed people 
involved in what they called 'backyard enterprising' were a lack funds, 
business acumen and work facilities This challenged them to acquire 
premises and to recruit informal operators who were interested in pooling 
their resources and business experience 
Mr Langa was elected chairperson/manager of Launisma 
Enterprises His position was related mainly to his key role in establishing 
the employment project Among other reasons for his election, however, 
were his former position as community leader, his business experience, a 
general recognition of him as an elder1, and his ability to communicate in 
English 
The people chose him because they don't know how to speak 
with the white people (Interview 1 2) 
The three month lease for the premises was signed by him on behalf 
of those involved in the employment project By that time about twenty 
people were recruited by the founders as members of Launisma Foremen 
were elected, the founders formed a Trust and LE was established as a 
voluntary association 
6.3.2 The Enterprises 
By May, 1987 Launisma consisted of motor repairs (panel-beating and 
mechanical repairs) enterprises and a bnckmaking enterprise The former, 
previously located in some members' backyards, were the only enterprises 
with customers at the time of its formation The latter, which is the focus of 
this chapter, was formed but only started operating in about October, 1987 
when Mr Langa obtained a R5 000 loan on behalf of the bnckmakers This 
loan was from the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC)2 and 
1
 Members addressed him as Tata Langa which means Father Langa 2
 The SBDC is an organisation funded jointly by the private sector and the state for 
the purposes of promoting small enterprises 
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was used as starting capital The American Embassy donated R13 800, and 
British Petroleum, R5 000 towards machinery and equipment for the 
bnckmakers (Interview 1 1) This financial aid helped Launisma 
Bnckmaking to its feet and by mid-1988 it was able to generate some 
income The building construction enterprise was formed later in 1987 
All these enterprises, were located in an old, virtually dilapidated 
factory building which had no electricity The British Embassy paid for the 
installation of electricity From the outset, Launisma depended on financial 
aid for its establishment 
6.4 Structure and Power Relations 
Launisma was structured so that each enterprise formed a department under 
its management which was centralised in the hands of Mr Langa The 
enterprises / departments were structurally, managenally and financially 
interdependent For this reason a crucial part of this case study involves an 
examination of the relationship between LBC and other enterprises in LE 
Major decisions were made at weekly general meetings of LE In 
theory, decisions were made by consensus on the basis of a one person-
one-vote principle In practice, however, decisions were heavily influenced 
by Mr Langa, the most powerful person in Launisma In this context the 
general membership had an attitude of "non-opposition' to decision-
making (Interview 1 6) 
The relationship between Mr Langa and members of LE was 
essentially one of patronage His power was manifested in his position as 
lessee for premises hired, and of obtaining loans on behalf of the members 
They thus owed allegiances to him for enabling them to operate and so 
have some form of survival In these circumstances it was not easy for 
them to challenge him This in combination with members' respect for him 
as former community leader, elder and manager of LE, and their low level 
of participation in decision-making facilitated his influence The latter was 
directly linked to very low levels of education and a lack of organisational 
experience among the members His power was further facilitated by the 
absence of organisational structures to counteract such influence 
6.5 Launisma Brickmaking: Market and Production 
Launisma Bnckmaking produced cement bricks and blocks for low cost 
housing construction 1978 to 1988 marked the completion of several large 
low-cost housing projects for blacks in South Africa Khayehtsha, Silver 
Sands, and Blue Downs are examples of such projects This construction 
market was, however, dominated by large contractors who obtained their 
supplies from large producers (for example, Corobnk) and contracted out 
jobs to small and medium-sized subcontractors This created a highly 
competitive market limiting customers of small-scale bnckmakers such as 
the LBC to owner-builders and very small building contractors 
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Production in Launisma Bnckmaking was small-scale, labour 
intensive and characterised by low levels of technology Blocks were 
handmade and the electrically operated bnckmaking machine which 
produced only one dozen bricks at a time was manually loaded On the one 
hand, this simple production process required little production 
management On the other hand, considering that raw material costs 
constituted about 66% of the final product cost, the need for working 
capital was high (Commission of Inquiry into Co-ops) This required 
effective financial management, unfortunately, severely lacking in 
Launisma Furthermore, the cyclical nature of the bnckmaking industry 
required marketing strategies which could facilitate the stabilisation of 
demand These skills were also lacking and marketing was done mainly by 
word of mouth 
6.6 Membership Composition and Wages 
Table 1 below shows that both LE and LBC had a predominantly male, 
unskilled membership with little education and high levels of illiteracy 
None of LE's members were skilled apprentices Some members in motor 
repairs, however, had acquired some skills informally and hence claimed to 
be skilled During times of financial difficulty, members either received a 
meagre RIO weekly allowance or no remuneration at all These allowances 
were drawn from the meagre income generated by the motor repairs 
departments When LBC was generating income, the bnckmakers each 
earned only R30 weekly The weekly living wage levels set by the Wage 
Board for the bnckmaking industry in Cape Town at the time were R69,46 
for a general worker and R178.48 for an artisan (Information from Labour 
Research Services) According to these figures which were likely to be 
underestimated, the bnckmakers were receiving a wage well below the 
living wage level Wages in the motor repairs departments ranged from 
R80 to R150 weekly depending on the level of skill claimed by members 
Furthermore, during peak production periods the LBC hired 
unskilled, casual labourers at RIO per day while the building construction 
department hired some skilled labour This meant that the number of 
people working in both LE and LBC fluctuated considerably A further 
factor contributing to this fluctuation was that members and potential 
members often left the enterpnse in search of better paid employment The 
vast majonty of the membership was African and unemployed 
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Table 6.1 Launisma Enterprises: Membership Composition 
'Dept 1 Dept 2 Dept 3 Dept 4 Total 
Males 2 
Females 3 
Skilled 
Unskilled 
Illiterate 
Primary Education 
Secondary Education 
Core Members 
Hired Labourers 
23 
4 
15 
0 
10 
0 
50 
7 
none 
all 
30 
23 
4 
57 
43 
Fluctuating Total 100 
Notes 
1 Department 1 is the management of LE which includes Mr Langa a bookkeeper and 
three secretaries, one of whom is Mr Langa s wife, 2 is Launisma Bnckmaking 
enterprise 3 the motor repairs and 4 the building construction enterprises 
6.7 Lack of Funds and Contests over Scarce Resources 
A severe shortage of funds at the time of formation meant that LE was 
unable to pay its first rent instalment of R2 000 for May, 1987 Mr Langa 
negotiated an exemption from rent payments for the first two months with 
the landlord When the next instalment was due, none of the enterprises 
had yet generated sufficient income to cover the rent LE borrowed R2 000 
from one of the founder members to pay the rent for July 1987 This lack 
of funds, a chronic feature of Launisma, eventually led to disagreements 
among departments over the distribution of these scarce resources I 
proceed to explore these contests 
6.7.1 Motor Repairs Departments: From Subsidisers to Private 
Operators 
When LE was founded its members decided to share equally among all 
departments any income received, irrespective of the department in which 
the income was generated and the cost structure in each department This 
decision was linked to the ideology of enterprise accountability to the 
community which implied sharing rather than privately accumulating 
resources As expressed by Mr Langa 
The co op does not belong to Mr Langa It does not belong to 
the people in the co-op only The co op is for the community at 
large Everyone in the community is a member of the co op 
When you join the co-op you come just with your ideas and 
your labour [power not your money] money is power 
(Interview 1 1 ) 
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Since the building construction and bnckmaking enterprises were 
not m operation during the months of May to October 1987, this decision 
resulted in the subsidisation of wages for these enterprises by the motor 
repairs departments The latter were the only departments generating some 
revenue at the time This meagre revenue was spread among the members. 
The amounts of money subsidised and of revenue generated are unknown 
However, rental arrears for the months August to October 1987, revealed 
later, and the meagre and often non-existent wages of bnckmakers suggest 
that the subsidy to LBC could not have been high 
By October 1987 this situation resulted in discord over access to and 
the distribution of financial resources in the co-op 
[The] panel[-beater<¡] and [the] mechanics did not want to 
share money equally anymore They wanted to use money 
made bv them for themselves (Interview 1 4) 
Furthermore, the foremen of the motor repairs departments 
announced financial difficulties and requested LE for permission to do 
additional work on the premises to supplement their income This entailed 
providing taxi services and repairs According to Mr Van der Westhuizen, 
voluntary co-op advisor to the UWM, permission was granted under the 
following circumstances 
the panel-beating and motor repairs departments were idle at 
the time either because they did not have sufficient spare parts 
to complete work to be done, or because they did not have any 
work to do members of these departments were thus granted 
permission to do work for the purposes of supplementing their 
income on the basis that they did not have any work to do 
(Interview 1 6) 
The reality, however, was that the panel-beaters and mechanics used 
LE's premises as a base for their private taxi operations They provided taxi 
services until about ten Ό clock every morning, reported to work at LE 
around mid-day, repaired the taxis they drove and left at about three Ό 
clock in the afternoon tor their second shift of taxi services The bulk of 
their working day was spent supplementing their income while their 
departments were economically stagnant Moreover, it was alleged that 
some of these members owned the taxis 
As revealed in later developments, the reluctance of the panel-
beaters and mechanics to share their income with other members, their 
request for permission to supplement their income, and the financial 
difficulty of these departments were intricately linked. Their taxi 
operations were a far more lucrative activity than bnckmaking and/or 
building Under the guise of supplementary income these operations 
provided the panel-beaters and mechanics with an independent income on 
which no one else could lay claim It was thus in their material interests to 
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have each department responsible for its costs This way, they did not 
contribute to LE's revenue even though they used space rented by LE, nor 
did they share their supplementary' income with other departments 
Instead, they were sole beneficiaries of income generated from their taxi 
operations 
Their proposal that each department take responsibility for its own 
costs which included R500 monthly rent, R100 weekly administrative costs 
and wages, was accepted It was not clear, however, how and by whom this 
decision was made Mr Langa in his capacity as manager of Laumsma 
Enterprises and despite his emphasis on sharing resources with fellow 
members of one's community, made no attempt to resist either the practices 
of these departments or their proposal 
6.7.2 Financial Crises and Mismanagement 
Towards the end of 1987 Laumsma experienced financial problems It was 
not generating sufficient revenue to cover monthly rent and electricity 
costs By the end of December 1987 it owed R8 000 for rent (instalments 
for August to November, 1987) and Rl 000 for electricity R6 000 was 
received from a private company in Bellville to pay some of this debt, R4 
000 was borrowed from Get Ahead3 to pay the rent for December 1987 and 
January 1988 A further R4 000 was borrowed from someone to pay the 
rent for February and March 1988 
Furthermore, around mid-1988 the building construction department 
lost R3 000 on a construction project in Stellenbosch and R4 440 on such a 
project in Mowbray because members were unable to complete the projects 
within the stipulated time (Interview 1 4) In addition, a member of this 
department misused funds to the value of Rl 330 
By mid-1988 the motor repairs departments were also in dire 
financial straits As noted earlier, these departments were not generating 
revenue for LE Instead, earnings from their taxi operations were treated as 
their personal income on the basis that it was supplementary 
6.7.3 The Tables are Turned 
On the basis of their apparent financial difficulty as departments, the 
foremen of motor repairs this time requested that LE revert to their original 
decision to share all revenue equally among departments In addition, they 
argued that they were eligible for higher wages than members of other 
departments since they were skilled Their proposal was accepted 
According to Mr Van der Westhuizen, the acceptance of this 
proposal was partially influenced by LBC's suspicions about motor repairs 
taxi operations and its attempts to gain control over the flow of income and 
3
 An American development agency linked to an organisation called Build a Better 
Society 
1U4 
expenditure in the latter departments (Interview 1 6) Instead of gaining 
such control, however, the bnckmakers ended up subsidising rental, 
administrative, and additional wage costs for the motor repairs enterprises 
This situation arose partly as a result of the unequal power relationship 
between the unskilled bnckmakers and the panel-beaters and mechanics 
who claimed to be skilled and were able to bargain for higher wages A 
further factor was the history of subsidisation of bnckmakers by the latter 
departments in the initial stages of the project It would be seen as 
unjustified for LBC to refuse financial support to other departments even 
though the amounts involved were to cnpple the enterpnse 
Moreover, the ideological context of shanng rather than pnvately 
accumulating resources, though sidestepped by other enterprises, was a key 
factor influencing the bnckmakers' 'non-opposition' to this proposal 
Contributing to their silence about their suspicions was a fear of violence 
as a form of social control as expressed by the foreman of LBC when 
encouraged to break away from LE and operate independently 
Hulle sal jou brand mense die kant is me soos mense daai 
kant waar julle bly me - hulle sal jou brand as jy so leti doen 
want hulle sal sêjy bedrieg hulle (Crossroads, March 1989)4 
This was a clear indication that the history and expenences of 
township violence in Crossroads influenced behaviour in the cooperative 
Finally, breaking away from LE would mean no financial support network 
for the bnckmakers when they were in need 
The decision to share revenue despite the private income of the 
panel-beaters and mechanics, and the factors militating against any 
opposition to their opportunism eventually crippled the LBC By mid-1988 
Launisma Bnckmaking was in operation for about eight months Its 
economic activity was facilitated by the R5 000 loan borrowed from the 
Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) in October, 1987 for 
starting capital By this time LBC was able to pay its members an average 
wage of about R30 per week (Application for loan, September 1989) 
Table 2 below shows how much of its income was spent on expenses 
in other departments and on LE s debts Among these expenses were five 
months' rent and administration fees for the panel-beating and motor 
repairs departments, some of the higher wages claimed by the latter, stock 
supplied to the building construction department and rental arrears The 
heavy financial responsibility accruing to LBC in these early stages of its 
operation (October, 1987 to June, 1988) resulted in it suffering a loss of 
about R24 700 
4
 They will burn you [literally] people who live here [blacks] are not like those 
where you live [whites] they will burn you if you break away and form an independent 
enterprise because they will see this as a betrayal on your part (Mr Chilibe 
Crossroads, March, 1989) The fear of being burnt is related to the violent burning of 
peoples houses and shacks during the township violence in Crossroads in the 1980s, 
especially during the battles between the witdoeke of Ngxobongwana and the 
comrades of the progressive resistance movement 
\Q5 
Table 6.2 'Subsidies'in Rands from Brickmakers' Revenue in 1988 
Rent and Admin 
fees May to Sept 
Other expenses 
Higher Wages 
Bricks and Blocks 
Rental Arrears 
Total 
Repairs' 
6 0002 
7 7002 
8 1002 
21 800 
Build 
6 0003 
6000 
LE Debts 
5 0004 
5000 
Total 
R32 800 
Notes 
1 Repairs refers to both panel beating and mechanics departments 
2 Source General Meeting 12 October 1989 
3 Source Auditor s report, 28 February 1989 
4 Source Interview 1 4 
These and further developments suggest that Mr Langa engaged in 
contradictory managerial practices which were clearly not in the interests 
of the brickmakers 
6.8 Launisma Enterprises Joins the Unemployed Workers' 
Movement 
It is clear that LE as a whole was confronted with a financial crisis by mid-
1988 In July 1988, it joined the Unemployed Workers' Movement 
(UWM) This was when it nominally became a cooperative Judging from 
the financial state of the enterprises, the unequal access to and distribution 
of financial resources and the mismanagement of these severely scarce 
resources, it is safe to assume that among the reasons for the affiliation 
with the UWM were the need for an outside agency to assist in resolving 
the internal problems in LE, and to facilitate access to further financial 
resources in the form of loans and/or aid 
6.8.1 Relationship with the Unemployed Workers' Movement 
The UWM was a working class political organisation formed in 1984 and 
concerned with organising the unemployed. By 1988 it merged with the 
Western Cape affiliate of the National Unemployed Workers' Coordinating 
Committee (NUWCC), was renamed the Western Cape Unemployed 
Workers' Union (WECUWU) and became an affiliate of the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
Among its key activities were organising anti-scabbing campaigns 
and raising funds to support strikers As part of organising the unemployed, 
this relatively young organisation itself still in formation, initiated and 
supported producer co-ops in an attempt to create employment and so 
mobilise its members However, it had little experience with co ops and 
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cooperative development Its interest in co-ops as means of employment 
creation stemmed from its socialist ideology reflected in its key demand 
' work for all" or a 'living unemployment benefit" which implied full 
maintenance of the unemployed by the state (Interview 1 7) 
The organisation was financed with grants from Social Change 
Assistance Trust (SCAT), d local funding organisation By mid-September, 
1990, however, SCAT withdrew its financial support for the unemployed 
leaving the UWM in a financial crisis Among the reasons were 
mismanagement of funds by some organisers of the unemployed and 
changes in SCAT'S policy and aims The latter included its withdrawal of 
support for cooperatives (Interview 1 7) 
The relationship between Launisma and the UWM was one of 
mutual dependency The UWM depended on Launisma as a means of 
mobilising and expanding its membership while Launisma depended on the 
organisation's access to financial aid In the context of the general practice 
of providing aid to co-ops in South Africa, the UWM was in some way 
pressurised to act accordingly if it were to gain favour with the enterprises 
Under these pressures it provided some financial assistance to LE in the 
form of grants and loans from SCAT This relationship of financial 
dependency was an obstacle to promoting self-reliant enterprises 
Furthermore, the Cooperative Coordinating Committee (CCC) of the 
UWM was intended to serve as the representative structure of affiliated co-
ops This committee comprised representatives from all affiliated co ops, 
the two co op coordinators employed by the UWM and a voluntary co-op 
advisor, Mr Van der Westhuizen Its key functions were to provide for the 
financial and technical needs of co ops and to ensure that they functioned 
democratically 
This structure was, however, riddled with weaknesses and for this 
reason was often criticised by the co-ops The CCC lacked the basic 
infrastructure required to service co-ops co-op coordinators were not 
skilled, it had no funds and no transport It had no coherent policy and 
practice on co-ops and responded on an ad hoc basis to problems as they 
occurred This contributed to its inability to implement decisions The CCC 
generally engaged in crisis management from one problem to the next and 
contributed little to démocratisation and viability in the co-ops 
This mutual dependency and the structure of the CCC, though not 
representative, showed that the power relationship between Launisma and 
the UWM was slightly different from the typical co-op/service organisation 
relationship Generally, co-ops linked to service organisations find 
themselves in a subordinate position with no provision for their 
representation at any level The dominant position of service organisations 
can be attributed to their access to and control of financial and technical 
resources, the key needs of co-ops The UWM, on the other hand, had few 
financial and technical resources This had clear implications for its 
capacity to support co ops effectively In times of financial need on the part 
of the co ops, the balance of power tended to shift slightly in favour or the 
UWM However, in the presence of countless more well endowed service 
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organisations and/or foreign donor agencies which were generally more 
than willing to provide aid (for example, British Council, US Embassy, 
World Vision) it was very difficult for the UWM to win this balance 
6.8.2 The Unemployed Workers' Movement versus the Power 
Structure of Launisma Enterprises 
In September 1988 the UWM staff and voluntary advisor confirmed the 
mismanagement of financial resources in favour of the panel beating and 
motor repairs departments discussed earlier The UWM suggested financial 
and administrative separation of each department including separate leases 
for each (Minutes of meetings attended in September 1989) This 
suggestion which essentially entailed the restructuring of power relations in 
LE, was effectively countered by the chairperson and lessee, Mr Langa 
the force was too overwhelming against any such ideas 
[suggesting the restructuring of Launisma] and Tata Langa 
was the big force against [this suggestion} We had a few 
meetings in which Tata Langa, in a very efficient way, sunk 
any attempt to suggest a restructuring of the co op (Interview 
16) 
Furthermore, several attempts by Mr Van der Westhuizen to obtain 
the financial records of LE in order to evaluate the use of revenue 
generated by the various departments were unsuccessful because LE 
refused to give him access to the relevant records (CCC meeting, 30 
November, 1988) Attempts by the UWM to curb financial 
mismanagement proved inadequate against Mr Langa's power and 
influence Furthermore, his resistance to the UWM's suggestion for 
restructuring LE from financial and managerial interdependence among the 
departments to effective independence was a clear indication of his 
interests in maintaining control over all enterprises comprising LE 
As manifested in the continued mismanagement of income generated 
by LBC indicated below, the UWM was powerless in the face of Mr 
Langa's patronage, his contradictory managerial practices, bnckmakers' 
fears and the internal divisions among members 
6.9 The Tables Remain Turned 
In an attempt to save the LBC from its financial predicament the UWM 
approached Social Change Assistance Trust (SCAT) around 
August/September, 1988 for a loan of R20 000 to provide financial capital 
and additional equipment for the enterprise SCAT provided a R7 000 
interest free loan payable in R200 monthly instalments as from November 
1988 This capital and a ready market for cement bricks and blocks 
facilitated the profitability of LBC at the time Total sales from September 
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to mid-October 1988 amounted to R 15 817 After subsidising other 
departments' expenses once again, however, the surplus for this period 
amounted to R 145 (General Meeting, Crossroads, 12 October, 1989) 
By mid-October 1988 further disagreements over the unequal 
distribution of financial resources emerged in LE precipitated by the 
recurring problem of rental aiTears As from September 1988 a change in 
ownership of the premises was accompanied by a rent increase to R2 150, 
and an interest of R24 on late payments This time the bnckmakers, 
influenced by the UWM's suggestion, proposed that each department take 
responsibility for their own finances as was decided in October 1987 
This proposal was justified by the severe imbalance in LBC's 
expenditure on wages for panel-beaters and mechanics and those of its own 
members Table 3 below clearly shows that by mid-October 1988 the 
panel-beating and motor repairs departments were receiving more revenue 
in terms of wages than they were generating 
Table 6.3 Income Distribution in Rands: September to mid-October 1988 
Department Wage Bill Income Generated 
Panel Beating 3~~5DO" Tffî 
Motor Repairs 4 600 2 133 
Brickmaking and Admin 6 100 15 817 
(Source General Meeting, Crossroads, 12 October 1988) 
An examination of the five week period from September 1988 to 
mid-October 1988 shows that LBC's members earned about one third of 
the average weekly wage of panel-beaters and mechanics These two 
departments, however, each generated only about 15% of the total income 
earned by LBC over the said period These vast discrepancies were a clear 
indication of the degree of financial mismanagement in LE 
6.10 Aid Diffuses the Problem and Nothing Changes 
A decision about the LBC's proposal was postponed (General Meeting, 
Crossroads, 12 October, 1988) In the meanwhile, a loan of R20 000 
obtained by LE from Mobil Foundation5 to cover some of their debt 
diffused the interrelated issues of rental arrears, the interdependence of 
enterprises and the severe maldistribution of income This loan provided a 
further reason to postpone and avoid a decision about the bnckmakers' 
proposal (General Meeting, Crossroads, 12 October, 1989) 
By March, 1989 Laumsma once again faced rental arrears and a 
general financial crisis Its debts stood at about R14 000 Furthermore, the 
bnckmakers received no wages since December, 1988 and the new 
landlord gave LE notice to vacate the premises by March, 1989 (CCC 
meeting, Crossroads, 1 March, 1989) In response to this financial cnsis 
The UWM was unaware of this loan 
l 'y! 
and to increased rents, LE found cheaper premises in Philippi (an enclosed 
vacant plot without roofing) at Rl 300 monthly with an exemption from 
the first monthly payment Mr Langa signed the lease and the first rent was 
paid on 15 March 1989 (Visit to Launisma, Crossroads, 15 March 1989) 
In the face of this crisis, the UWM's suggestion to form a 
Commission of Inquiry into the Economic Viability of all its co operative 
affiliates, including LE, was accepted (CCC meeting, January, 1989) The 
Commission included a specific inquiry into the lack of wages in LBC The 
latter was, however, unsuccessful because LE refused to make the relevant 
information accessible Furthermore, while the commission persisted with 
its suggestion of financially and managenally separate departments, Mr 
Langa persisted with his resistance to such restructuring 
By this time the bnckmakers had again approached SCAT for a loan 
Based on the Commission Report, one of the conditions set by SCAT was 
that the bnckmakers sign the lease for the vacant plot of land at the time 
leased to Mr Langa (Interview 1 6) The foreman of LBC, Mr Chilibe, 
accepted this condition and the lessee for the plot was legally changed in 
the names of the bnckmakers This meant the independence of LBC from 
LE Once this condition was met, however, SCAT did not provide the 
bnckmakers with funds (Visit to bnckmakers, 3 November, 1989) This 
last minute withdrawal was probably linked to SCAT's process of ending 
its support for cooperatives Nevertheless, it placed the bnckmakers right 
back where they started unemployed and destitute 
Thus far I have shown how Launisma Brickmaking moved from one 
crisis to the next constantly trapped between destitution, the opportunism 
of its fellow LE members and the contradictory practices of its manager 
Some of the main external factors which help explain this chronic state of 
crisis are a severe shortage of funds and resources in general, a consequent 
dependence on aid and a very limited and seasonal market This severe 
scarcity of resources, however, set the stage for several internal factors 
which contributed to these crises These included mainly the structure of 
managerial and financial interdependence combined with the system of 
patron-client relationships and fear as a mechanism of social control This 
combination of factors locked the bnckmakers into subordination and 
powerlessness and facilitated the mismanagement of their income leaving 
them trapped in a cycle of poverty In addition, as mentioned earlier, there 
was the ideology of sharing rather than privately accumulating resources 
However, as indicated by the pnvate operations of some members of LE, 
this ideology operated selectively A further internal factor contributing to 
the general failure of LBC as a co-operative was embedded in its members' 
conceptions of a cooperative I proceed to deal with co-operative 
consciousness in this enterpnse 
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6.11 Cooperative Consciousness 
Mr Langa had a romantic conception of cooperatives expressed in terms of 
the political rhetoric of black people (as opposed to whites) working 
together and sharing the benefits of their labour 
Before capitalism we [black South Africans] worked together 
in the village1! but that tradition is gone now because of the 
white tradition (Minutes of Meeting 12 10 88) 
Despite his experiences of violent political battles within the 
Crossroads community, he denied the divisions and power relationships at 
play among black people in various social contexts including cooperatives, 
as shown in this case study Furthermore, he tended to emphasise the 
power of producers and broader political aspects such as relationships of 
the enterprise to the immediate community and the state 
The capitalist factory has a boss [who] just stand[s] up and 
tell[s] you to produce two hundred bricks before lunch And 
you must work hard to produce [this target] [The boss 
pressurises one to work] In the co-op if he [the producer] 
feels he cannot produce such a production [reach such a 
target], he [can] go back to the customer [and request an] 
extension 
The co-op does not belong to Mr Langa It does not belong to 
the people in the co-op only The co-op is for the community at 
large Everyone in the community is a member of the co-op 
When you join the co-op you come just with your ideas and 
your labour [power, not your money] money is power 
The [future] government must provide equipment, 
accommodation and pay for electricity [for co-ops] (Interview 
11) 
The economic goals of a co-op had no place in Mr Langa's 
conception The destitute, however, cannot feed on politics Broader 
political relationships in the absence of economic return are not the basis 
for successful cooperative production 
His conception of cooperatives was, however, different from that of 
some bnckmakers who emphasised the role of the co-op as a means for 
material survival These differences in emphasis and perception can be 
attributed to the respective positions occupied by Mr Langa and the 
members under his leadership both in the enterprise and in broader society 
As manager of LE and political leader in the local community, the co-op 
served as a power base for Mr Langa For some bnckmakers all of whom 
were destitute and unemployed LBC was simply one among other survival 
strategies The quotations below, though not representative of all LBC's 
members, give one some indication of members' ideas 
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1) The co-op is very important because it helps the people 
when the people got no food, no everything they [co-ops] try 
to make the people go without heavy pains they [community 
leaders like Mr Langa] try to take the [black] people and 
show them the way of life without the white people 
[When explaining to new members what a co-op is] I say we 
got the place where we are working and after we are working 
we sell [the products] so that money can help us If we can't 
sell, we wait until our stock is going until we got money We 
wait maybe two weeks without having pay after that we got 
money we pay (Interview 1 2) 
2) A co-op is a group of people who try to make some plans 
for people so that they can live (Interview I 3) 
These members emphasised immediate, daily survival with little 
conception of the long term success of LBC as both a cooperative and an 
economic unit This implied that if survival could be ensured through less 
demanding means such as constant injections of development aid or less 
cooperative practices the co-op as such was less, or not at all important 
Furthermore, the foreman of LBC, Mr Chilibe, gave an interesting 
account of the state of co-op consciousness among members while at the 
same time revealing his own conception of a co-op 
The people that they get to work for the co-op do not know 
about the co-op If they come here and they want a job, they 
want money at the end of the week So if they don't get paid at 
the end of the week they don't understand what this whole 
thing [the cooperative] is about This is a problem People 
leave and look for jobs elsewhere, that's why you see different 
faces all the time 
The main aim of Laumsma is to function as a co op But the 
people who don't know anything about a co-op are the actual 
people who change the principle of working in that way 
They [Launisma founder members] try to tell them [new and 
general members] in meetings about how a co op works and 
what it is all about The only problem is when there is no 
money Because when they discuss it in meetings they do 
understand how a co op should work But now the problem 
comes when there is no money (Interview 1 4) 
An important aspect of Mr Chilibe's conception was that one did not 
necessarily get paid at the end of a working week In one of the previous 
quotations from a member the same idea was expressed "we wait maybe 
two weeks without having pay" According to Mr Chilibe, if producers did 
not understand that they might not get paid, they lacked understanding of 
what a co-op was about This idea suggested that working in a cooperative 
was a commitment over and above an opportunity for effective material 
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survival thus implying that co-ops are not in the first place successful 
economic units In my view a co-op has to provide for the material needs of 
its members beyond temporary survival in order for them to believe in 
cooperation and in this way begin to form a cooperative consciousness 
Evidence in support of this view is the fact that members of LBC often left 
to seek work elsewhere because the co-op was often unable to pay their 
wages 
Members' emphasis on survival, even if only temporary, was directly 
related to their experience of long term unemployment and destitution 
Their limited organisational experience including a lack of previous work 
experience meant that they had no initial frame of reference to cooperation 
This case study suggests that co-ops may not be the answer to survival for 
the unskilled, destitute and marginalised unemployed In a context of 
competition for severely scarce resources, as was the case with Laumsma, 
the practice of participatory democratic cooperation is more difficult 
6.12 Conclusion 
In the light of Abell's (1981) five principles of democratic organisation, 
Laumsma Bnckmaking Co-op ranked low on a continuum of degrees of 
démocratisation Participation in decision-making was absent mainly 
because of practices of 'non-opposition' in the context of the power 
structure of Laumsma and low levels of education and organisational 
experience among the general members In the context of an organisational 
structure inconducive to democracy, the principle of representation through 
delegation was absent The severe lack of managerial and technical skills 
resulted in the absence of the quality of special competence Considering 
that the enterprise had not even begun to fulfill its primary goal, namely, 
providing for the material needs of its members, and that there were no 
signs of movement towards more democratic organisation, the principle of 
efficiency in terms of goal fulfillment was not being met Finally, the 
absence of participation, representation and competence makes Abell's 
(1981) fifth principle irrelevant in this case 
With reference to Bernstein's (1976) minimally necessary conditions 
for effective democracy, LBC once again exhibited a very low degree of 
démocratisation Low levels of member-participation in decision-making, 
the absence of an independent board of appeal and of guaranteed individual 
rights were testimony to this Furthermore, the absence of managerial 
expertise left little information to be shared Even in the presence of such 
expertise, low levels of education among the members and the lack of 
means to address this situation constituted barriers to effectively sharing 
information about enterprise operations 
The limited economic results of Laumsma Bnckmaking were a clear 
indication to its members of the effects of their efforts In the context of 
severely scarce and unequally distributed resources within LE, however, 
these results were unlikely to lead to processes of economic improvement 
and/or adjustment in these enterprises Finally, members' perception of the 
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co-op as a survival strategy in the context of their economic destitution 
precluded the development of traits of a participatory democratic 
consciousness Their understandable preoccupation with survival hindered 
the long-term development of Laumsma Bnckmaking as an economically 
successful co-op 
The material and structural conditions of this enterprise placed 
severe constraints on its development into a viable democratic enterprise 
In the light of the absence of all Bernstein's minimally necessary conditions 
for effective and sustained democracy, I conclude that Laumsma 
Bnckmaking was unlikely to develop into a sustained participatory 
democratic organisation 
This enterprise exhibited characteristics of both pre-cooperatives and 
non-viable cooperatives as defined by Brecker (1988) These include the 
following pre-cooperative features 
(a) the need for very basic training in cooperative ideology and practice, 
(b) the need for basic skills training and skills provision, 
(c) the need for aid and soft loans for nurturing the enterprise and the 
following features of non-viable co-ops 
(a) insufficient management skills and material resources, 
(b) not well established production structures and 
(c) an incapacity to generate sufficient surplus to sustain its members 
and/or to invest in expanding production and an inability to plan towards 
these ends 
Laumsma Bnckmaking is an example of the poor trapped in a cycle 
of poverty This case study highlights some of the negative implications of 
aid by showing how it diverted attention from the key factors contributing 
to the failure of LBC and the poverty of its members These included the 
financial mismanagement of severely scarce resources and an 
interdependent organisational structure which was inconducive to 
démocratisation and, instead, perpetuated the power of patronage In 
addition to these factors, the cultural aspect of respect for elders which 
helped prevent members from challenging Mr Langa's contradictory 
practices and their fear of violence played a significant role in keeping 
them poor and powerless, and hindering démocratisation 
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CHAPTER 7 
WORKING WITHOUT A BOSS: MONTAGU CARPENTRY 
COOPERATIVE 
7.1 Introduction 
Montagu Carpentry Cooperative (MCC) is an example of an 
organisationally more advanced co-op in which producers actively 
challenged racist power relations in the workplace The dynamics involved 
in its organisational development and in the budding cooperative 
consciousness of its members are the subject of this chapter Firstly, 
however, I provide an introduction to the town of Montagu where this 
enterprise is located This contextuahses some of the processes and 
contests within the co-op at the time of research 
7.2 Brief Profile of Montagu 
7.2.1 Demography and Political Economy 
Montagu is a small town in the magistenal district of the same name in the 
rural Western Cape It is one of several such towns in the Overberg region 
of the Western Cape Other towns include Ashton, Barrydale, Swellendam, 
Zuurbraak, Heidelberg, Riviersonderend, Robertson, Bonnievale, and 
McGregor A key demographic feature of this rural periphery is the 
predominance of the coloured population (66% of the total in the periphery 
in 1990/91) The African population is small (12,3%) but increasing 
(Cousins, 1993 17) 
The magisterial district of Montagu includes the towns of Montagu 
and Ashton, the African township, Zolani, and farms in the vicinity Table 
1 below indicates the predominance of the coloured population (more than 
70%) 
Table 7.1 Population Figures for Montagu District, 1985 census 
Coloured 
Montagu 
Ashton 
Zolani 
Farm pop 
Total 
4 246 
3318 
4 
4 869 
12 437 
White 
1922 
671 
1 
809 
3 403 
African 
32 
30 
1540 
166 
1768 
Asian 
1 
0 
30 
0 
31 
Total 
6 201 
4019 
1 575 
5 844 
17 639 
(Source Central Statistical Services, 1985, cf Cousins 1993) 
Although Montagu is situated in a rural periphery, the Table above 
shows that in 1985 only one third of the population lived on farms This 
highlights two important features Firstly, in comparison with other regions 
in South Africa, the Western Cape has a relatively urbanised population 
(15% rural dwellers compared to a national average of 48%) (Cousins, 
115 
1993 17) Secondly, unlike rural areas elsewhere in Africa, this is not an 
area characterised by peasant production Agriculture in South Africa is 
highly commercialised, mechanised and capitalised (Marcus, 1989) In the 
Western Cape, the agricultural labour force is composed mainly of landless 
coloured workers with no history of peasant production 
Montagu is shaped by this context It is an integral part of the 
political economy of agrarian capitalism in the surrounding rural areas 
Like many other Western Cape towns, it serves as a source of reserve 
agricultural labour for times of seasonal demand, additionally, many 
people are employed in the agro-industnal fruit and vegetable canning 
enterprises in both Montagu and neighbouring Ashton Some members of 
Montagu carpentry co op worked in these enterprises 
Montagu is also marked by the relationships of economic and 
political inequality that have shaped the history of the Western Cape 
countryside This history has meant that the town's coloured people, though 
numerically predominant, are politically disempowered and economically 
exploited It is a complex history marked with experiences of colonisation 
and slavery (Erasmus and Du Toit, 1994) 
7.2.2 Slavery 
The coloured people of the Western Cape are descended, ultimately, from 
the contact between indigenous pastorahst Khoi peoples, the white 
colonists and their imported slaves The institution of slavery had a 
decisive role in the shaping of Western Cape society Over about 170 
years, it entrenched a deep racial division of labour and shaped labour 
relations Montagu today still bears the scars of this history of economic 
exploitation and domination (ibid ) 
Despite the wealth of the region, it provides only few and meagre 
livelihoods for coloured people Agriculturally, this region is fertile with 
most land classed as High Potential Agricultural Land - a category that 
comprises only 4% of South Africa's agricultural land (Lipton, 1993) 
Though the majority of the population is coloured, land ownership is 
monopolised by a small minority of wealthy white farmers The key 
farming activities include wine grapes and fruit for export and canning 
Farming is lucrative and labour intensive, and wages are low In 
addition, formal employment is mainly seasonal both on farms and in agro-
ïndustries (Wesgro, 1991 28, 38 cf Cousins, 1993 17) The estimated 
labour force in this periphery (ι e people willing and able to work) is 
195 000 or 35% of the total population (565 000) The number of people 
formally employed is estimated at 113 000 or 58%, with the rest either 
unemployed or engaged in informal economic activity (ibid ) 
Langeberg Canning in Ashton is the largest agro-industnal 
enterprise It currently employs about 428 permanent workers mainly from 
Ashton and up to 2 100 casual labourers at peak seasons mainly from 
Montagu and Zolam (Cousins, 1993 19) The casual labourers are mainly 
women engaged in seasonal employment for about four months of the year 
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The minimum wage paid to casual and unskilled permanent workers is 
R225 weekly (ibid.)· In the 1980s a similar enterprise in Montagu stopped 
production as a result of a merger. This increased unemployment in the 
town (ibid.). 
In addition to high unemployment and low wages, work is 
characterised by racist power relations. To work is, inevitably, to work for 
a white person, which means to work for a baas (a 'master', a boss). As 
illustrated in the quotation below, this experience is generally one of 
exposure to indignity and humiliation. 
Na skool het ek werk gaan soek en ek gaan maak toe 'η grap 
en gaan toe by die blommewinkel in en ek vra: 'Missies, het 
missies nie vir my werk nie?' 'Wag net gou vir die grootnooi', 
se huile toe vir my....En ek vat toe die werk...Maar in die loop 
van die week was dit ook nie my fout nie, gaan ek in 'η toilet 
in, ek kom daar uit, toe sê sy vir my: 'jy mag nie daar in gaan 
nie. Ons gebruik dit. Julie toilet is oor 'ie straat'.....Diep in my 
hart het dit my seergemaak.... (interview 3.5b)l. 
Interviews with MCC's members and observations of social 
relationships at work in some of the local supermarkets revealed that 
coloured workers in most such stores addressed their superiors in the 
traditional terms of deference typical of the Western Cape's history of 
slavery and paternalism: ou nooi (mistress), juffrou (miss), baas (master), 
and/or missies (madam). In turn, white employers address coloured 
workers as jong (boy) and/or meid (girl). Furthermore, the hierarchy of 
racial categories has been well internalised by members of the Montagu 
community. 
A further noticeable aspect of everyday life in Montagu is the 
importance of religion in people's lives. The predominant denomination 
among coloured people here is protestant. The Dutch Reformed Mission 
Church plays an important social and political role in the community. 
7.2.3 Current Changes 
The current transition to majority rule and proposals for restructuring the 
pattern of agricultural landownership will profoundly change the politics of 
this region. At this time, however, the nature and outcome of these changes 
remain unknown. The political context also remains uncertain. With the 
National Party in a clear majority in this region, it is sure to be a real 
political force. As such, it will do its utmost to preserve the old structures 
of power and privilege. In this context, locally based contests over power 
1
 "After my schooling I went lo look for work. I went to a florist and jokingly 
asked. 'Madam, does madam have any work for me?' They replied 'Just wait for the 
mistress'. I took the job. During the week I visited the toilet. So she said to me1 'You 
may not use that toilet. It is for our use only. Your toilet is across the road'. This was 
not my fault I felt deeply hurt " (Interview 3 5b) 
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and authority will be very important In the Montagu Carpentry Co-op, 
challenges to managerial power and authority generally based on racist 
power relations in conventional enterprises in the region and in South 
Afnca as a whole, provide an example of such locally based contests 
7.3 Overview of Cooperatives in the Overberg 
At the time of research there were three producer co-ops and one service 
co-op in this region Two producer co-ops, Zuurbraak Carpentry Co-op 
(ZCC) in Zuurbraak, and Montagu Carpentry Co-op (MCC) in Montagu, 
were operating for about four to five years Cotton Cloud (CC) in Montagu, 
the third producer co-op, started in November 1988 and Overberg 
Cooperators' Service Co-op (OCS), in July 1989 These were very young 
enterprises 
ZCC produced chairs from canary pine wood (a hard pine wood) 
using chair-bodging techniques of the early craft industry The chair-seats 
were made with woven seagrass. MCC, involved in small-scale 
manufacturing, produced a limited range of products The predominant 
product changed with shifts in high-income urban-market demands 
Previously MCC manufactured toddler furniture on contract for creches At 
the time of research, the main product was wooden futon-bases convertible 
into couch and chair bases Other products included deck chairs, compact 
camping tables, trapezoidal tables, and tables to match the chairs made by 
ZCC Cotton Cloud produced futon-matresses to complement MCC's 
futon-bases OCS provided the producer co-ops in the region with essential 
services like transport, design, and market surveys 
These co-ops were structurally independent, but functionally 
interdependent Each made a product to match that of the other. OCS 
provided an avenue for marketing these products as single units ZCC had 
about seven members, two of whom were female MCC had eleven 
members, three of whom were female. CC had only two female members, 
and OCS, about three members and a contact person in the field of market 
research 
All these co-operatives were serviced by an organisation called 
Montagu and Ashton Community Service (Montagu en Ashton 
Gemeenskaps Diens MAG) I now focus briefly on the relationship 
between MAG and MCC 
7.4 The Relationship between the Community Organisation and 
Montagu Carpentry Cooperative 
Apart from friendly links with other co-ops in South Afnca MAG was the 
only organisation with which MCC had a formal relationship The MAG is 
an ecumenical community development organisation It was founded in 
October 1976 by community leaders concerned about alcoholism among 
the local coloured people By 1989 it was well established and provided 
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services mainly to coloureds. Although MAG has links with the Dutch 
Reformed Mission Church, it is structurally independent of the church. Its 
Christian component and the success of its activities gave the organisation 
credibility among members of the local community. This made MAG 
attractive to funders. 
MAG had clear principles of self-reliance in its development 
strategy. This was manifested in its provision of loans rather than grants to 
co-operatives. This practice allowed members to have complete control 
over and responsibility for the financing of the enterprise. It facilitated the 
financial independence of MCC and fostered a relatively balanced power 
relationship between the co-op and the service organization. Grants usually 
lead to relationships of dependency. MCC's financial independence also 
facilitated a more realistic evaluation of its operation as an economic unit. 
Despite this emphasis on self-reliance, however, Mr James Taylor, 
the co-op coordinator, noted that the community perceived MAG as "the 
giver of everything" (Interview 3.1). In this sense there was a relationship 
of dependency. This tendency is revealed in MCC's request for a grant 
which I explore later in this chapter. Furthermore, MCC's free access to 
managerial skills from MAG contributed to dependency. The establishment 
of the Overberg Cooperatore' Service Co-op (OCS), however, was intended 
to institutionalise entrepreneurship and managerial skills in an attempt to 
move away from this dependence on skills and to make them more 
affordable for all co-ops in the region. This was innovative considering the 
high market price and scarcity of these skills, and the need for co-ops to 
have continuous access to them. 
MAG had no written policy on co-ops. However, it defined and 
treated co-ops as primarily economic enterprises owned and controlled 
exclusively by their members. This fostered a similar attitude among co-op 
members which had positive implications for the success of the enterprise 
in delivering material goods to its members. 
The relationship between MAG and MCC had two key dimensions: 
one was contractual based on the loan agreement signed by the co-op; the 
other was supportive based on the services MAG provided. This 
relationship was not always easy. MAG's commitment to facilitate the 
eventual independence of MCC implied a "dynamic and changing" 
(Interview 3.1) relationship between these organisations: 
We [the MAG] are only ultimately successful when we are not 
needed anymore (Interview 3.2). 
Significantly, this dynamic relationship allowed for democratic 
organisation as an ongoing process involving enterprise adaptation to 
changing needs. MAG was prepared to change its role with changes in 
MCC's needs during its development. In this way MCC was ensured of 
support throughout its initial stages of development. 
119 
7.5 Historical Development of Montagu Carpentry Co-op 
7.5.1 Initial developments 
The co op was initiated at the end of 1985 Three members of the Montagu 
coloured community approached the MAG for funds to start a carpentry 
business They were employed for many years as carpenters in local firms 
owned by white employers and characterised by capitalist and racist social 
relationships One of them was a skilled cabinet-maker who had no formal 
carpentry training but several years of experience His reputation later 
attracted many customers to the MCC, some of whom were the clientele of 
his previous employer 
The MAG responded to this initiative by making available a 
reasonably soft loan of R24 000 with which some basic machinery was 
purchased The loan agreement involved payments at 10% interest over 
about fourteen years, with an initial moratorium of about eighteen months 
The latter was meant to give the co op a chance to find its feet MCC paid 
R250 monthly towards this loan 
The founder member1 had very limited managerial skills Mr James 
Taylor, staff member of MAG responsible for small business development 
at the time, and later appointed as co-op coordinator, had some experience 
in carpentry He helped set up the carpentry co-op in Zuurbraak He 
contributed management, administration, costing, quoting, and other 
related skills to the newly found MCC The enterprise grew very rapidly in 
response to demands of the local market 
7.5.2 Decline of the Enterprise 
Towards the end of 1986 specific problems arose which started the co op 
on a long, slow and steady decline Firstly, revenue generated in 1986 was 
paid out in bonuses at the end of that year leaving no working capital for 
1987 The amount involved is unknown Secondly, the quality and design 
of products declined and customer negotiations became a major problem 
(Interview 3 2) 
It became clear that specific skills such as financial planning and 
customer negotiations were indispensable to a successful carpentry 
workshop Furthermore, jobs accepted had to be designed and cost 
individually because the raw materials required differed from job to job If 
the co-op were to remain in artisanal carpentry production the producers 
would become dependent on the continuous input of these skills At the 
time it was unreasonable to expect producers to acquire the skills in the 
short term, and too expensive to employ someone with the specific skills 
(Interview 3 1) 
In addition to these related problems of financial decline and skills 
shortage, group dynamics among the co-op members deteriorated The 
2
 Two of the three carpenters who approached the MAG for funds lost interest in 
the initiative leaving the skilled cabinet maker as the founder member 
120 
founder member had little understanding of what working in a co-operative 
entailed This was as new an experience for him as for his fellow members 
According to Mr Anton Grutter3, the manager at the time of research, "he 
saw it as an opportunity to run his own show" (Interview 3 2) This 
perception and his emphasis on his seniority in both age and skill 
converged with fellow members' intemalisation of age and skill 
hierarchies This made it difficult for them to challenge his behaviour and 
so act in their own interests That the founder member was an alcoholic 
added to these already complex problems Eventually the co-op members 
parted company with him as he was no longer productive This was a 
traumatic experience for the co-op as a whole, and yet necessary for its 
survival 
Furthermore, during 1986 the co-op had appointed a member-
manager (the first manager) It is not clear when, how, and why this 
manager was appointed, but it turned out to be an unsuccessful attempt at 
introducing management skills into the enterprise Early in 1987, this 
manager was recalled by fellow members as he failed to execute his duties, 
and acted against the interests of the co-op as a whole The structure of the 
co operative which enabled members to have control over management, 
and the method of decision making by a simple majority vote facilitated 
this process 
Although Mr Taylor, the MAG co-op coordinator, guided producers 
where necessary, he avoided imposing his ideas upon them The process of 
decline of the co-operative was thus not impeded, instead, it was "allowed 
to decline" (Interview 3 2) 
7.5.3 Appointment of a New Member-Manager 
Mr Taylor went on leave and his skills had to be replaced This brought 
home to producers the necessity for management skills in their enterprise 
Early in 1987 when the co-op was in dire financial straits Mr Anton Grutter 
was temporarily appointed as co-op coordinator by the MAG 
Later, the predominantly coloured producers of MCC decided to 
appoint Mr Grutter, who was white, as member-manager of their 
enterprise This major decision was followed by an important process in 
MCC's history two days of meetings about the manager's role in the co-
operative The process of appointing Mr Grutter came to a head around 
March and April 1987 
The parameters of his role as member-manager within MCC were 
decided upon collectively These included production planning, product 
development, customer negotiation, sales, marketing, product delivery and 
ordering of raw materials Importantly, he was given complete authority in 
the workshop He did not, however, have the power, held by managers 
(generally white) in capitalist firms, to "heers oor die werkers" (reign over 
3
 Mr Grutter was (he second member manager of MCC appointed by the co op 
members 
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the workers) (Interview 3 2) Furthermore, he was responsible for 
presenting to members information they required for decisions about the 
enterprise This included weekly reports on productivity levels in relation 
to the production target, the state of sales and orders, and the relationship 
between income and expenditure 
The latter was an important and often difficult role Mr Gratter had 
to facilitate other members' ability to ask relevant questions about 
information at the same time as presenting the information 
You need a developed skill to do this especially when talking 
to people most of whom do not have a conception of what they 
are expected to do with the information, and do not know what 
questions to ask (Interview 3 2) 
When producers had problems, including those related to the 
managers function, these were raised at fortnightly general meetings or at 
special meetings for urgent problems Furthermore, co-op members held 
the right to recall the manager's position in the event of his unsatisfactory 
performance Finally, as member manager, Mr Grutter obtained his salary 
from the revenue of the co-operative This in addition to the practices 
mentioned above facilitated managerial accountability in the enterprise 
When Mr Grutter was appointed, the co-operative was still in a 
process of economic decline His suggestion of a 25% wage reduction was 
rejected by members A 10% reduction was collectively agreed upon as an 
attempt to bring the co op onto its feet again For some time after this wage 
reduction the co-operative went through a lengthy process of keeping its 
head above water For 1987 MCCs revenue from sales was R59 000 
(Income and Expenditure 1987/1988) while the surplus for that year was a 
meagre R2 800 (ibid ) During this time the enterprise lost a significant 
number of members from thirteen down to four producers and the 
manager A lengthy process of rebuilding the MCC started This involved a 
restructuring of the cooperative and also a process of negotiation around 
Mr Grutter authority Research was conducted in the midst of this process 
7.5.4 Shift from Artisanal Carpentry Production to Assembly-Line 
Production 
In response to the related problems of economic decline and skills 
shortage, and as part of rebuilding MCC, the enterprise shifted from 
artisanal carpentry to assembly-line production This major structural 
change in the organisation of production had significant implications for 
further developments 
The shift to assembly-line production was an attempt to (a) adapt the 
production process to the skill level of most producers and (b) to reduce 
production costs in an attempt to improve economic performance 
In the context of artisanal carpentry production each skilled producer 
concentrated on a single product with an unskilled producer working as an 
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assistant This method of production organisation proved to be inconducive 
to transferring skills effectively, perpetuating the already existing skill 
hierarchy The shift to assembly-line production involved a division of 
tasks With this process skilled members were deskilled This provided 
space for the creation of jobs for the unskilled It meant that the co-
operative could expand more easily by including unskilled people in the 
less skilled processes of production In this way people with limited skills, 
often needy of work, could be slowly assimilated into the co-operative 
With regard to production costs, artisanal carpentry production 
meant that raw material had to be bought for each job This often meant 
buying in small quantities and having much wasted material On the other 
hand, with assembly-line production and the making of several of the same 
product, raw matenal could be bought in bulk and wastage reduced This, 
combined with the production time saved when shifting from artisanal 
carpentry to assembly-line production, helped reduce costs 
The appointment of Mr Grutter as member-manager and the 
accompanying division of labour decided on in the co-operative, removed 
producers' dependence on skill input from outside the enterprise In 
addition, the shift to assembly-line production facilitated their ability to 
gain control of a major portion of the production process Once a product 
was developed producers made mistakes in the sample stage of production 
When these were corrected and a production line setting for a specific 
product started, they took complete control of the remaining production 
processes 
The shift to assembly-line production was one of the most 
significant organisational and structural changes in the development of 
MCC It marked a move from an individualised artisanal form of work 
organisation to a more socialised and collective production process This 
shift facilitated producers' collective control of production 
7.5.5 1988: A Year of Success 
1988 proved to be successful both economically and organisationally for 
MCC Revenue from sales almost doubled this figure for 1988 was R96 
000 (Income and Expenditure 1988/1989) compared to R59 000 for 1987 
The co-operative managed to negotiate three highly lucrative 
contracts early in this year One of these was with the Department of 
Education and Training (DET) for the manufacture of toddler furniture for 
creches This contract amounted to R50 000 and entailed the production of 
forty-eight sets of furniture with fifteen items in each (Letter from 
manager, 10 1 90) It facilitated the shift into assembly-line production by 
enabling producers to manufacture batches of fifteen similar items at a 
time Production started in April 1988 and the final delivery of furniture 
was made in November 1988 
The second contract was with the Braehead Bishop's Residence in 
Cape Town for the manufacture of church benches This amounted to R20 
000 Production started in September 1988 and was completed in 
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November of that year (Letter from manager, 10 1 90) This was a 
challenging job for the co operative in terms of its members' skills, its 
technology and the need to be creative and adaptable when solving 
production problems The challenge, however, enabled Mr Grutter to work 
very closely with producers on the shopfloor in an attempt to do the job 
well This goal was achieved collectively 
We managed to get it done and to establish pride in our work 
which was very important It was very hard and there were 
times when we really had to 'sukkel' [battle] We often ran into 
technical problems because we did not always have the 
appropriate machinery for all the work and we basically had 
to figure it out for ourselves But we did it and we established 
that we could rate among the best (Interview 3 2) 
The third contract was with Delaney's, an advertising agency, for the 
manufacture of deckchairs This amounted to R18 000 Production started 
towards the end of 1988 and was completed early in 1989 
7.5.6 Further Changes to Production Organisation in 1988 
The nature of work for the DET contract enabled further significant 
changes in the organisation of production A clear technical division of 
labour developed 
Before every guy would handle a job and he would have one 
or two people ытріу assisting him Now we have about five 
departments in the workshop (Interview 3 2) 
These departments included, in the order of production, the 
following 
a) the heavy machinery department, where parts were cut, 
b) the light machinery department, where parts were shaped, 
c) the assembly department, where parts were assembled, 
d) the sanding department, where weak parts in the wood were filled and 
where the assembled parts were neatly and smoothly sanded down and, 
e) the finishing and packing department, where painting and packing was 
done 
A further change in the production process included a move from 
hand-painting to spraypaintmg This was a major technical change New 
equipment was purchased, a spray room fitted with a ventilator was 
prepared, and a member in the finishing department was trained in 
spraypaintmg 
By the end of 1988, the co-operative managed to make a surplus of 
about R12 000 a portion of which was distributed among the members m 
the form of bonuses (about R5 000), while the rest was invested in product 
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development It is clear that the co-operative experienced major 
developments organisationally, economically, and technically in that year 
Looking back on 1988 with regard to member participation and 
responsibility, however, Mr Grutter thought there were very few changes 
There was basically one 'оке' I guy] who was the manager, 
and he told everybody what to do, and they did it (Interview 
3 2) 
This scenario changed The reorganisation of the workshop into 
various departments enabled the allocation of manageable work to the 
unskilled co-op members The first half of 1989 saw further organisational 
developments in the co-operative, this time accompanied by increasing 
responsibility on the part of co-op members In addition to an overall 
production co-ordinator, a co-ordinator was elected for each department 
All co-ordinators were working members of the co-op who met weekly to 
discuss bottlenecks in production and to plan production for the next 
working week Since producers now organised production themselves, the 
manager was no longer formally involved in this process This had positive 
effects for the development of members as responsible and accountable 
cooperators 
Seeing people take responsibility and growing in their work 
has been a positive experience for the co-op we decided 
that it is not morally right or wrong, not better or worse, but 
ineffective for everybody to do everything So we delegated 
particular functions to various people (Interview 3 2) 
7.5.7 New Problems lead to a Second Decline 
In contrast to the success of 1988, the co-op experienced economic decline 
in the first half of 1989 Alongside the above-mentioned positive 
implications, the shift from artisanal carpentry to assembly-line production 
precipitated new marketing problems 
Whereas before we had people come through the front door 
with work, we now had to go out and sell the products that we 
made (Interview 3 2) 
Marketing skills were severely lacking in the co op A marketing 
strategy appropriate to assembly-line production was not adopted in time to 
allow a balance in production and sales Hence, the decline in sales and 
related difficulties covering costs Moreover, a substantial amount of 
production time and much of the surplus of 1988 was invested in product 
development during the first few months of 1989 As a result, MCC had 
insufficient financial capital for an extensive marketing campaign 
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Furthermore, with artisanal carpentry production income was 
received on completion of jobs With assembly-line production, however, 
MCC had to focus on stock building This meant spending money on raw 
materials for products not to be sold immediately causing an imbalance in 
sales and costs Value produced was in the form of stock rather than sales 
In addition, MCC sold its products to established commercial furniture 
dealers which operated on the basis of credit over a period of thirty, sixty, 
or ninety days The co-op extended credit to these enterprises 
Consequently, cash money owing to MCC for goods sold was received 
much later resulting in cashflow problems 
In sum, marketing and cashflow problems were the key reasons for 
this decline Towards the end of the research period MCC was exploring 
strategies to deal with this crisis 
7.5.8 Disagreements over Strategies 
The co-op obtained a bank overdraft of R5 000 to make itself more liquid 
When this measure proved insufficient, Mr Gratter suggested applying for 
an additional loan from MAG His argument was that the value of stock 
(approximately R13 000) could be used as collateral tor a loan of R13 000 
Co op members, however, wanted a grant The manager's suggestion was 
overridden by a majority vote at a general meeting for a grant 
His comment on this was as follows 
Developmentally this is a very important step because it shows 
that the manager does not rule the roost I think that we 
should not go for funding But I have to subject my opinion to 
the will of the members I view that as development The 
meeting took a decision with which I did not agree I accepted 
the authority of the meeting If the meeting at another time 
rejects someone else's idea, they must know that they must be 
subjected to whatever the majority decides (Interview 3 2) 
The context of this disagreement is important Unlike workers in a 
conventional enterprise, all members were acutely aware of the decline of 
their enterprise through weekly financial reports The reports from mid-
May to the end of July 1989 clearly indicated an increasing negative bank 
balance despite wage cuts over the past seven months. In addition, living 
costs were rising This was the first time MCC's members faced this 
situation 
It is hard for them I have had to deal with this type of stress 
before, but they are learning it now (Interview 3 2) 
Moreover, their lack of experience with credit facilities augmented 
their request for a grant rather than a loan 
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1 ) Die mense kan dit nie bekostig nie (Interview 3 4f· 
2 ) Ons skuld hulle nog vir 'ie masjiene; ons nog 'ie klaar 'ie 
Ons skuld 'ie bank Ons kan me nou meer diep in 'ie skuld 'ie 
Hoe gaan ons hierdie skuld uitkom7 En hoe gaan ons 
vorentoe gaan ? (Interview 3 6)5 
3.) Most members do not have experience of credit - they do 
not want to owe so much money (Interview 3 2). 
Contact with other cooperatives in South Africa, the majority of 
which depend on large grants, also influenced members' partiality to this 
form of assistance The vote for a grant was not a step towards self-
sufficiency and viability. It did, however, indicate tensions between 
expectations on the part of MAG and the co-op members respectively 
These disagreements were indicative of MCC's growing pains 
The motivation for a grant proved to be very difficult in the light of 
MAG's policy on financial assistance to cooperatives Eventually, MCC 
applied for two loans one of R13 000 with stock as collateral and a second 
of R12 000 without collateral. The latter was motivated on the basis of 
rapidly increasing living expenses and the need for capital to build a more 
stable enterprise. 
Considering the need for growth and the potential marketability of 
MCC's products these loan applications were realistic Most successful 
economic enterprises operate with certain amounts of debt for the purposes 
of financial capital required for the growth Furthermore, in the light of 
MAG's responsibility for facilitating the establishment of MCC, it was 
more responsible for the service organisation to provide the co-op with a 
substantial loan 
Dit is vir my meer onverantwoordehk om te min geld te leen 
vir 'η co-op as om geen geld te leen nie (MCC Meeting: July 
1989) (Interview 3 1)* 
The outcome of these loan applications is, however, not included in 
this work 
7.6 Tensions around the Management-Producer Relationship 
The introduction of management skills into the co-op was a positive 
development providing much needed skills and independence from outside 
sources of skill However, the appointment of a member-manager who held 
4
 "The members cannot afford to have credit" (Interview 3 4) 
5
 "We still owe the MAG for the machines, we have not yet settled this debt We 
owe the bank money We cannot afford to enter into deep financial debt now How will 
we settle this debt1? And how will we progress7" (Interview 3 6) 
6
 'In my opinion, providing an insufficient loan is more irresponsible than 
providing no loan at all" (Interview 3 2) 
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authority in the workplace introduced a complex relationship into the co-
operative. 
This relationship was further complicated by the fact that the 
manager was white while all members (except one who was African) were 
coloured. This introduced an element of inequality - one that producers felt 
bound to challenge. Consequently, tensions arose in the workplace. These 
were expressed by some members as follows: 
I.) Ek sou sê dat Anton 'η goeie bestuurder is. Ну het baie 
sterke deursettingsvermoë. Ну werk baie hard. As jy 'η 
probleem het - al is dit ook hoe simpel - sal hy jou sy volle 
aandag gee. This member expressed the following problem: 
As hy wil hê dit moet so gaan, moet dit so gaan. Asjy nou met 
iets besig is, en hy wil hê jy moet iets doen, dan verwag hy dat 
jy nou moet los watjy doen (Interview 3.5a)1 
2.) Anton is die bestuurder van MSK nê, maar die meeste van 
die tyd wil hy soos 'n baas optree. Want as hy gesê het spring, 
dan moet ons vra hoe hoog. A positive comment by this 
member was as follows: Daai iets wat 'η leier moet het, het 
Anton een baie sterk kenmerk, en dit is mensekennis. Hy weet 
net hoe om, as ons nou nie miskien lekker voel nie, hoe om ons 
op te beur (Interview 3.5b)% 
3.) Anton is 'n goeie man op 'ie job want hy kan nie rus 'ie. Hy 
werk dag en nag. Ну werk hard - hy bring 'ie geld - hy bring 
'ie job Nou ek sien Anton het die goeie kante in hom. Maar 
hy speel daai baas kant. Byvoorbeeld, as ons hier nou werk, 
as hy iets sê, dan wil hy hêjy moet luister na hom. Ander ding, 
hy wil hê dat ons werk soos hy wil (Interview 3.6)9 
To some extent these tensions were negative. Members' perceptions 
of the manager's execution of his role were shaped by their perception of 
him as 'white'. They were suspicious about him, and sometimes this gave 
rise to defensive responses to legitimate problems raised by the manager. 
This further complicated the management-producer relationship causing 
often unnecessary stress on the manager, and blocking effective 
communication between him and the members. 
7
 "Anton is a good manager. He works hard and perseveres If you have a problem, 
no matter how simple, he will give you his full attention He does, however, want his 
way If you are busy and he wants you to do something, he expects you to leave what 
you're doing immediately" (Interview 3 5a) 
8
 "Anton is the manager, but most of the time he acts like a white boss If he says 
"Jump", we have to ask "How high9" Nevertheless, he has the quality a leader needs 
most, namely, knowledge of human nature/compassion He knows how to cheer us up 
when we don't feel so good" (Interview 3.5b). 
y
 "Anton is good at his job He does not rest He works day and night He works 
hard He brings money/income and work. He has good qualities But he plays the role 
of a white boss. For example, if he speaks while we are working, he wants us to listen 
immediately And he wants us to work according to his wishes" (Interview 3 6) 
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This was exacerbated by the uneven spread of the 
stress/responsibility for the co-op's economic success or failure. As in most 
capitalist enterprises, most of this responsibility was carried by the 
manager. Even as workers challenged what they perceived as his 
paternalist attitude, they tended to assume that the manager is ultimately 
responsible for the economic failure or success of the enterprise. These 
conflicting attitudes towards the task of management converged in the co­
op, causing a specific tension around responsibility. 
But these tensions also had very important positive consequences. It 
kept members on their toes with regard to the manager's activities and his 
attitude toward them. In this way, it initiated a continuous process of 
negotiation around authority, inequality, and how best to execute work. 
Members engaged in a continuous re-definition of the manager's authority. 
This ultimately contributed to their empowerment, and contradicted the 
generally assumed management prerogative in capitalist firms. 
Clearly, some kind of authority was needed. But these tensions could 
only be resolved if the workers and the manager could negotiate a new kind 
of authority - one based, not on paternalist baasskap10 but, instead, on a 
shared commitment to a common goal. 
7.7 Challenges to 'Baasskap': The Development of Cooperative 
Consciousness 
One of the main reasons why people formed and joined MCC was their 
common experience of racial discrimination in their previous work 
environments. Their resentment of such discrimination had a marked effect 
on both their initial frame of reference to co-operation and their definition 
of MCC as a co-operative. The quotations below show how some of 
MCC's members experienced the difference between their previous 
employment and work in the co-operative. 
1.) By Langeberg werkjy onder 'η baas. In die ko-operatief is 
jy op jou eie (Interview 3.3)". 
2.) Ek het by die Langeberge gewerk. Nou daar, as jy nou net 
toilet toe gaan of so dan word jy uitgeskel Nou skel die 
boere ook nog! Maar hier, jy werk vir jouself; jy word nie 
rondgeshout nie (Interview 3.5a)'2. 
3.) Na skool het ek werk gaan soek en ek gaan maak toe 'η 
grap en gaan toe by die blommewinkel in en ek vra: 'Missies, 
het missies nie vir my werk nie?' 'Wag net gou vir die 
grootnooi', se huile toe vir my....En ek vat toe die werk....Maar 
1 0
 'Baasskap' refers to work and other hierarchical relationships based on race 
1
 ' "At Langeberg [Canning Factory] you work under a white boss. In the 
cooperative you are on your own" (Interview 3.3). 
1 2
 "I worked at Langeberg [Canning Factory]. There, you are shouted at when you 
visit the toilet And the 'boers' have the audacity to shout at you! Here [in the 
cooperative] you work for yourself, and you are not shouted at" (Interview 3 5a) 
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in die loop van die week was dit ook nie my fout nie, gaan ek 
in 'η toilet in, ek kom daar uit, toe sê sy vir my: 'jy mag nie 
daar in gaan nie. Ons gebruik dit. Julie toilet is oor 'ie 
straat'.....Diep in my hart het dit my seergemaak In die 
MSK voel ek baie gelukkig (Interview 3.5b)>}. 
4.) Die verskil is toe ek in die stad was, jy het vir 'η baas 
gewerk. Die lekkerste is om in die MSK te werk omdat hy nou 
'n ko-operatief is. Jou kennis kanjy verskriklik uitbrei In die 
private sektor besit die baas die brein want anders kan hy nie 
die besigheid bestuur nie. Ну sê wat word gemaak. Jy is onder 
bevel in die private sektor, enjy is me onder bevel in die MSK 
me (Interview 3.4)14. 
5.) Geen baasskap is mos daar in die ko-operatief me 
(Interview 3.7aYs. 
The experience of baasskap was predominant among most members 
of the MCC. By comparing work at the Langeberg Canning Factory, for 
example, with work at MCC, members developed a conceptualisation of 
the latter as different work. Contrasting present with previous work 
experiences was important in the growth of a critical consciousness - a 
rejection of baasskap. Shared negative experiences of racial discrimination 
and white authority among most of MCC's members contributed to their 
solidarity, their commitment to work co-operatively, and to the meaning 
that the co-op had for them. 
For most members the key feature of a co-op was that it did not have 
a baas and that it gave them independence: 
I.) 'n Co-op het nie 'η baas nie en het nie 'η beperkte ledetal 
nie. Jy werk vir jouself. Jy kan uitbring wat op jou hart is wat 
jy nie in die private sektor kan doen as jy vir 'η baas werk nie. 
Jy kan nie vir hom sê ons moet nou so en so maak me want jy 
sal nie gehoor word me. Want wat die baas sê is wet. En as 
daar 'n probleem ¡s luister hy na jou maar hy luister nie met 'n 
vol oor na jou me. Dit gebeur nie in 'n co-op nie - as jy praat 
het jy 'n stem - enjy is geregtig op daai stem....En 'n mens kan 
13
 "After my schooling 1 went to look for work. I went to a florist and jokingly 
asked· 'Madam, does madam have any work for me9 ' They replied 'Just wait for the 
mistress'. I took the job. During the week I visited the toilet So she said to me· 'You 
may not use that toilet It is for our use only Your toilet is across the road'. This was 
not my fault I felt deeply hurt ..In the MCC I feel happy" (Interview 3 5b) 
'* "When I worked in the city I worked for a white boss It is enjoyable to work at 
MCC because it is a cooperative. You can expand your knowledge here. In the private 
sector the white boss possesses the brain otherwise he cannot manage the business He 
decides what should be produced You are under command in the private sector, and 
you are not under command in MCC" (Interview 3 4) 
15
 "There is no white authority in the cooperative" (Interview 3 7a) 
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die MSK 'η ko-operatief noem omdat daar is 'η gevoel dat 
daar nie 'η baas is nie (Interview 3.4)16. 
2.) Hoe ek 'η ko-operatief sien is, niemand is baas nie, elke lid 
het 'η stem. As daar 'η probleem is dan los ons dit saam op. 
En net die lede van die ko-operatief behartig die sake van die 
ko-operatief omdat huile nou daar werk (Interview 3.3)π. 
3.) Ko-operatief is van die mense. Ko-operatief sit ons op 'ie 
pad van 'ie struggle. Daar is 'ie 'n baas 'ie - ons probeer self 
(Interview 3.6)™. 
4.) Kyk, in 'n ko-operatief werk jy nie onder 'η baas 'ie; jy is 
op jou eie (Interview 3.7a)^. 
5.) Ons het 'n bestuurder maar nie 'η baas nie (Interview 
3.5a)20. 
MCC's members arrived at this definition through their experience in 
MCC. Their practical activity in an attempt to eliminate baasskap in their 
workplace gave their experience meaning. 
Although the absence of baasskap was predominant, other factors 
also contributed to their conceptualisation of MCC as a co-operative. 
Among these were the recognition that they had a voice in MCC and the 
space to take initiative. 
Some members emphasised team work: 
As 'n span moet 'η mens kan saamwerk in 'n ko-operatief. As 
een span moet jy kan baie idees self kan gee in die ko-
operatief Die idees moet van die span self afkom. As daar nie 
kan spanwerk wees nie dan ly produksie daaronder (Interview 
3.3)». 
'6 "A co-op does not have a white boss and it does not have a limited membership. 
You work for yourself. You can voice your grievances - something you cannot do in the 
private sector if you work for a white boss. You cannot express your opinion because 
you will not be heard Because, what the white boss says is law. And, if there is a 
problem, he listens to you, but not with his full attention. This does not happen in a co­
op, if you speak, you have a voice and you are entitled to that voice. And, one can call 
the MCC a cooperative because there is a feeling that there is no white boss" (Interview 
3.4). 
1 7
 "The way I see a cooperative is that nobody is a white boss/a single authority 
figure, every member has a voice. And if there is a problem, we solve it collectively. 
And the members manage the affairs of the cooperative because they work in it" 
(Interview 3.3). 
1 8
 "Cooperatives are of the people. Cooperatives set us on the road of struggle. 
There is no white boss We make our own effort/we try on our own" (Interview 3.6) 
1 9
 "Look, in a cooperative you do not work under a white boss, you are on your 
own" (Interview 3.7a). 
2 0
 "We have a manager but not a white boss" (Interview 3.5a). 
2 1
 "As a team you must be able to work collectively in a cooperative. As a team 
you must be able to contribute ideas in the cooperative. The ideas must come from the 
team itself. If there is no teamwork, production suffers" (Interview 3.3). 
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Others stressed the importance of the enterprise in the community: 
I.) Ons wil self ons gemeenskap probeer opbou (Interview 
3.5a)22. 
2.) Die MSK se goeie punte is dat hy verskafwerksgeleenthede 
vir die mense in die gemeenskap. Ons wil mense oplei sodat 
nulle hul kennis kan verbreed (Interview 3.4)2>. 
Sharing in both the profit and loss of the enterprise and taking 
responsibility for work also formed part of members' conceptualisation of 
the MCC: 
I.) Ons werk op ons eie daar, jy sien. As ons miskien nie ons 
tyd reg bestee om ons produkte te maak me, jy sien, dan is dit 
van ons eie tyd wat ons mors en ons eie geld wat ons mors. 
Daarom voel ons as daar werk gedoen moet word, dit moet 
gedoen word - en as daar rusty d is dan is daar rus tyd 
(Interview 3.3)24. 
2.) Die werk wat ek nou kry weet ek dat ek dit moet doen. Ну 
[the manager] gaan nie meer op ту kop sit nie om te sé dit 
moet so en dit moet so. Ek weet ek moet dit doen (Interview 
3.5a)2\ 
3.) As 'η mens onder druk werk is jy seenuweeagtig en jy kan 
nie lekker werk 'ie. Jy voel vry om jou werk te doen [in the co-
op]. Die feit dat jy nou respek het vir jou werk - jy voel 'dit is 
ту ne' (Interview 3.5 b)26. 
4.) Jy hoef nie iemand moet jou stoot agterjou nie. Jy sien self 
hoe gaanjy maak. Die werk hang by jou. Jy moet self moeite 
maak (Interview 3.6)21. 
These factors show that the process of conceptualising MCC as a co­
operative did not occur exclusively through members' negative definition 
of it - daar is 'ie 'n baas 'ie2*. Instead, they knew how their enterprise 
2 2
 "We want to try developing/improving our community ourselves" (Interview 
3 5a). 
2 3
 "The MCC's good point is that it provides employment opportunities for people 
in the community. We want to train people so that they can expand their knowledge" 
(Interview 3.4) 
2 4
 "We work on our own there, you see If we do not spend our time productively, 
it is our time and our money that we waste. That is why we feel that work to be done 
must be done - and rest periods are rest periods" (Interview 3.3). 
2
^ "I know that the work I receive must be done The manager no longer dominates 
me by saying it must be done this way or that I know I must do it" (Interview 3.5a). 
2 6
 "If you work under pressure you become nervous and cannot work well You 
feel free to do your work in the co-op because you respect your work - you feel 'it is 
mine'" (Interview 3 5b). 
2 7
 "You do not need anyone to push you You figure it out for yourself The work 
depends on you You must make an effort" (Interview 3 6) 
2& There is no while boss 
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differed from a baasskap This helped define new forms of authority at 
work 
Here the work of Bate and Carter (1986) (reviewed in detail in 
Chapter 3) is of significance Their distinction between ideational' and 
ideological' factors involved in people's predisposition to form and join co 
ops is helpful One of the primary 'ideational' factors in MCC was 
members' common expenence of racial discrimination in their previous 
work environments Their resentment of such discrimination had a marked 
effect on both their initial frame of reference to co-operation and their 
definition of MCC as a co-operative 
7.8 Conclusion 
MCC's organisational structure facilitated démocratisation by attempting to 
build an alternative to the dominant culture of authoritarian work 
relationships The system of elected departmental coordinators facilitated 
delegation of authority and responsibility to the producers Structural 
change in production organisation from artisanal carpentry to assembly-
line production contributed to developments in the division of labour both 
in production and decision-making This change allowed for increasing 
producer participation in and control over the affairs of the enterprise 
Mechanisms ensunng members' control over management and 
managements accountability also facilitated démocratisation 
The rejection of baasskap among most members and their 
assumption of responsibility for their work engendered a sense of solidarity 
and collective commitment to the enterprise as an alternative workplace 
Finally, the dynamic relationship between the MCC and MAG made room 
for démocratisation in the enterprise 
All these factors, in addition to members' high skill levels, the high 
quality and uniqueness of the products, and MCC's ability to generate its 
own income contributed to the potential viability of the co-op at the time 
The marketing and cashflow problems were signs of enterprise growth 
rather than non-viability 
Moreover, Table 2 below shows that wages earned in the co op 
compared relatively favourably with wages in other cooperatives in South 
Africa at the time, and in other possible employment opportunities in the 
area 
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Table 7.2 Comparative Wage Figures 
Type of Work Monthly Wage in Rands 
Τ Experienced MCC members 3ÖÖ 
2. Inexperienced MCC members 240 
3 Average in other co-ops in South Africa 144 
4 Minimum for casual and unskilled 
permanent workers in agro-induslnes 450 
5 Average for permanent workers in agriculture 350 
6 Average for seasonal farm workers 131 
Sources and Notes: 
Figures 1 and 2 are wage figures for 1989 after the 10% wage reduction 
Figure 3 is cited from Philip, 1988: 146 
Figure 4 is calculated from the estimates given by Cousins, 1993: 19 
Figure 5 is calculated from the average annual wage reported by Hamman, 1992 cf 
Cousins (1993: 18). 
Figure 6 i.s calculated from the average annual wage reported by Hamman (in Cousins 
1993. 18) This annual average (R523) was divided by 4, roughly the number of months 
worked by seasonal employees per year. 
These comparative wage figures are significant when considering 
that MCC's members joined the co-op not only for ideological but also for 
material reasons. Clearly the MCC was serving its members material needs 
favourably in relation to other sources of income as well as providing an 
alternative work environment. 
In the light of Abell's (1981) five principles of democracy, MCC 
reflected a relatively high degree of démocratisation. This was manifested 
in widely practiced member participation in the co-op's affairs. The 
delegation of specific tasks and decisions to the manager and department 
coordinators was in tandem with Abell's principles of representation and 
special competence. Furthermore, principles of efficiency and meta-
democracy were relevant in this case. Members' decisions about problems 
facing the enterprise were indicative of steps taken towards goal 
fulfillment. The appointment of a member-manager because of the lack of 
managerial skills and the introduction of a clear division of labour in 
production and decision-making were examples of such decisions. Since 
these were made democratically, the principle of meta-democracy was 
relevant in the MCC. 
Similarly, in terms of Bernstein's (1976) minimally necessary 
conditions for effective and sustained participatory democracy, the co-op 
reflected a high degree of démocratisation. A combination of both direct 
and delegated participation in decision-making was practiced. Weekly 
management reports and fortnightly general meetings allowed for sharing 
management-level information with producers. Although MCC's members 
did not have an independent board of appeal, the small size of the 
enterprise facilitated peer discussion of grievances. 
Members' assumption of responsibility for their work and their re-
definition of relationships in the workplace were indicative of a particular 
type of consciousness. These were important steps towards building a 
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cooperative consciousness Although not formally written, practices in 
MCC reflected guaranteed individual rights Further, the 10% wage 
reduction decided on by members was a form of feedback of economic 
results Considering that Bernstein's minimally necessary conditions were 
present in MCC at the time of research, I conclude that this co-op had the 
potential to become a sustained and effective participatory democratic 
organisation 
This account of MCC shows that it exhibited the features of 
Brecker's (1988) characterisation of potentially viable cooperatives Firstly, 
MCC had a basic level of management, organisational and production 
structures to facilitate planned production towards a surplus Secondly, the 
key problems facing the co-op, about five years after it started, were 
growth related MCC's marketing and cashflow problems required 
specialised financial, technical and managerial needs The co-op was 
clearly in a crucial transitional phase at the time of research Choices about 
short and long term strategies to overcome its crisis, access to appropriate 
financial support, and the availability of technical support specifically 
directed at its needs as a growing cooperative enterprise were bound to 
have a significant influence on the future of this co-op 
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CHAPTER 8 
FENCING SERVICES COOPERATIVE SOCIETY: 
PHOENIX COOPERATIVE AND CO-FOUNDER OF A SELF 
FINANCE SCHEME 
8.1 Introduction 
Fencing Services Cooperative Society (FSC) is a manufacturing 
cooperative based in Harare, Zimbabwe It was formed in 1983 by workers 
who took over a capitalist firm, formerly M & D Enterprises FSC 
manufactures fencing material and wrought iron gates, and erects fences It 
is one ot the first industrial cooperatives to be formed in Zimbabwe and 
one of the founders of the Collective Self Finance Scheme 
Before telling the story of this cooperative I provide, briefly, the 
socio-political and economic context of cooperatives in Zimbabwe at the 
beginning of 1990, the time of research in this particular enterprise I begin 
with a brief overview of the political economy of the country This is 
followed with a brief history ot the cooperative movement in Zimbabwe 
Furthermore, I attempt to outline the place of contemporary co-ops in the 
economy and their general organisational structure Some attention is also 
given to the role of the state in relation to cooperatives 
The focus on the state's role is important since it has made some 
commitment to support co-ops The case of Fencing Services Co-op is 
indicative ot such support Nevertheless, many observers including those 
involved in the co-op movement in Zimbabwe have defined the state's 
commitment as simply rhetoric, and since the evidence indicates that the 
state has made few concrete steps in support of co-ops, it is important to 
examine the disjuncture between the state's promises and its actual 
practice 
8.2 The Zimbabwean Context: A Brief Overview 
Zimbabwe has a population ot about 9 million (1988) The majority of the 
people are black Less than 2 percent of the population is white and less 
than 0 5 percent are coloured (Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989 8) 
Unemployment is a key social problem The escalating process ot 
urbanisation due to fewer restrictions alter Independence on people staying 
in towns and heightening pressures on the land, only barely lifted by the 
state's resettlement programme, and the slow growth of employment 
combine to raise unemployment levels According to Stoneman and Clifie 
(1989 67), the 1982 Census recorded 268 000 unemployed, all apparently 
in the urban areas, representing 10,8 percent of the total labour force If the 
rural areas were added the actual number of unemployed people for 1982 
would be much larger In his budget speech in July, 1988, the Minister of 
Finance, Mr Chidzero, estimated that there were about 900 000 
unemployed, or 30 percent of the entire workforce 
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The scale of unemployment in Zimbabwe is similar to that in South 
Africa Moreover, Stoneman and Cliffe (1989 67, 68) predicted that in the 
post-independence context of a large increase in education mainly at the 
secondary level, 100 000 school-leavers each year will be competing for 
only 10 000 new jobs in the formal sector in the 1990s On the basis of 
anticipated trends of employment creation it is estimated that by the mid-
1990s the annual shortage of jobs will be around 250 000, making a third 
of the labour force unemployed (ibid ) These figures paint a threatening 
picture of the growing problem of unemployment in the country and could 
in the long run have important implications for the cooperative movement 
The Zimbabwean economy is essentially capitalist The bulk of its 
major productive property is privately owned with production being for 
private interests, in the pursuit of profit, through the employment of wage 
labour Furthermore, self-managed cooperative enterprises play a marginal 
role in the economy and despite promises made, such ventures have 
received little attention from the state 
The majority of cooperatives in the country are involved in 
agricultural production, marketing, and supply According to Chitsike 
(1986 226), the total number of Agricultural Marketing and Supply co-ops 
as estimated by July 1985 was 597 In addition, Stoneman and Cliffe 
(1989 116) estimate that there are about eight hundred (800) active 
farming collectives in comparison to approximately eighty (80) such 
enterprises in other sectors of the economy 
Next to South Africa, Zimbabwe is the second most industrialised 
country in the Southern African region with manufacturing being the core 
of industry The majority of industry is privately owned and run by whites, 
while there is some state investment in the cotton and iron and steel 
industries The Zimbabwean Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) is a semi-
parastatal which exports about 80% of its manufactured goods There are, 
however, also cooperative enterprises in this sector of the economy 
Figures provided by Chitsike (1986 226) indicate eight fishing, two 
hundred and fifty (250) industrial, and twenty five (25) mining co-ops by 
July 1985 
Among the range of financial institutions is the Zimbabwe Banking 
Corporation Limited (Zimbank) in which the government has direct 
investments of about 61 percent (Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989 151) The 
vast majority of these financial institutions do not provide finance to co 
ops since these enterprises generally have a weak capital structure 
Zimbank, however, has been providing finance to some cooperatives since 
May, 1989 
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8.3 Elements in the History of the Zimbabwean Cooperative 
Movement 
8.3.1 White Farmers' Marketing Co-ops 
The first co-ops in former Rhodesia were established in the second decade 
of this century These were marketing co-ops founded by groups of white 
settler farmers They were "cooperatives of the exploiting class" (England, 
1987 128) Such enterprises were engaged in the collection, transportation, 
and sales of the produce of white farmers, and many of them served as 
outlets for the provision of farming equipment such as fertilisers and seeds 
Relics of these enterprises exist in Zimbabwe today, for example, the 
Farmers' Co-op This is essentially a large capitalist enterprise which sells 
agricultural inputs to its members - mainly white commercial farmers - at 
discount prices 
8.3.2 African Peasants' Marketing and Supply Co-ops 
A second type of cooperative existed in Zimbabwe before Independence 
These were the Marketing and Supply Cooperatives established among 
small African peasant farmers towards the end of the settler period These 
enterprises emerged in the mid- 1950s as part of the colonial state's strategy 
to create a class of relatively wealthy small African peasant farmers These 
farmers were allocated land on the African Purchase Areas In order to 
make their individual farming activities viable they needed methods of 
purchasing agricultural inputs and of marketing their produce This gave 
rise to the Marketing and Supply Co-ops which served the needs of these 
peasant farmers who continued to produce as individuals, rather than 
collectively 
These enterprises were the main type of cooperative in existence at 
Independence and have grown significantly in number since then By the 
end of 1985 more than 600 such societies had registered (Stoneman and 
Chffe, 1989 114) and by 1987 these organisations served more than 100 
000 peasant farmers (England, 1987 128) Stoneman and Chffe (1989 
114) suggest that this growth in the number of Marketing and Supply Co­
ops is a result of both the changed economic context and peasants' 
endeavours to produce for the market, and of government encouragement 
through the Ministry of Cooperatives 
The Marketing and Supply Co-ops fit into a three tiered level of 
organisation At the local level the cooperative society to which each 
farmer-member elects officials is the primary cooperative Primary 
societies are made up of farmers who work as individual producers, but 
join a co op to benefit from shared purchasing and marketing facilities A 
collection of such societies in a specific area are affiliated to a union of 
cooperative societies which is made up of individual farming enterprises 
These unions operate at a regional level The unions belong to an umbrella 
organisation at national level, namely, the Central Association ol 
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Cooperative Unions (CACU). CACU is heavily dependent on government 
services and foreign donor agencies. It is assisted by the Friederiech Ebert 
Foundation of West Germany and US Aid (Chitsike, 1986: 14). 
Currently the strength of these cooperatives lies at the union rather 
than at the primary or national level. In general terms this implies that there 
is little prospect for such co-ops becoming effective organisations of 
peasant producers for the purposes of defending their interests either at the 
grass-roots or the national levels. Peasants organised at the grass-roots 
level might be able to control their own affairs and their relations with the 
market and the state. Furthermore, such organisation at the national level 
could enable peasants' demands to be heard alongside the effective national 
representation achieved by the large commercial farmers (Stoneman and 
Cliffe, 1989: 115). The absence of organisation at these two levels, 
moreover, points to one of the weaknesses of the cooperative movement. 
8.3.3 Contemporary Collective Co-ops 
Distinguishing Characteristics 
Cooperatives formed after Independence are called 'collectives' to 
distinguish them from the Marketing and Supply Co-ops. Membership of 
collective co-ops is drawn mainly from unemployed unskilled and semi-
skilled workers (especially farm workers), landless rural poor people, 
people displaced by the liberation war, and demobilised ex-combatants. On 
the contrary, membership of the Marketing and Supply Co-ops are mainly 
relatively wealthy small peasant farmers. Furthermore, unlike the 
individual character of production among these small farmers, the internal 
relations of collective cooperatives are characterised by collective 
ownership and control of the means of production, collective labour, and 
the sharing of the proceeds of production (OCCZIM, 1983: 15). 
The relations of such enterprises with the capitalist market (their 
external relations) demand that the collectives survive on the same terms as 
any other capitalist enterprise. Hence, collective co-ops must produce for 
the market in response to forces of supply and demand. There are about 
800 active farming collectives with about 25 000 members (Stoneman and 
Cliffe, 1989: 116). In addition, there are about eighty (80) collective 
cooperatives operating industrial firms, commercial enterprises, and mines 
(1989: 116). Fencing Services Co-op is one of these industrial enterprises. 
The Organisation of Collective Cooperatives 
On the basis of their collective nature these co-ops formed their own 
umbrella organisation independent of CACU, namely, the Organisation of 
Collective Cooperatives of Zimbabwe (OCCZIM), and published their own 
newspaper, namely, Vanguard. After several meetings in 1982 in 
preparation for the launching of OCCZIM, and after the state had, on two 
occasions, instructed the organisers to cancel its founding conference, 
OCCZIM was finally formed in September, 1983. 
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The aims of OCCZIM are to promote and unite progressive co-ops 
(OCCZIM, 1983 4) defined as collectively organised co-ops with a 
socialist orientation (OCCZIM, 1983 17) Furthermore, the aim of 
OCCZIM is to represent the interests of such enterprises (OCCZIM, 1983 
13) It is for these reasons that England (1987 136) describes OCCZIM as 
an organisation (in formation) with an "embryonic class consciousness" 
It is estimated that by March 1986 OCCZIM represented about one 
third of the approximately 800 active collectives in Zimbabwe (Hanlon, 
1986 2 с f Вгескег, 1987 2) Despite this relatively large 
representativeness, OCCZIM's embryonic nature meant that it was 
organisationally weak and inexperienced in effectively organising 
collectives A further weakness within OCCZIM was its bureaucratic 
character (Brecker, 1987 21, 122) 
In addition, since its inception OCCZIM and its member co-ops have 
relied heavily on financial assistance from foreign donor agencies such as 
the Canadian University Service Organisation (CUSO), and local voluntary 
organisations such as Zimbabwe Project (Brecker, 1987 3) For example, 
OCCZIM's board of directors received their salaries from CUSO These 
financial ties proved to be a double-edged sword On the one hand, access 
to donor finance facilitated the establishment of several collectives while 
on the other hand, these ties eventually led to dependency relationships 
between со ops and the donors In this regard Brecker (1987 17) describes 
OCCZIM as "prisoner of the donor agencies" This was in direct 
contradiction with OCCZIM's aim to promote 'progressive', self-reliant со 
ops (OCCZIM, 1983 8) 
Brecker's (1987) case study of the OCCZIM Mechanics Training 
Programme reveals some of the mechanisms at play in the development of 
this dependency At the October, 1986, OCCZIM Conference, however, 
the old executive committee of the organisation was dismissed by its 
membership in their attempts to reduce its dependency on aid Although 
the majority ol the collectives of Zimbabwe still suffer from the effects ot 
this dependency today, there has recently been a move towards self 
reliance among some such enterprises The establishment of the Collective 
Self Finance Scheme (CSFS) in 1988 represents the first step toward a self 
reliant co operative movement in Zimbabwe Fencing Services Co op is 
one of the founder members of this Scheme 
Organisational Structures within Collectives 
Typically, the organisational structure of a collective cooperative (whether 
it be agricultural, industrial, or commercial) includes a management 
committee elected by the general members at the Annual General Meeting 
(AGM) of the enterprise Depending on the size and degree of variation of 
productive activity there may be production departments each representing 
an economic activity in the co-op Such departments may each have 
department heads who take responsibility for the specific tasks of that 
department For example, typical departments on an agricultural co op 
include piggery, crops, gardens, and administration, while in an industrial 
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co-op one might find marketing, sales, assembly, and administration 
departments Furthermore, some departments may deal with social issues in 
the co-op such as education, welfare, and nutrition The productive sphere 
of these enterprises is usually under the direction of an elected general 
manager 
With regard to the distribution of revenue, should there be any 
surplus, this is divided among the membership in accordance with their 
collective decision Usually a monthly allowance (wage) based on equal 
pay for equal work is set according to the surplus projected This, however, 
may be altered depending on the deviation of the actual from the projected 
surplus In some co-ops there may be a practice of dividing a portion of the 
remaining surplus after provision has been made for investment capital 
Again, this decision ultimately rests on the general members who will be 
advised by the management committee 
Means of Finance 
The collective co-ops in Zimbabwe have been financed by (a) the 
government, (b) funds contributed by cooperatore in the form of 
demobilisation funds and (c) foreign donor agencies The government 
sponsored agricultural collectives are known as the Model 'B' type co-ops 
in which groups ranging in size from 50 to 200 people are resettled on ex-
commercial farms of an average size of just more than 2,5 hectares These 
co-ops constituted part of the government's resettlement programme which 
can be seen as a response to peasants' expectations of land redistribution 
with the coming of Independence The co-ops constituted between 8 and 10 
percent of people resettled by the end of 1984 and "represent the main 
material contribution by the state to the cooperative sector" (England, 
1987 130) 
According to England (1987 130), the state had high expectations 
for these co-ops Some of these have been identified 
- To eliminate exploitative relations of production 
- To realise economies of scale 
- To facilitate the development of advanced production and 
management techniques 
- To circumvent the constraints on small scale peasant 
production (cf England, 1987 130) 
Model 'B' co-ops were not given title deeds to the land - the state 
owns these Instead, in order to achieve the goals quoted above the 
enterprises were given permits to occupy the farms and a national 
'establishment grant' of Z$ 63 000 in the form of equipment and inputs The 
permit system grants the cooperatore' use, control, and benefit rights over 
the land while the state maintains transfer rights This means that the 
collectives have control over production and reap the benefits of it but 
cannot dispose of the land and that the state, should it decide that 
production is inadequate, can repossess it 
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With regard to the 'establishment grant', by 1984 only 15,8 percent 
of the funds budgeted for these grants was allocated "Some co-ops got as 
little a 5 percent of their budgeted figure, and 53 percent of co-ops got 
nothing at all (England, 1987 131) The result was that most of these co-
ops severely lacked a capital infrastructure Consequently, the utilisation of 
land on these co-ops was under 10 percent (ibid ) In these circumstances 
co op members were unable to generate their own investment capital, the 
economic performance of the enterprises was extremely poor, and the 
members became poorer This situation has facilitated many observers 
comments that co-ops are bound to fail Among other factors contributing 
to failure include poor management and a lack of both organisational and 
technical skills 
The bulk of collective cooperatives, however, was not financed by 
the government At the end of 1985 it was estimated that there were 
approximately 900 collectives of which only 46 were government 
sponsored Model B' type enterprises (England, 1987 132) Some of these 
enterprises provided their own start-up capital, for example, Simukai Co-
operative outside Harare Simukai was an existing commercial farm that 
was bought by the members from pooled demobilisation funds Other 
enterprises received funds from foreign donor agencies This eventually 
gave rise to the development of a dependency relationship between co-ops 
and such agencies 
Profile of Independently Funded Co-ops 
England (1987 132) gives a percentage profile of these non-government 
funded co-ops which indicates that they are spread over most sectors of the 
economy agriculture (31%), industry (30%), consumer (23%), transport 
(4,5%), mining (3,5%), street traders (3,5%), arts and crafts (2%), fishing 
(1%), and other (1,5%) 
In addition, he gives one a brief profile of the co-ops in the different 
sectors With regard to those in the industrial sector, the sector relevant to 
this study, he states that most of these enterprises are small scale sewing 
cooperatives involving mainly women producing school uniforms 
Furthermore, there are a few larger-scale industrial co ops engaged in 
brick-making and building construction, fence-making and erection, and 
cosmetics manufacture (1987 133) Some of the larger-scale enterprises 
such as FSC were formed by worker takeovers of previously privately 
owned firms 
8.3.4 Informal Pre-Cooperatives 
In addition to the officially registered Cooperative Societies engaged in 
marketing and collective production, there is a vein of cooperative activity 
which is informal Such activities are especially widespread in the 
countryside and are referred to as 'pre-cooperative' These include informal 
women's savings clubs and groups of neighbouring households who share 
oxen, ploughs, and/or labour A government report by Chitsike (1985) 
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suggests that about twenty percent of the rural population is engaged in 
such pre-cooperative activity Such activity abounds in South Africa and 
the rest of Africa 
8.4 The State and Co-ops in Zimbabwe 
The exposition above shows that the existence of various types of 
cooperatives is widespread in Zimbabwe This indicates that such 
enterprises are reasonably popular initiatives Despite the government's 
favourable attitude towards co-ops, however, as expressed in official 
rhetoric, its practice of promoting such enterprises is at best ambiguous, 
and its provision of the resources required by co ops is entirely inadequate 
8.4.1 State Policy 
State policy on cooperatives dates back to 1909 In this year the 
Cooperative Agricultural Societies Act was passed to facilitate the 
formation of the white commercial farmers' marketing co-ops Nine such 
enterprises still exist in Zimbabwe serving the interests of about 4 000 
large-scale commercial farmers (World Bank, Agricultural Sector Review, 
1989 i) Since this Act failed to provide limited liability for the members 
of societies registered in its terms, it was removed from the statute books in 
1958 and replaced by the Cooperative Companies Act (Majóme, 1985 2, 
3) The commercial farmers' cooperatives now operate under this Act 
Furthermore, in 1944 the Native Production and Trade Commission 
was formed to investigate marketing and supply problems experienced by 
African peasant farmers On the recommendation of this Commission the 
colonial government promulgated the Cooperative Societies Act in 1956 
This Act provided for the registration of agricultural and trading 
cooperatives to serve the interests of neh African peasant farmers ( 1985 2, 
3) This legislation of the colonial period remained in use after 
Independence and continued to govern co-ops until the beginning of 1990 
Soon after Independence and in response to the sensitive issue of 
land redistribution, the task of redistributing land and forming cooperative 
societies was given to the Ministry of Lands Resettlement and Rural 
Development This Ministry established a department of Cooperative 
Development to administer and promote cooperative development 
(Gauldin, 1989 19) 
In response to the outdated nature of the 1956 legislation the 
government made a new policy statement in its Cooperative Policy Paper 
of 1983 This Paper simply outlined a general approach on the part of the 
Zimbabwean government towards co-op development It presented the 
promotion and establishment of co-ops as a remedy to the problems of 
poverty, unemployment, exploitation, and lack of skills in Zimbabwe 
(Chitsike, 1986) In 1986, the Ministry of Community and Cooperative 
Development and Women's Affairs (MCCDWA) was established to 
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coordinate and strengthen the promotion of cooperatives (Gauldin, 1989 
22) (As of November 1989, this Ministry is referred to simply as the 
Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development (no longer of 
Women's Affairs) (1989 23)) 
In 1988 the drafting of a new policy on cooperatives began This 
legislation was, however, not yet officially passed by the beginning of 
1990 The Cooperative Societies Bill of 1988 is far more detailed than the 
1983 Policy Paper and tends to move away from broad sweeping objectives 
towards socialism to a more issue-specific focus in its policy on 
cooperatives, for example, the specified conditions for registration and the 
detailed provisions for organisational structures and duties within co-ops It 
remains to be seen, however, how effectively this Bill will and can be 
implemented, and what possible unintended consequences might anse as a 
result 
8.4.2 State Action 
As mentioned earlier, observers have defined the state's commitment to 
support co-ops as simply rhetoric and, moreover, there is considerable 
evidence indicating that the state has done little in practice to support such 
enterprises (refer to Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989 116, England, 1987 131, 
Brecker, 1987) Such criticism has also emanated from within government 
structures Comrade Malunga, an MP from Mpopoma has said that the 
government has linked cooperative development "too much to ideology" 
and that it has "talked too much and did very little to help cooperators" 
(Zimbabwe Herald, undated article) In this short section I examine briefly 
the disjuncture between the state's promises and its actual practice by 
looking at the explanations provided by two authors on the subject 
Chitsike (1986) accounts for this disjuncture by focussing on the 
lack of knowledge among government officials responsible for co op 
development regarding problems facing co-ops, a shortage of such officials 
and a lack of adequate transport for the few who are employed in this 
capacity, a lack of coordination among the various government 
departments responsible for cooperative development, and inadequate 
legislation on this subject This approach suggests that the development of 
a well-equipped bureaucracy will ensure that co-ops get what they were 
promised 
On the other hand, Brecker (1987) places much of the responsibility 
for the lack of state support for co-ops on the failure of the state to deliver 
its promises He tends to shift from blaming the state directly to referring 
briefly to the implications for cooperatives of the unequal balance of class 
lorces in Zimbabwean society The problem with his approach lies in his 
heavy emphasis on the state being at fault "The state must bear full 
responsibility for the crisis conditions that have developed on the 
collectives" (1987 68) 
Neither one of these authors provide an adequate explanation of the 
state s failure to do what it had promised In my view, a consideration of 
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the balance of class power in Zimbabwean society and its expression 
through the state highlights the reasons for the state's lack of support for 
co-ops despite its favourable policies towards such enterprises 
Firstly, it requires effective political organisation and hence the 
development of political power to influence state actions As indicated 
earlier, the marketing and supply co-ops are strong only at the union level 
and not at the primary or national levels of organisation This means that 
peasant farmers are unable to control their own affairs with the state and to 
have their demands heard alongside the effective national representation 
achieved by the large-scale commercial farmers Furthermore, the class 
nature of the collective co-op movement, and the embryonic nature of 
OCCZIM contributes to the weakness of this movement in relation to the 
state and other class forces in society Hence, its inability to demand the 
promises made The present balance of class forces in Zimbabwe 
characterised by a politically more powerful bourgeoisie in relation to the 
proletariat and the peasantry thus helps to explain the incongruity between 
state policy and action with regard to cooperatives 
Furthermore, there are indications of a tendency towards state 
control of the cooperative movement This tendency is manifested in the 
state's response to the formation of OCCZIM Early in 1983 the 
government attempted to form a National Federation of Co-ops This 
organisation was intended to bring together all types of co-ops ranging 
from the commercial Fanners' Co-ops, through the African Peasants' 
Marketing and Supply Co-ops to the collectives The co ops were to be 
organised by sector in this organisation In the light of the balance of forces 
among these co-ops and the numerical dominance of the African peasant 
farmers' co-ops, this objectively meant that the collectives would be 
swamped in this national organisation This would have serious 
implications for the democratic and representational potential of the 
cooperative movement (England, 1987 136, 137, Stoneman and Cliffe, 
1989 116, 117) Furthermore, the effective banning of OCCZIM's 
founding conference by the state is an indication of its attempts to control 
the collective cooperative movement 
According to England (1987 137), this action towards OCCZIM on 
the part of the state should be seen in histoncal perspective During the 
period immediately after Independence 35 000 ex-combatants were 
demobilised 
They were demobilised in the most fragmenting manner - by 
paying each individual a small sum of money Effectively, 
therefore, they were demobilised not only militarily, but also 
politically, as any kind of organised force (1987 137) 
About 12% of these ex-combatants resisted this disjoining and re-
organised themselves into collectives As individual collectives, however, 
they still remained a fragmented socio-political force The formation of 
OCCZIM represented the first attempt to re-organise the ex-combatants 
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(and also the poor peasantry and the unemployed urban workforce) 
politically at a national level Furthermore, this re-organisation was across 
political party and regional divisions and under the control of the rural and 
urban poor (England, 1987 138, OCCZIM, 1983 7) This form of 
organisation presented a threat to the newly independent one-party state 
caught in the contradiction of its socialist rhetoric on the one hand and, on 
the other, its role of maintaining the essentially capitalist social order in 
Zimbabwe 
The historical development of the cooperative movement in 
Zimbabwe and, more specifically, the struggles of the collective 
cooperative movement highlight the importance for cooperative 
organisation ot a well organised cooperative movement independent of 
both the state and aid organisations It also illustrates the need to examine 
the balance of class forces in society as a whole when assessing particular 
stages in the historical development of any social movement In addition, 
the experiences of dependency in this movement and the recent move away 
from this toward a more self reliant cooperative movement, as manifested 
in the establishment of the CSFS in 1988, points to the importance of 
experience in cooperative development 
In the context of a new political order in South Africa and its 
emphasis on redistributing wealth in the form of land, to mention but one 
source of wealth, processes in the history of the Zimbabwean cooperative 
movement offer many lessons to leam from 
8.5 Historical Development of Fencing Services Cooperative 
8.5.1 Taking over a Virtually Bankrupt Firm with the Help of the 
Ministry of Labour 
FSC is a phoenix co-op Mr Beasley, owner of the capitalist fence 
manufacturing firm, M & D Enterprises operating as Fencing Services 
Private Limited, applied to have his firm liquidated in March, 1983 The 
workers decided to take over this firm and to form Fencing Services 
Cooperative Society By this time the Zimbabwean state had implemented 
its policy on promoting cooperatives 
In the context of the ensuing elections and the state's interest in the 
co-op, and in the face of losing their jobs in the event of liquidation, the 
workers of M & D Enterprises refused to go home on the instructions of 
government officials of the Department of Labour The Minister of Labour 
then intervened and met with the workers At this meeting the idea of 
forming a cooperative originated and on 1 April, 1983, Fencing Services 
Cooperative Society Limited was officially registered Upon formation of 
the co-op each member bought shares in the enterprise to the value of 
Z$40 
The first Executive Committee (EC) of the co-op comprising seven 
people initiated a challenge to the liquidation order They were assisted by 
the Ministry of Labour and government legal officers Ten months of 
146 
negotiations followed between the Ministry of Labour in support of the 
workers, the seven EC members of the co-op, and Mr Beasley, the owner 
of M & D Enterprises After successfully challenging the liquidation order, 
the workers finally signed an agreement with Mr Beasley to take over the 
firm 
This agreement resulted in the workers buying the machinery and 
equipment worth Z$ 221 300, furniture for Z$ 5 310, and stocks of raw 
material and finished goods worth Z$ 330 000 The co-op was thus 
indebted to Mr Beasley for about Z$ 560 000 This money had to be paid to 
him at 12 percent interest over a period of four years (Agreement between 
Beasley and Co-op Management Committee, 1984, FSC Profile, Brecker, 
June, 1988 24) 
Moreover, the premises on which the enterprise was situated was 
also Mr Beasley s property This was sold to the Central Mashonaland 
Cooperative Union (CMCU) for about Z$ 200 000 (Interview 4 1) 
According to Ms Maramba, Management Assistant at the CSFS, the 
government extended a loan of this amount to CMCU to buy the premises 
from Mr Beasley At the time of research FSC rented these premises from 
CMCU at Z$ 2000 per month 
In January 1984 FSC had a total of one-hundred and forty-three 
(143) members By September of that year, however, a feasibility study of 
the enterprise by the Small Enterprise Development Corporation (SEDCO) 
and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), both parastatals, 
suggested a considerable reduction in membership for the purposes of 
enterprise viability A combination of the last-in-first-out retrenchment 
procedures which followed this suggestion and the voluntary departure of 
some members due to lack of funds for wages and salaries, brought the 
total membership of the co-op down to fifty-three and later, to forty-nine 
At the time of the take-over, the owner of M & D Enterprises, Mr 
Beasley, had accumulated debt to the value of about a half-million 
Zimbabwe dollars The major creditors included Zimbabwe Iron and Steel 
Company (ZISCO), a parastatal, Lancaster Steel, a subsidiary of ZISCO, 
Mr Beasley himself, and the bank Significantly, Lancaster Steel was the 
supplier of raw materials namely, galvanised wire, to FSC and the co-op's 
only competitor in the manufacturing of barbed-wire 
The take-over meant that the workers were responsible for this debt 
Furthermore, the evidence indicates that workers were taking over a firm 
that had been stripped of all its liquid financial resources the balance sheet 
of M & D Enterprises as at 31 March, 1980 indicates that Z$ 98 000 was 
paid out in dividends from a retained profit of Z$ 102 000 The most likely 
explanation for this significant decrease in liquid capital is that 
immediately before Independence in 1980, the firm paid out dividends in 
the face of uncertainty regarding continued operations after Independence 
This stripped the enterprise of a substantial amount of liquid capital 
In the face of enormous accumulated debts and no liquid funds to 
serve as working capital for the purposes of buying raw materials for 
continued production, the co-op approached the Small Enterprise 
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Development Corporation (SEDCO), a parastatal, for financial assistance 
On two successive occasions SEDCO advanced credit facilities to FSC to a 
total value of Z$ 70 000 for buying raw materials from Lancaster Steel 
Unfortunately, however, due to the mismanagement of funds on the 
part of FSC's first Executive Committee, the co-op could not fulfill its 
credit agreement with SEDCO and Lancaster Steel Subsequently, the 
amount of Z$ 70 000 was altered into a long-term loan with SEDCO, while 
Lancaster Steel sold raw materials to the co-op only on a cash-on-delivery 
basis The loss ot these credit facilities and the consequences, namely, 
having to pay cash for materials, further undermined attempts towards 
building an economically successful enterprise 
Further investigations on the part of co-op members into this 
mismanagement of funds revealed the complex history ot FSC's Executive 
Committee 
8.5.2 From a Self-instated to a Democratically Elected Executive 
Committee 
Information obtained from Mr Makoni, chairperson of the co-op at the time 
ot research, suggests that the officials on the first Executive Committee 
(EC) were not elected by democratic process According to Mr Makoni, 
with the formation of the co-op, 
we were told by the Ministry that if [we] want [our] things 
[firm] to go well, [we] must make him, a white-man, Mr Gibb, 
the chairman, [while we would] elect the other people [to the 
exec ulive committee]" (Interview 4 5) 
In addition, those workers who participated in the negotiations 
against liquidation simply claimed to be the EC allegedly on the advice of 
the Ministry of Labour (Interview 4 5) Furthermore, according to Mr 
Makoni, the rest of the membership agreed to this claim since they were 
more interested in proceeding with the operations of the enterprise 
There were no fair elections They just took the positions and 
told the people that they were chosen by the government, and 
yet they were not Now we did not want to waste time arguing 
on positions, so we said it's ok, it's no problem You carry on, 
as long as everybody i<¡ doing his job (Interview 4 5) 
The first, essentially self-instated EC fired the first chairperson, Mr 
Gibb It also forced the second chairperson, Mr Maviki, to resign 
According to Mr Makoni, this chairperson was elected by the members Mr 
Chiwaya, another member of the EC at the time, suggested that he could 
take the position of chairperson since he had worked closely with Mr 
Maviki and thus knew what needed to be done The general members 
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accepted this suggestion and Mr Chiwaya became chairperson of FSC 
These changes in the EC occurred between 1984 and mid-1987 
The Executive Committee under Mr Chiwaya was responsible for 
mismanaging the credit facilities for raw matenal purchases granted by 
SEDCO With the termination of these credit facilities an investigation was 
initiated by co-op members with the assistance of the Ministry of Co-ops 
into the practices of this committee It was found that certain committee 
members, including the chairperson, Mr Chiwaya, were firing co-members 
for being critical about committee procedures Mr Makoni, the accountant 
at the time, was among those threatened with losing their jobs 
In the face of retrenchment, these members approached the Ministry 
of Co-ops for assistance with an investigation into the practices of the 
Executive It was clearly revealed that the first Executive Committee had 
not been elected by the general members through a democratic process 
Neither had the Ministry advised those members initially involved in 
liquidation negotiations to take up positions as executives Furthermore, an 
examination of financial records of the co-op revealed that certain 
executive members had been embezzling funds 
Consequently, in mid-July, 1987, the self-instated EC with Mr 
Chiwaya as chairperson was fired by the general members for running the 
co-op as though it was their private business and for having embezzled 
funds A new EC with Mr Makoni as chairperson was elected by the 
general assembly of members 
8.5.3 Operation at 20 percent capacity for over Five Years 
In addition to the credit facilities lost due to the mismanagement of funds, 
FSC's new Executive Committee noted as at June, 1988 that most of the 
co-op's revenue would be ploughed into the 12% interest paid to Mr 
Beasley Interest charges to that date exceeded Z$ 173 354 even though 
they had repaid an amount of Z$ 365 621 (principal debt plus interest), 
leaving a balance of Z$ 365 343 owed to Mr Beasley after the agreed four-
year payment period (Brecker, June, 1988 24, 25) Considering that FSC 
started with no working capital and limited managerial and entrepreneurial 
skills it was unrealistic to expect it to repay debt to the value of Z$ 560 000 
at a 12% per annum interest rate within four years 
With no working capital, a bad credit record, and no collateral for 
obtaining further credit to finance continued production, the co-op was 
unable to produce at full capacity and to create surplus revenue On the one 
hand, there was a demand for barbed-wire since Lancaster Steel and FSC 
were the only manufacturers of this product in Zimbabwe at the time On 
the other hand, the co-op did not have sufficient funds to buy raw matenals 
on a cash basis According to Ms Maramba, the co-op operated at twenty 
percent capacity from 1984 through to May 1989 a period of five and a 
half years 
Information obtained from Mr Makoni, the Chairperson of Fencing 
Services Co-op, confirms the above 
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We did not have working capital, that was the problem What 
we were left with was just raw materials and a few finished 
products [this] was our starting capital (Interview 4 5) 
8.5.4 Reasons for Taking over the Firm Despite the Odds 
There are significant reasons why workers decided to take over the firm 
and form a co-op despite the debt involved and probably unknowing ot the 
implications ot having no liquid capital Firstly, the liquidation ot the firm 
took the workers by surprise and in an attempt to secure their jobs in the 
face of unemployment, they decided to take over the firm Secondly, in the 
context of government socialist rhetoric encouraging people to form co 
ops, the opportunity existed for these workers to own the firm (Interviews 
4 5,4 1) And, finally, 
We knew that we were the ones who were doing the 
operations if one man [the owner] goes away, why should 
we fail7 He was just a person who would come and sit in his 
office and go, meanwhile we are the people who are doing 
the work We wanted to show the government that we can do it 
[run the firm] regardless of him [the owner] having gone 
away (Interview 4 5) 
8.5.5 Founding the Collective Self Finance Scheme 
Under the leadership of the new Executive Committee FSC's major 
problems did not change These included a severe lack of working capital 
to finance continued production, a bad credit record, and no collateral to 
serve as security for credit By mid-1988 the cooperative had no-one, but 
ltsell, to turn to for financial assistance Meanwhile, since 1987 there had 
been developments within the co-op movement in Zimbabwe about the 
possibility of establishing a self finance scheme for co-ops In May 1988, 
FSC joined seven other cooperatives in an attempt to create their own 
finance scheme for the purposes of supplying the co-ops with working 
capital and the managerial skills necessary to manage such finances 
8.6 The Collective Self Finance Scheme 
The Collective Self Finance Scheme (CSFS) is a unique form of non-
governmental development organisation It was launched in September 
1988 by eight potentially viable cooperatives in Zimbabwe Mr Carl 
Brecker, an exiled South African in Zimbabwe, and Mr Andrew Nyathi, 
chairperson of Simukai Cooperative at the time, were key figures 
facilitating the founding of the CSFS The Scheme emerged in response to 
dependency on aid and donor control within the cooperative movement 
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Until 1990, it was the only known self-finance scheme in Southern Africa 
established, organised, and democratically controlled by cooperatives for 
the benefit of such enterprises In addition, it was one among few such 
schemes which (a) employed skilled people for dealing with economic, 
training, managerial, and social problems facing co-ops, (b) had formal 
financial agreements with a recognised commercial bank, and (c) provided 
the necessary services required by co ops entering loan agreements with 
the bank 
The eight founder member-cooperatives each operate in different 
sectors of the economy including the agricultural, manufacturing, retailing, 
and service sectors By 1990, however, the Scheme boasted a total of 
twenty-three member co-ops operating in these sectors of the economy 
(CSFS Newsletter, No 1, October, 1988, Brecker, October, 1989 1) 
8.6.1 Aims and Objectives of the Scheme 
The purpose of the Scheme is to provide its member-cooperatives with 
effective financial assistance and to develop their financial management 
capacity in preparation for obtaining bank loans guaranteed by the CSFS 
Its aims are, firstly, to provide a source of credit for its members at 
reasonable interest rates, secondly, to receive and hold shares and annual 
subscriptions of its members, thirdly, to enable member co-ops to use and 
control their financial resources for their mutual benefit and with minimum 
risk, and, lastly, to provide loans for its members which are administered 
by the Bank of Zimbabwe (Zimbank) (CSFS Newsletter, No 1, October, 
1988, CSFS Rules 1) 
In the light of their negative experiences with donor assistance and 
recognising the limits of donor and government funds for co-ops, CSFS 
member-cooperatives aim to achieve three inter-related objectives These 
are, firstly, to introduce cooperatives to the commercial finance market, 
secondly, to determine for themselves the form and scale of credit required, 
and thirdly, to continue using donor funding to assist them to these ends 
and to eventual self-reliance (Brecker, August, 1988 4) 
These aims and objectives are realised through CSFS rules, 
structures, methods of providing credit through its Loans Sub-Committee 
(LSC), services to member co-ops through its Technical Support Team 
(TST), and agreements with Zimbank and donors The Technical Support 
Team includes a Training Officer, a Management Assistant and a Social 
Organiser The latter staff member is responsible for social problems in co-
ops such as nutrition, child care and problematic social relationships among 
members The various organisational structures of the Scheme generally 
comprise of cooperators themselves, and when not, such structures are 
made clearly accountable to the cooperators through enforced rules and 
procedures The details of its operational structures and of its relationships 
with various institutions such as Zimbank are included in the appendix 
The specific relationship between the CSFS and its member co-ops is, 
however, dealt with in the paragraphs below 
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The specialised services of the CSFS are designed to serve 
cooperatives who have already established within their enterprise a sense 
of cohesion among members and who are potentially viable, that is, 
capable of producing a reasonable surplus Such co-ops which still lack the 
capacity to access development capital on the open financial market are 
eligible for membership and assistance from the CSFS (Brecker, August, 
1988 4) The CSFS does not serve pre cooperatives 
8.6.2 Shifting the Balance of Power in Favour of Co-ops 
The emergence of the CSFS did not mark a move towards the complete 
rejection of donor aid per se Instead, it meant a move towards shifting the 
balance of power between co-ops and donors in favour of the former by 
using donor funds in ways that empower cooperatives To make this 
strategy a reality rather than simply a 'vision' required "the conscious 
intervention" (Brecker, 1989 4) of the co-ops This entailed a difficult 
battle between founder co-ops of the CSFS and donor agencies mainly 
around control of the organisation receiving funds from donors, in this 
case, the CSFS During the course of this battle founder co-ops of the 
CSFS rejected all donor aid not controlled by them (1989 3) This marked 
the beginning of a process in which co-ops were taking responsibility for 
their own development 
Furthermore, 
[The] CSFS concluded [from the lessons it learnt through its 
member co-ops' experiences} that collectives can only grow 
under conditions in which the cooperators could remain in 
effective control through the production of a sustaining 
surplus [The] CSFS therefore turned its back on free hand 
outs not related to production, which for so long has been the 
order of the day (Brecker, October, 1989 10) 
This meant, firstly, that the co ops had to understand aid and the 
donor-recipient relationship as essentially political and that they had to use 
these insights to strengthen their position in this relationship so as to assist 
co-ops in determining the terms, forms, and methods of donor assistance to 
such enterprises (Brecker, 1989 15, 16) This understanding helped the 
Scheme establish co-op control over these key aspects of donor assistance 
Today, the CSFS is funded by donor agencies on its terms and in the 
interests of self-reliance of its member cooperatives 
The priority ot self-reliance in CSFS policy and practice developed 
as a response to historical experiences of dependency and donor control 
among cooperatives in Zimbabwe Furthermore, the relative independence 
of the CSFS from donor agencies is clearly a result of a long and difficult 
process 
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The CSFS was born out of the learnt experiences of those few 
relatively successful cooperatives who were/are still the 
recipients of donor assistance CSFS reflects their heightened 
consciousness and determination to use credit for 
development, rather than continue to request wanted 
assistance (Brecker, 1988 2) 
Processes involved in the birth of the CSFS as expressed in this 
quotation confirm my assumption that cooperative consciousness develops 
through experience and human action It is necessary to note, however, that 
the birth of the CSFS was facilitated not only by the heightened 
consciousness of some of its members but also by the particular material 
conditions prevailing among most of its founder co-ops The fact that most 
CSFS founder co-ops, excluding Fencing Services Co-op, were relatively 
more well off economically than other co-ops barely surviving in 
Zimbabwe points to the interrelationship between relative economic well 
being and the development of cooperative consciousness 
The relatively well developed cooperative consciousness of those 
who facilitated the founding of the CSFS was not, however, reflected in all 
co-ops who joined the Scheme In the case of Fencing Services Co-op, 
members' shared experiences of working in a capitalist firm and their 
common experience of the threat of unemployment influenced their initial 
frame of reference to cooperation However, some continuities in the 
structure of the former capitalist firm and the newly founded co-op resulted 
in subtly different conceptions of a cooperative among FSC's members 
Firstly, FSC's worker-members were wage labourers in the previous firm 
while manager-members were mainly salaried elencai staff in M & D 
Enterprises This structure continued in the cooperative with worker-
members on the shopfloor and manager-members in the offices The 
exception was that all members were shareholders in the co-op rather than 
employees/wage labourers Their specific positions in the cooperative 
resulted in significantly different perceptions of FSC as a cooperative 
These differences are reflected in the quotations below 
The following quotations indicate worker-members' perceptions of a 
co-op 
1 ) A co-op is where you can work either no paying any money 
[not receiving wages] The next week you can get money to 
survive (Interview 4 8) 
2 ) A co-op is a good organisation If you form your co-op you 
come to be rich quicker If you work united you never 
breakdown (Interview 4 6) 
3 ) To work for yourself is better than to work for someone 
(Interview 4 9) 
The following quotations indicate manager-members' perceptions 
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1 ) A cooperative is a company But it is different from a 
private company because it is cooperatively owned The 
decisions are participative If you people are doing a job one 
can say No that is not right work, let's try and do this' 
Regardless of a manager being there, you can listen to 
someone else's ideas Unlike in a private company where the 
boss is the one who can make decisions, here we have to make 
decisions together So that if I send someone to collect a 
cheque, he feels it's his cheque There is no reason why he 
should steal it (Interview 4 5) 
2 ) A cooperative is just like a company where workers work 
together to make their own things They are the employer and 
the employees It's just like socialism (Interview 4 3) 
3 ) The co-op is a group of people working under one 
umbrella, people working together doing one thing FSC is a 
co op (Interview 4 2) 
Worker-members emphasised the idea of 'working together', 
sometimes even for no pay, as better than working for someone else These 
views are, however, not representative, hence I cannot make any 
generalisations Manager-members, on the other hand, emphasised the idea 
that a co op is an enterprise like any other with the exception of its 
organisational, ownership and decision making structures These 
differences are, like in the other enterprises studied, related to members 
specific positions in the co-op structure 
8.6.3 Development Policy of the Scheme 
The CSFS's development policy emphasises (a) co-op autonomy with the 
primary function of such enterprises being production of a surplus adequate 
to workers needs, (b) co-op development as a process and a socio-political 
force, (c) grassroots control over and democratic participation in 
determining the future of co-ops, and (d) the empowerment of cooperators 
through their conscious actions (Brecker, October, 1989, August, 1988, 
June, 1988) 
It stresses democratic and grassroots control over all forms of 
assistance rendered to co-ops and the importance of considering how 
assistance facilitates production of a sustaining surplus - the primary 
function of a cooperative enterprise and the key to its success At the core 
of its approach is a belief that given appropriate organisational structures 
and the required managerial skills, cooperators are capable of decision-
making regaiding the organisation of their productive activities and 
resources so as to produce a surplus 
In addition, the CSFS does not only see cooperatives as democratic 
organisations in formation, instead, it also sees itself as such an 
organisation with a responsibility to respond to changes as a result of its 
development alongside the co ops which it serves This entails learning 
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from its experiences and from those of its member co-ops Furthermore, the 
CSFS recognises cooperatives as unique forms of production organisations 
requiring similarly unique forms of assistance in order to facilitate their 
success (Brecker, October, 1989, August, 1988, June, 1988) 
8.7 Relationship between the Scheme and its Members 
Member-cooperatives of the CSFS are selected on the basis of its entena 
for servicing potentially viable cooperatives Democratic control of the 
CSFS is rendered possible by each member electing a representative to the 
Council which makes general policy decisions and elects the Board to 
manage the Scheme (Brecker, June, 1988 5, Brecker, August, 1988 10, 
16, CSFS Rules 2,3,5) 
Members are admitted after selection by the Board, subject to 
approval by the Council Co-ops are required to make an equity 
contribution to the CSFS in the form of the payment of subscription fees 
and the purchasing of shares This money forms the basis for determining 
the member's liability for any debts of the Scheme In addition, the 
enterprise is required to wait for a period of six months before receiving 
funding from the CSFS in the form of a loan 
During this penod project appraisals are undertaken and technical 
assistance is provided by the CSFS This is followed by at least two years 
of further membership during which the CSFS delivers its development 
and credit services to the co-op In the event of resignation or expulsion 
from the Scheme liability of a member to the Scheme extends for a further 
two years beyond its minimum membership period (CSFS Rules 2, 3, 
Brecker, June, 1988 5) The initial financial contnbution from co-ops, the 
six month waiting period and the minimum membership period helps to 
ensure commitment to the Scheme 
The CSFS provides for its members mutually supportive finance and 
technical assistance for their development from potentially viable to viable 
enterprises 'Mutual support' in the CSFS implies that each of its member-
cooperatives has an obligation to its fellow members to be successful In 
the event of a member co-op s failure to meet its obligations to the Scheme, 
for example, to repay its loans, it is penalised 
The success of one is seen as the success of all, just as the 
failure of one becomes the responsibility of all (Brecker, June, 
1988 5) 
Furthermore, this mutual support is reflected in the system used 
when issuing loans and subsidising the interest payments on such loans 
Poorer co-ops receive the smallest loan provision while relatively more 
wealthy co-ops are eligible for larger loans Poorer co-ops, however, are 
eligible for a larger subsidy on interest than wealthier enterprises Through 
their subscnptions and shares the more wealthy CSFS co ops contribute to 
subsidising their poorer fellow members (Brecker, June, 1988 7) The size 
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of the loan and interest subsidy is determined by the grade of the 
cooperative 
The grading system devised by the CSFS allows for five grades It 
stipulates the maximum loan (arranged through Zimbank) and the 
maximum subsidy on interest (provided by CSFS) for each grade provided 
that the total amount borrowed does not exceed total funds, guarantees, and 
securities held by the CSFS The grades are as follows 
Table 8.1 CSFS Grading and Loans 
Grade Maximum Loan in Z$ 
τ Tsm 
2 5000 
3 10 000 
4 20 000 
5 50 000 
Table 8.2 CSFS Grading and % Subsidies 
Grade Maximum Subsidy 
Τ 73"% 
2 50% 
3 25 % 
4 10% 
5 5% 
(Brecker, June 1988 5, CSFS Document on Grading Criteria) 
The relationship between the CSFS and its members is essentially a 
mutually supportive service relationship under the direction of the 
cooperatore themselves It ensures member co-ops of support throughout 
their transformation into viable enterprises and gives them complete 
responsibility for their financing and the repayment of their loans 
Economically, the co-ops benefit from the credit facilities and skilled 
technical assistance provided by the Scheme These services are very hard 
for co ops to come by on the open market 
Moreover, membership of the CSFS opens up opportunities for the 
co-ops to survive the transition from potentially viable to viable economic 
enterprises trade union This is made possible through the ways in which 
services are rendered to co ops by the CSFS Firstly, these services are not 
provided randomly and mainly in cases of emergency Instead, CSFS 
financial and technical support is ongoing and is defined by the detailed 
agenda and the needs of the co-op as formulated and expressed by its 
membership This relationship facilitates self-determination and economic 
self-reliance among the member-cooperatives 
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8.8 Some problems with the Scheme 
At the time of research the CSFS was a relatively young organisation 
experiencing some birth pains One of these was the need to ensure that the 
Technical Support Team (TST) takes into consideration worker-members' 
interests, and not only those of member-managers Others included 
recruiting TST staff with both appropriate skills and an interest and 
concern for issues confronting co-ops With regard to the former, I refer to 
some bnef field experiences with two TST staff members 
The Management Assistant and the Training Officer tended to meet 
mainly, if not only, with member-managers of FSC These TST staff 
members had little direct contact with co-op members on the shopfloor 
Consequently, they developed relationships with and obtained information 
from member-managers only 
This situation had serious implications for the CSFS as represented 
by the TST Firstly, there was a danger that co-op members on the 
shopfloor would come to identify the TST as acting in the interests of 
manager-members rather than in the interests of the members as a whole 
Secondly, the information which the TST received from member managers 
was likely to be biased and this may have resulted in overlooking serious 
problems in the co-op, such as grievances about managers' behaviour In 
the event of the TST being identified as acting in member-managers' 
interests only, and of a failure to identify serious problems in the co-op 
regarding the management-producer relationship, the CSFS would be 
failing to serve the cooperatore 
It is true that the Social Organiser in the TST was responsible for 
identifying social problems in CSFS co-ops It is also true, however, that 
the Management Assistant and Training Officer's work could not be 
separated from dynamics of social relationships in the co-op In order to 
provide effective assistance, all TST field staff needed to be aware of these 
dynamics and to consider them when collecting information and actively 
working with the enterprise 
One way of learning about such dynamics was to speak to both 
member-managers and members on the shopfloor Furthermore, in order to 
develop a relationship with shopfloor-members and to win their trust the 
TST needed contact with the shopfloor before consulting member-
managers After all, the majority of cooperators were on the shopfloor and 
not in the offices Further, if cooperative management is seen as a 
relationship, both parties to it should be consulted 
With regard to the structure of the CSFS, there tended to be much 
overlap between co-op members who sat on the CSFS Council and Board, 
and those involved in managerial and executive structures within the co 
ops Six of the seven CSFS Board members were managers or executive 
members in member co-ops In combination with the overlap within co-ops 
between members of the executive and managerial structures, as illustrated 
later in the study of FSC, these members were also involved in decision-
making processes in the CSFS In the light of these overlaps m decision-
making and representative structures in both the co ops and the CSFS, the 
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Scheme required practical mechanisms to prevent decision-making at the 
level of the CSFS from being controlled by management and/or executive 
structures of the co ops 
One reason for these overlaps was the lack of education and skill 
among general members of CSFS member-co-ops The prevention of 
technocratic control over the CSFS by executives and a more participatory 
decision-making structure highlighted the importance of training general 
members in skills which enabled them to participate more effectively in 
both their enterprise and the CSFS 
8.9 Fencing Services Almost Incorporated into Lancaster Steel 
Just before the CSFS was able to provide its members with financial 
assistance, that is, around March/Apnl 1989, Mr Beasley complained to 
FSC about its failure to fulfill its agreement to pay off the machinery 
within four years and consequently arranged to sell the machinery in the 
co op in an attempt to recover his money He approached Lancaster Steel 
and proposed that it should buy the machinery from him The co-op had 
bought the machinery tor Z$ 221 300 in 1984 and in 1988 Mr Beasley 
offered the same machinery to Lancaster Steel for Z$ 269 000 Lancaster 
Steel then approached the co-op and proposed that it would buy the 
machinery from the co op, take responsibility for all its debt, and absorb its 
members into the semi parastatal as workers 
According to Ms Maramba (Interview 4 1), the co op members were 
divided about whether to be incorporated into Lancaster Steel as workers 
and whether to continue struggling as workerowners In the meanwhile, 
Lancaster Steel had issued a cheque to Mr Beasley for the machinery At 
this point, the Ministry of Co-ops intervened in tandem with its policy on 
co-ops and in support of those co-op members who did not want to be 
incorporated as wage labourers into Lancaster Steel According to Ms 
Maramba, the Ministry argued that Lancaster Steel could not purchase the 
machinery from FSC since the cooperative had not followed any 
procedures for liquidation or deregistration This prevented the 
incorporation of the co-op into the semi-parastatal, Lancaster Steel 
In an attempt to further protect the co-op from Mr Beasley's 
endeavours to recover his money, the Ministry of Co-ops paid him 
Z$ 269 000 in cash for the machinery This meant that the co-op was 
indebted to the state rather than to Mr Beasley Moreover, according to Ms 
Maramba, a verbal agreement between the Ministry of Co-ops and FSC 
held that this debt was a long term loan to the co-op from the state for the 
purposes of buying the machinery from the former owner 
8.10 A Turning Point in the History of Fencing Services Co-op 
On 27 May 1989, shortly after the incident with Lancaster Steel and a year 
after its formation, the CSFS administered its first overdraft facility This 
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was an overdraft of Z$ 100 000 from Zimbank to FSC. In the light of the 
history of financial mismanagement in the co-op, the CSFS and Zimbank 
suggested that the Executive Committee of the co-op be trained effectively 
in managerial skills. This training was facilitated by the fact that some of 
the co-op members occupied managerial positions in the former M & D 
Enterprises. Furthermore, lessons learnt from the past and a determination 
to be successful this time around, facilitated a change in the organisational 
structure of FSC. 
A Management Committee was introduced with the assistance of a 
volunteer manager. The volunteer, Mr David Parr from the USA, owned 
and managed a firm there, had consulted and assisted in several worker 
take-overs in the USA and was scheduled to spend six weeks with the co-
op until the end of June 1989. He was placed in FSC for the purposes of 
transferring skills to the Management Committee which would operate 
alongside the Executive Committee. This change meant a clear distinction 
between short-term and daily decision-making, and medium- to long-term 
decisions. The Executive Committee was elected by general members at 
the Annual General Meeting of the co-op. The Management Committee 
was appointed by the executive on the basis of skill. It consisted of the 
General Manager, and Sales, Factory, and Contracts Managers. 
Access to the credit facility of Z$ 100 000 and to on-the-job training 
in financial and production management through the assistance of Mr Parr 
marked a turning point in the history of the co-op. According to Ms 
Maramba, FSC produced a net surplus of Z$ 49 000 during the six months 
from May 1989 to November 1989. The Balance Sheet dated 1 April, 1989 
to 31 March, 1990, shows a net profit of Z$ 34 700. Although the size of 
the profit indicated differs, there is some evidence that a surplus was 
produced in the year 1989. When considering the loss brought forward for 
this year, however, Z$ 377 577, the co-op was still making a cumulative 
loss of Z$ 342 856 (Balance Sheet, 31 March, 1990). 
The introduction of (a) the two tiered structure of Executive and 
Management Committees with clear rules and mechanisms of control over 
both worker- and manager-members of the co-op and (b) the appointment 
of managers on the basis of their skill and experience in management, 
contributed to the limited success of the co-op relative to its previous 
record of operation. Albeit, this change did not come without complexities. 
8.11 Tensions in the Management-Producer Relationship 
Various measures ensured managerial accountability in FSC. These 
included that (a) all managers were co-op members; (b) they obtained their 
salaries from the cooperative and thus their material well-being rested on 
the success of the enterprise; (c) disciplinary measures kept a check on 
slack performance; (d) managers could be recalled by a two-thirds majority 
vote of the general members; (e) the General Manager was obliged to 
produce monthly and annual reports on the financial state of the enterprise 
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and on decisions made by the Management Committee and (f) general 
members could vote to change managerial decisions 
Significantly, however, general members' inability (due to lack of 
skill and education) to effectively assess and criticise managerial reports 
and decisions often made this accountability simply a formality This gave 
rise to tensions in the manager-producer relationship 
The tensions arose mainly from (a) the introduction of a relationship 
of technical authority based on skill, (b) the existence of extreme 
disparities in skill and education between member managers and general 
members and (c) the perpetuation of these disparities through the present 
management structure They amounted to relationships of social inequality 
between general and manager members 
The tensions were manifested mainly in contests about surplus 
distribution, for example, wage versus salary levels and the payment or 
non payment of commissions to members in the sales team They also 
revolved around unequal distribution of social benefits, sometimes referred 
to as the 'social wage' of the co-op, and issues relating to general conduct 
of the Management Committee I proceed with examples of such contests 
Firstly, producers staged a work stoppage in October 1989 in an 
attempt to pressurise management to raise wages The fact that they had to 
resort to such action pointed to a weakness in communication between 
managers and producers 
Secondly, information gathered from interviews with worker-
members revealed some dissatisfaction with differentials between wages 
and salaries 
1 ) the ones who work m the offices lare] getting a higher 
salary - very high I'm earning $70 [per week] If I can get 
$30 more, then it will be better If the other workers are 
getting $60 [per week] and they get another $30 to [bring 
their wages to] $90 they will be happy, even [with an increase 
of] $20 they will be happy (Interview 4 6) 
2 ) Management [is] not good [because they do] not give any 
money Management get more wages [I] don't like this [A] 
$6 or $7 difference [between management's and worker-
member's remuneration] is о к [A] $100 difference is not 
о к [My] wages [are] too low for six children [With] no 
increment people work weakly The power [to work] is from 
money - no money, no power (Interview 4 7) 
The latter quotation points to a lack of understanding on the part of 
the worker-member of the need for differential remuneration in a 
cooperative enterprise in the light of the ever-present market value of 
different skills, and the high demand for skilled people in co-ops, 
especially in management If member managers were to earn only Z$6 or 
Z$7 more than the worker-members, the co-op would soon be without a 
Management Committee since these skilled people could easily find better 
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paid employment in the private sector Experiences among co-ops both in 
South Africa and in Zimbabwe have shown that the failure to provide 
skilled members with reasonable incomes leads to a loss of such members 
which, in turn, reduces the potential to produce surplus revenue and hence 
to provide all members with an income 
Despite this lack of understanding, however, the above quotations 
did indicate dissatisfaction about low wages This was an indication that 
the co-op was not altogether successful in providing for the material needs 
of its members 
A third example of such contests was related to the commission paid 
to salespeople According to Ms Maramba (Management Assistant, CSFS), 
from mid-1987 to the beginning of 1989 individuals in the sales team were 
paid commissions on the amount of debt collected and the value of the 
transactions made with customers (Interview 4 1) The value of this 
commission as a percentage of the sale or debt collected is unknown 
Nevertheless, according to both Ms Maramba and Mr Makoni, the 
collection of debts improved during that time because the commission 
served as an incentive for sales people 
At the beginning of 1989, however, the commission was withdrawn 
for two reasons The first was that some worker-members disagreed with 
the payment of commissions to sales people One such incident was 
explained by Mr Makoni, chairperson of Fencing Services 
I would go to the lowest common man and try to explain to 
him [why the sales people are paid a commission] because 
they would say 'I also want the commission I have welded the 
gate that you put there, but are you giving me commission 7 
No I also want commission' (Interview 4 5) 
The second reason for the withdrawal of commissions was related to 
conflict about these payments among sales people and between these and 
the general manager As explained by Mr Makoni 
The reason for cancelling the commission was because the 
sales people could not agree among themselves [about 
sharing the jobs which accompanied a commission] They 
were scared that the [sales] manager would get more 
commission [Furthermore, the sales manager] could start 
doing his own jobs and not do the other ones so that [he] can 
get more commission [that is, pressurising the factory floor 
members to complete the commissioned transactions made by 
him] The other [sales people] started complaining [about 
this] 
Not all jobs have commission If one [sales person] gets a job 
today with a commission he wants it done today Now in the 
factory we have a line of production where we are doing jobs 
three, four, five, six, seven We can't do this job fifteen today 
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Then they [the sales people] are up in arms with me again 
'Buy me materials to do this today' Now where can I get 
money to buy materials for that job [fifteen] and yet these 
other jobs are lying, of which it is you [the sales people] who 
have brought in those jobs, they are not yet paid for You've 
got to control your $ 100 000 [overdraft], don't go beyond 
[it] 
Now I had various things to do [at the time], the lawyers 
[and] paying the creditors So, instead of sitting down and 
do[ing] that little thing [settling the struggle with the sales 
people], which they [were] causing themselves, I said well, at 
the moment we can't waste our time doing that [settling the 
struggle] We have to stop it [the commission] if you [the 
sales people] can't understand the situation at that minute 
then I have to suspend it [the issue around the commission] 
till later (Interview 4 5) 
The above quotations illustrate contests both between managers and 
worker-members, and among managers and sales people over the payment 
or non-payment of the commission 
One worker-member's comment clearly illustrated contests about 
unequal distribution of social benefits 
[This is a] co op for [the] management committee They [the 
managers are] drinking tea [in the offices] [There is] no tea 
here This is a cooperative7 This is not a cooperative 
(Interview 4 7) 
The chairperson's response to this was as follows 
if you explain to the people that this is a cooperative and it 
is our business they would think well, why don't we also go 
in the office and drink tea Then you have to explain to them 
why [they will not] win on this place [win the opportunity to 
drink tea in the offices] Otherwise the government has to 
come in and intervene [to explain to them why they cannot sit 
and drink tea in the office (ZE)] (Interview 4 5) 
Co-op provision of further education for member-managers and no 
such benefits as yet for worker-members was a further manifestation of 
unequal benefits The rationale for providing managers with further 
education was that it would enable them to be of better service to the co-op 
as a whole One could argue that general members are equally entitled to 
further education to enable their more effective understanding of enterprise 
operations, control over management, and efficient work Education of 
general members is equally significant as managers' education in making 
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members of better service to the co-op as a democratic organisation and 
economic unit 
This acclamation, however, sounds much simpler than is possible in 
practice The reality of illiteracy and innumeracy among a small minority 
of members, and ot a lack of conceptual skills among most of members 
regarding operations of their enterprise made educating them a difficult, 
though not impossible, task 
Tensions also arose from the general conduct of member managers 
As expressed by one worker-member 
The co-op is good but we m the cooperative are not 
cooperating We've got a difference between the one[s] who 
work in the offices and the one[s who work on the shopfloor] 
We are not the same people Ion the shopfloor] are not happy 
with what they [the managers] are doing They [the 
managers] make a segregation [with] the people, they say 
they are the top people (Interview 4 6) 
This indicated that the manager-producer relationship in the co-op 
was hierarchical with worker-members in a subordinate position 
Furthermore, an Enterprise Workshop about the concept of a 
cooperative was organised by the CSFS technical staff for FSC dunng the 
research period General members boycotted this workshop in an attempt to 
indicate to the CSFS that they were dissatisfied with the present 
Management Committee 
People didn't come [to the workshop] to show [the] Scheme 
[CSFS] that there is something wrong with [the] committee 
(Interview 4 6) 
This information from a producer was later confirmed by the Factory 
Manager Similar to the work-stoppage of October 1989, this action on the 
part of general members further indicated lack of effective communication 
between management and general members 
8.11.1 Technocratic Management 
The evidence given thus far shows a tendency towards technocratic 
management in the co-op at the time of research This was confirmed by a 
comment from the chairperson When asked whether there was any conflict 
between the Executive and Management Committees, Mr Makoni, 
chairperson, accountant, and general manager at the time, replied as 
follows 
[There has] not [been] much [conflict] because I've got full 
control I am conversant on both sides (the political and the 
economic) My side is more technical than this other side [the 
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'political' sphere] So, if this other side [the 'political'] wants 
to overreach that one [the economic/technical] and yet I am 
the chairman, I stop them and explain [to] them really what it 
is and what is business so that they don't overreach the other 
side [technical/economic] (Interview 4 5) 
Technocratic management and the resultant centralisation of power 
over decision-making in the hands of a few skilled member-managers 
raised important questions about the degree to which FSC's management 
was democratic Management's centralised power was further facilitated by 
the overlap between members on the Executive Committee and those on 
the Management Committee This blocked critical consideration of 
implications of this management style and inhibited démocratisation in the 
enterprise 
The above quotation also pointed to a tension in the enterprise 
between economic viability and democratic participation The 'technical' 
refers to the economic viability of the enterprise The 'political' refers to (a) 
democratic participation of members and (b) whether the distribution of 
both material and social benefits was in the interests of démocratisation 
With regard to the latter, I have noted that the distribution of education 
opportunities perpetuated an unequal balance of power in the co-op, a 
factor hindering démocratisation 
Information gained from Ms Maramba, the Management Assistant at 
the CSFS, confirmed my observation that economic viability was a priority 
in the enterprise at the time of research 
In FSC, if a decision i<¡ a technical one and it is good for the 
co-op, they [the management committee] make that decision 
even if it is something that the members would not take very 
well They seem to appreciate that you cannot mix the two 
things You can't run a cooperative on the feelings of the 
members О К, they have to be considered tu a certain extent, 
but they should not be the major force in determining a 
decision So, they [the management committee] focus mainly 
on the viability of the co-op as an economic enterprise 
(Interview 4 1) 
I would agree with Ms Maramba that a co-op is first and foremost an 
economic enterprise and that its success depends entirely on its economic 
viability This, however, does not mean that processes of participation and 
démocratisation should be put on hold This begs the question about who is 
to take care of members' 'feelings' or interests if these are to be considered 
to a certain extent' in decision-making9 Furthermore, it is not a matter of 
considering members' interests, instead, it is one of finding the appropriate 
balance between a form of democratic participation that maximises the 
firm's ability to be economically viable These aspects of a co-op are not 
separable, but rather interrelated 
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The emphasis placed on economic viability may have been a stage 
through which the co-op needed to pass on its way to a more democratic 
form of organisation Movement out of this stage, however, was not going 
to be automatic Co-op members had to act on organisational problems in 
order to gain greater democracy 
Formally, the Executive and Management Committees were separate 
bodies, however, in practice, the same people constituted these two 
structures Furthermore, decisions about democratic goals tended to take 
second priority in the context of managers' emphasis on economic viability 
In addition, since EC members were the MC, in their capacity as the 
Executive, and considering that they were more articulate and educated, 
these members could sway decisions in a general meeting to suit their 
requirements 
In the light of these problems, FSC needed to provide more effective 
representation ot general member' interests This could be done by having 
the Executive Committee represent only worker-members This body 
would then be responsible for appointing a Management Committee 
accountable to the worker-members The EC could 'negotiate' with the MC 
about wages and working conditions and could serve the role of a trade-
union 
The development of technocratic control in the co-op and the neglect 
of democratic goals such as the interests and needs of members, may have 
been a partial result of separating economics and democracy/participation 
in the enterprise in the interests of economic viability Such a separation is 
false and misleading For example, the CSFS is an organisation established 
to provide for co-ops financially Its structure and methods of providing 
access to finance, however, embody concerns about both economic 
viability and democratic participation 
Technocracy in FSC can also be partially attributed to the continuity 
in management from M & D Enterprises to Fencing Services Co-operative 
Society This continuity and the approach taken by FSC's Management 
Committee suggests that there may have been a change in the form of the 
enterprise - from capitalist firm to collectively owned cooperative, 
however, the nature of managerial behaviour and practice still needed to 
change into a more cooperative type management 
8.12 An Economic Setback for Fencing Services Cooperative 
At the time of research, January 1990, the co-op was in a crisis related to 
marketing its products One of the problems was that the co-op did not 
predict a significant increase in the pnce of raw materials, while the other 
resulted from the fact that its supplier, Lancaster Steel, was one of its major 
competitors in the market and the only other manufacturer of barbed-wire 
Six months earlier, in June 1989, President Mugabe announced a lift 
on the pnce freeze This meant that economic enterpnses could apply for 
price increases on their products FSC and the Management Assistant at 
CSFS did not, however, incorporate the possibility of pnce increases on 
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raw materials in the cash-flow projections for the co-op. Furthermore, since 
October 1989, Lancaster Steel had been disrupting the supply of raw 
materials to the co-op. 
According to Ms Maramba, Management Assistant at the CSFS, 
Lancaster Steel did not supply the co-op with its order of raw materials due 
in October 1989. Instead, the supplier, also a competitor, produced huge 
amounts of barbed-wire at the old price. In December 1989, after having 
flooded the market with barbed-wire produced and thus being sold at the 
old price, the supplier, as directed by the Ministry of Co-ops, delivered 
three delayed orders of raw material (for the months October, November, 
and December 1989). These deliveries were made at once with a demand 
for cash-on-delivery payment for all the orders, valued at a total of about 
Z$ 114 000. 
Since the co-op did not have this much money in cash, it had to 
extend its bank overdraft to Z$ 150 000 in order to pay for the deliveries in 
two instalments. In addition, because the co-op did not predict a price 
increase it was now forced to pay the new increased price for its raw 
materials. According to Mr Makoni, chairperson of the co-op, the price of a 
50 kilogram roll of galvanised wire was increased from Z$ 65 per roll to 
Z$ 108. The price of raw materials thus increased by 66 percent for FSC. 
Furthermore, the co-op had been selling such material at Z$ 99 per roll 
while the cost price was now Z$ 108. The fact that the co-op was caught 
unaware of this dramatic price increase resulted in significant problems in 
the marketing of its produce and costly disruptions in its production plan. 
Firstly, by January 1990, the co-op had over 400 rolls of barbed-wire 
in stock, and about 10 tons of galvanised wire. In the face of its 
competitors' old selling price and in an attempt to prevent tying up capital 
in the form of stock, the co-op had to calculate a break-even price for its 
barbed-wire. This meant that FSC was not going to make a surplus on the 
production achieved during the festive season. In addition, it had to 
terminate the production of barbed-wire until the available stocks were 
sold. This in turn meant that its barbed-wire machines were idle. 
Secondly, the co-op had lost some of its customers to Lancaster Steel 
who was selling barbed-wire at the old price. Towards the end of January 
1990, however, the Management Assistant had found a customer who was 
prepared to purchase all the barbed-wire in stock at FSC. The break-even 
price for the 400 rolls of barbed-wire came to Z$ 60 000. At the 
termination of the research period this transaction was still in progress. 
8.13 Conclusions 
Though at a national level the state has not supported co-ops as much as 
promised, FSC's case is indicative of some such support. From the 
historical account of this cooperative it is clear that the Zimbabwean state, 
represented by the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Cooperatives, 
played a significant role in the co-op's formation. Its role included that of 
advisor, fundcr and constructive intervenor. The latter is clearly illustrated 
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in the liquidation negotiations, the prevention of FSC's incorporation into 
Lancaster Steel and the directive to this semi-parastatal to deliver supplies 
to the co-op It can, however, be argued that the large amounts of state loan 
capital invested in FSC to save but a few jobs in an enterprise which was 
stripped of all its capital may not have been a profitable investment This, 
however, remains to be seen 
In the context of its dependence on state loans and its general 
financial and managerial difficulties, FSC's active involvement in 
establishing CSFS was indicative of its attempts to become financially 
independent and can be seen as a first step towards self-reliance The major 
obstacle for this co-op was its high accumulated debt most of which was 
'inherited' Although there have been clear improvements in managerial 
performance these were not as yet reflected in figures on balance sheets 
Nevertheless, such improvements, despite the tensions in the management 
producer relationship, cannot be ignored when examining the development 
of the enterprise wholistically It is in the light of FSC's ability to manage 
its resources effectively that I regard the co-op as potentially viable 
Abell's (1981) principles of democratic organisation are relevant in 
the case of FSC Firstly, the principle of political equality whereby all 
members have the right to participate directly in decisions affecting the co 
op is manifested in the role of the General Assembly as supreme authority 
over enterprise decisions Secondly, the election of an Executive 
Committee and the appointment of a Management Committee were 
indicative of practices of representation m FSC The authority delegated to 
the Management Committee consisting of skilled managers showed a 
recognition on the part of the co-op that particular decisions require 
specialised skills The key obstacle to effective implementation of these 
principles, however, was the extreme disparity in education among 
members resulting in limited producer participation and control 
In the light of the emphasis on economic performance in FSC, one 
can argue that the enterprise clearly recognised this aspect of cooperative 
organisation as its primary goal This emphasis was reinforced by the 
CSFS policy emphasis production of a sustained surplus as the key goal of 
a co-op Considering the economic difficulties faced by the co-op, 
however, member-managers' emphasis on economic issues is 
understandable This suggests that, depending on the stage of co-op 
development and on the specific experience of a co-op at a particular time, 
management's emphasis may shift from a focus on 'bread and butter' issues 
to concerns for member-education and démocratisation FSC's management 
was clearly concerned with the former 
There were, however, indications that the democratic organisation of 
FSC required serious attention In terms of Bernstein's minimally necessary 
conditions for sustained democracy, the dispanty in education among 
members was a key factor hindering effective participation and full sharing 
of management information FSC was also characterised by ineffective 
representation of worker-members' interests Furthermore, the technocratic 
nature of management pointed to limits in the type of consciousness 
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required by managers according to Bernstein's conditions, namely a 
consciousness of both 'educators' and 'democratisers' 
In the light of these observations, I conclude that at the time of 
research, FSC faced significant constraints to sustained démocratisation 
and that the co-op practiced a limited degree of participative democracy 
Among these constraints were (a) the disparity in education between 
managers and general members, (b) the need to prioritise economic issues 
at that stage of the co-op's development and (c) the lack of effective 
representation of general members When viewed as a process, however, 
there is some space in FSC for progressing towards increased and sustained 
démocratisation The education of general members, and the introduction 
of a representative body to balance the management committee's emphasis 
on economic performance could shift the enterprise towards greater 
democracy Such a shift would, however, depend on FSC's economic 
performance Unless member education is financed through grants, the co-
op will need to generate sufficient revenue to set aside resources for 
member education 
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CHAPTER 9 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE COOPERATIVES 
STUDIED 
9.1 Introduction 
I begin this comparison at a very general level by looking at similarities 
and differences in the contexts in which the enterprises operate These are 
important in giving an indication of (a) the historical and socio-political 
aspects influencing cooperative development and (b) the specific 
constraints faced by such enterprises I then point to broad similarities and 
differences among the enterprises, focusing on general characteristics and 
constraints The general differences identified suggest that the enterprises 
are at different stages of development I continue to highlight more specific 
similarities and differences The enterprises are compared in relation to the 
themes in each case study, namely, levels of organisational development, 
degrees of démocratisation, relationships with other organisations and 
members' cooperative consciousness Management structures and practices, 
conceptualised as relationships between managers and producers, are used 
as an indicator of levels of cooperative organisational development 
9.2 The Contexts 
9.2.1 Similarities between South Africa and Zimbabwe 
Both South Africa and Zimbabwe are capitalist economies in which the 
bulk of productive property is in private hands with production being for 
private interests, in the pursuit of profit, through the employment of wage 
labour Self-managed cooperative activity plays a marginal role in these 
economies Moreover, a capitalist economic and institutional environment 
imposes similar practical constraints on co-ops These have been dealt with 
in detail in Chapter 3 
Further similarities include (a) the legacy of colonialism and 
capitalist domination, more specifically, the impact of this historical 
experience on the actions and consciousness of cooperators and on their 
position in broader society, (b) the severe lack of experience among 
cooperators of cooperative work and organisations, (c) their low levels of 
literacy, education, and skills (with the exception of Montagu Carpentry 
Co-op), and (d) their subordinate position m the economy and in society 
These factors form the core of internal constraints to cooperative 
development in both South Africa (SA) and Zimbabwe In addition, the 
predominant forms of social relations (class, race and gender relations) in 
SA are similar to those in Zimbabwe In this regard, the socialisation 
processes which cooperators undergo is similar This implies, firstly, that 
cooperators, both in Zimbabwe and South Africa, face the challenge of 
unlearning old ways of doing things, and secondly, that support structures 
in these countries face the challenge of facilitating this process 
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South Africa and Zimbabwe are the two most industrialised 
economies in the Southern African region Both countries, however, have 
been experiencing escalating processes of urbanisation and unemployment 
Unemployment in Zimbabwe at the time was of a similar scale to that in 
SA - approximately 30% Both economies are characterised by slow 
growth, especially in formal sector employment The formation of 
cooperatives should be seen in the context of these high levels of 
unemployment and slow growth 
Just as in Zimbabwe, there are two strands of cooperative activity in 
SA established farmers' marketing and consumers' co-ops on the one hand, 
and on the other, consumer and producer co-ops among the marginalised 
and unemployed Furthermore, in both countries most contemporary co-ops 
are engaged in clothing manufacture involving mainly women 
9.2.2 Differences between South Africa and Zimbabwe 
Some of the major differences include (a) the stage of cooperative 
development, (b) the relative weakness of working class organisation in 
Zimbabwe in comparison to SA and (c) the role of the state in relation to 
cooperatives I proceed to discuss each of these differences briefly, 
considering the implications for cooperative development 
Stage of Co-op Development 
Unlike Zimbabwe, SA has little historical experience of comparable co-ops 
to draw from Co-ops in SA are essentially in formation and 
organisationally relatively undeveloped Though the majority of co-ops m 
Zimbabwe share similar features, co-ops in this country are a few steps 
ahead of those in SA Unlike South African co ops of the 1980s, 
Zimbabwean collectives have a slightly longer history of organisation 
manifested in the founding of the Organisation of Collective Cooperatives 
in Zimbabwe (OCCZ1M) in 1983 Despite OCCZIM's organisational 
weaknesses, it has played a significant role in the historical development of 
the contemporary cooperative movement in Zimbabwe The lessons leamt 
from OCCZIM have had relatively significant influence on the 
establishment of the Collective Self Finance Scheme (CSFS) as a first step 
towards a self reliant co-op movement in Zimbabwe This is an indication 
that though the co op movement in Zimbabwe is itself embryonic, it is at a 
further stage of development than that in SA Although one can identify 
major clusters of co-ops across SA, there is as yet no formally established 
progressive co op movement in this country 
Relationship to the Workers' Movement 
South African cooperatives and cooperative organisations have a 
potentially strong support base from which to start - a well established 
workers' movement Such a social force is and has long been absent in 
Zimbabwe The history of working class organisation m SA is likely to 
have a significant impact on cooperative development and broader 
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cooperative organisation Recent developments, including organising the 
unemployed and trade union support for cooperatives, are indicative 
It is important to note, however, that a strong working class 
movement has to be aligned with relatively successful cooperative 
enterprises in order to form the base for cooperative organisation In SA 
today, there are very few successful cooperative enterprises The absence 
of a cooperative movement is in a sense a reflection of the current state of 
co-ops in SA 
Role of the State 
Unlike its South African counterpart, the Zimbabwean state has made some 
commitment to support co-ops I have noted the disjuncture between 
Zimbabwean state promises and practices in this regard, and explained this 
in terms of the balance of class forces in Zimbabwean society My 
conclusion is that the absence of strong working class, peasant, and/or 
cooperative organisations makes it difficult for the relevant parties to 
demand action on state promises Nevertheless, one should not lose sight of 
developments in the field of state policy on co-ops, such as the effects of 
the Cooperative Societies Bill of 1988 One should also bear in mind state 
support for Fencing Services Cooperative Society in the form of (a) legal 
representation in preventing liquidation of the firm, (b) advice in the initial 
developments of the co-op, and (c) financial support Such general and 
specific forms of support have not as yet arisen in the South Africa 
The legal position of cooperatives differs in the two countries 
Although legislation governing co-ops in Zimbabwe m 1990 dated back to 
the colonial period, steps were being taken to draft new legislation The 
latest legislation, the Cooperative Societies Bill 1988, specifies conditions 
for registration with the Ministry of Co-ops and sets out clear provisions 
for organisational structure and duties within co-ops Although informal, 
unregistered pre-cooperatives are found both in SA and Zimbabwe in rural 
and urban areas, a large proportion of Zimbabwean collectives are 
registered Because no relevant legislation exists in SA as yet, the vast 
majority of co-ops in SA have no specific legal status 
Additional Differences 
Further differences in the features of co-ops in these countries are that (a) 
co-ops in Zimbabwe are predominantly engaged in agricultural activity 
while those in SA are found mainly in services and manufacturing and (b) 
unlike co-ops in SA, collectives in Zimbabwe generally include in their 
organisational structure an elected management committee and general 
manager In addition, Zimbabwean collectives are financed by the 
government, by contributions from cooperatore in the form of 
demobilisation funds, by donor agencies and through the CSFS In SA, 
such ventures are mainly financed by donor agencies 
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9.3 General Similarities among the Case Studies 
All, but one, of the South African co-ops studied were initiated by the 
people for whom the enterprises were intended It is only the Langa 
Spinning Project which was initiated by the Catholic Welfare Bureau 
(CWB) In SA, co-ops are generally initiated by cooperators themselves, by 
community leaders, trade unions and service organisations This pattern of 
initiation is very different from that in the rest of Africa 
African cooperatives, unlike similar organisations in 
industrialised nations, did not emanate from the people for 
whom they were intended, but rather in response to active 
encouragement and financial assistance from governments, 
because they were considered instruments of development 
(ILO, 1988 10) 
This difference is related to the presence of an illegitimate state and 
a context ot political repression before the beginnings of transition to 
democracy in this country in April, 1994 During this time, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Montagu and Ashton 
Community Services (MAG) referred to in Chapter 7, for example, and 
trade unions played a significant role in initiating community development 
projects Examples of such projects include the cluster of co-ops in the 
Overberg region and those linked to various trade unions Such activities 
on the part of NGOs have been significant in the context of a history of 
limited and ideologically biased government involvement in development 
With the newly elected legitimate government which is concerned about 
economic and social restructuring, this pattern is likely to change and could 
include active state support for cooperative enterprises as part of a solution 
to development Experiences of NGOs can be important guides for social 
and economic restructuring in the current political climate of 
transformation 
At a general level, the co-ops studied were relatively similar For 
example, all the enterprises were small-scale with memberships ranging 
from eleven to fifty-seven people With the exception of some members of 
Montagu Carpentry Cooperative (MCC), for example, the manager, the 
producers were generally drawn from among unemployed and marginal 
populations All the enterprises were engaged in manufacturing while 
Launisma Enterprises (LE) and Fencing Services Cooperative Society 
(FSC) also provided primary services The co-ops were initiated with the 
aim of creating and/or saving jobs For this reason, a major concern for the 
producers was material survival With the exception of MCC and FSC, the 
enterprises were engaged in informal economic activity for the purposes of 
survival and essentially marginal to the economies in which they operated 
In addition, they faced similar constraints Among these were a weak 
capital structure, a highly competitive market, lack of and/or limited access 
to credit, lack of skills, more especially management skills, and education, 
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the absence of an appropriate legal structure in which to operate, and non-
democratic habits and values on the part of the membership 
A further similarity was that each enterprise had a particular power 
structure which gave rise to conflict within the co-op The bases of power 
and conflict in each enterprise were, however, very different Related to 
this similarity, was another, namely, that people in different roles and 
positions in each enterprise had different perceptions of the co-op 
Furthermore, each of the enterprises were linked to a support structure of 
some kind 
9.4 General Differences among the Case Studies 
Alongside differences in the their products and the markets for which they 
produced, there were other notable differences among the cooperatives 
Although all the co-ops lacked managerial skills, some were worse off than 
others In this regard, Launisma Bnckmaking Cooperative (LBC) was 
worse off than the Spinning Project (SP), Montagu Carpentry Co-op 
(MCC) and Fencing Services Cooperative Society (FSC) who had access to 
relatively skilled managers Similarly, with regard to financial resources 
and member-education levels, some co-ops were worse off than others In 
terms of access to credit, for example, LBC was financially worse off than 
SP, MCC, and FSC In terms of debt, FSC was worst off because of its 
inherited accumulated debt Member-education levels tended to be lower in 
SP and LBC than in MCC and FSC Economic problems differed from one 
enterprise to another those experienced by MCC were growth related 
while the remaining enterprises had problems with the actually viability of 
their activities in highly competitive markets Furthermore, the co-ops 
differed in the type of service organisations to which they were linked 
9.5 Different Levels of Organisational Development and Degrees of 
Démocratisation 
These general differences, more especially the fact that some enterprises 
were worse off than others in particular respects, suggest that the co-ops 
studied were at different stages of development Along a continuum of 
stages of development, the SP and LBC were in the early stages of 
development with LBC slightly ahead of the SP, while MCC and FSC were 
further along the continuum, at later stages of development, with FSC 
slightly ahead of MCC in certain respects, and vice versa 
These differences in stages of development among the enterprises 
were reflected m (a) their levels of organisational development, (b) the 
degrees of démocratisation, (с) their managerial structures and practices, 
(d) their relationships with other organisations and (e) members' 
cooperative consciousness I proceed to highlight more specific similarities 
and differences among the enterprises by focussing on these aspects 
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9.5.1 Levels of Organisational Development 
In comparison with MCC and FSC, the SP and LBC had relatively simple 
and informal organisational structures indicating early stages of 
organisational development The organisational structures of MCC and 
FSC were more complex In addition to a clear division between 
management and production tasks in these enterprises, there was a 
relatively well developed technical division of labour reflected in the 
division of production into departments with department heads 
Furthermore, there was a sense of progress in organisational development 
in both MCC and FSC - a process absent in the other enterprises This was 
especially visible in developments in the organisation and control of 
production in MCC, and in the separation of the Executive and 
Management Committees tasks in FSC Moreover, this differential in 
organisational complexity is not a function of size, as the SP and MCC 
were similar in size while LE and FSC were similar in this regard 
As with LBC, MCC formed part of a network of enterprises Unlike 
the case of Launisma Enterprises (LE), however, co-ops in the Overberg 
region were structurally independent and only functionally interdependent 
These organisational linkages allowed for supportive relationships among 
the co-ops, rather than exploitative relationships noted among enterprises 
in LE Moreover, the organisational structure of FSC was more advanced 
than that of either of the other co ops Unlike the other enterprises, FSC 
had an ownership structure in addition to a management structure 
subdivided into financial, entrepreneurial and production management In 
this regard, FSC was the most developed organisationally 
9.5.2 Management 
Management as an institution and organisational feature of a democratic 
work organisation is an important indicator of stages ol organisational 
development, démocratisation and democratic/cooperative consciousness 
A comparative analysis of management structures is likely to reveal 
significant features of the enterprises studied For this purpose I focus on 
the following related aspects of management 
a) who recruits/elects/appoints and hires management, 
b) criteria used to introduce management, 
c) the form which management takes, 
d) the material and social base of management, 
e) the power and accountability of management, 
0 producers' power in relation to management and levels of participation in 
decision-making and 
g) the quality and effectiveness of management 
I proceed by dealing with each of these criterion in the above order 
and point to some of the sociological insights which the comparisons 
provide 
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Recruitment 
Management in the SP was recruited and hired from outside by the service 
organisation (CWB) for the enterprise The spinners did not choose their 
manager In this regard, the situation in the SP was very different from that 
in the other three enterprises where management was either elected or 
appointed by the producers Contrary to practices in the SP, those in the 
other three enterprises were more in tandem with the cooperative principle 
ot control, through elections, by the producers Hence, I regard LBC, MCC 
and FSC as relatively more developed 
Criteria 
In the case of the SP, the criteria used to introduce management were both 
the need for such skills in the enterprise and the skill of the person 
recruited These criteria were, however, set by the CWB and not the 
producers In LBC the following attributes were considered when electing 
the manager his experience, though limited, in business operation, his 
position as both community leader and elder, his relative proficiency in 
English and access to donor agencies for funds The manager ot MCC was 
appointed on the basis of his previous performance as acting co op 
coordinator of the MAG doing managerial tasks, and of the need tor skills 
in the enterprise Similarly, in FSC the Management Committee was 
appointed on the basis of their skill and previous managerial experience in 
M&D Enterprises 
In the latter two enterprises skill and experience formed the basis for 
appointing management In the light of the severe lack of such skills in co-
ops, such appointments are in the interests of the development of the 
enterprise Although the manager of the SP was similarly chosen, the key 
difference is that she was not chosen by the producers, a practice which 
relinquished control by the producers thereby hindering the development of 
the project into a cooperative With reference to LBC, election of the 
manager on the basis of his personal power proved to be detrimental to 
both the organisational and the economic development of LBC 
Form 
The general scarcity of managerial skills among cooperators and of 
managers who want to work in cooperatives indirectly affects the form ot 
management in co ops People in this capacity often have to be hired from 
outside the enterprise In addition, a lack of financial capital in co ops 
makes it difficult for them to have more than one skilled manager 
In the SP the manager was a single person hired by the CWB from 
outside the project She was not a member of the project In the case ot 
LBC, the manager was a single person assisted by an administrative 
committee Both the manager and the committee members were not 
members of LBC, however, they were members of LE In MCC the 
manager was assisted by one administrative assistant and both these people 
were members of the cooperative The Management Committee of the FSC 
consisted of members of the co-op 
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In the light of the general definition of a cooperative as an enterprise 
in which the members are simultaneously the owners, workers and 
managers, having member-managers is an indication of developments 
along the lines of cooperative organisation In addition, a clear division of 
labour within management as in the case of FSC is more conducive to 
efficiency than, for example, the heavy load of tasks carried by the 
manager in MCC This contributed positively to the organisational 
development of the FSC in terms of task specialisation and efficiency 
Material Base 
The membership position of management has implications for its material 
base, that is, the source of its remuneration In the case of the SP, the 
material base of management was located outside of the enterprise with the 
manager obtaining her salary from the service organisation rather than the 
enterprise Considering the absence of accountability mechanisms between 
the CWB and SP, this feature placed unlimited power and control in the 
hands of the manager This left producers dependent on and powerless in 
relation to management, a situation clearly indicating the prematurity of 
this enterprise 
In LBC, this base was, in theory, only partly located within the 
enterprise This was so because management's base was spread over all the 
enterprises in LE Though, in theory, management was paid by all the 
enterprises, my account of practices m this case clearly indicate the 
contrary When funds were available, LBC paid management, when not, 
management was not paid Contrary to circumstances in the SP and LBC, 
the material base of management was located wholly within both MCC and 
FSC with managerial salaries drawn from the revenue of the respective 
enterprises 
In comparison with the position of management in the premature 
enterprises (SP and LBC), this institution was more solidly based within 
MCC and FSC 
Managerial Power and Accountability 
The skill levels of management in relation to the producers, its form and 
the location of its material base have direct implications for its power in 
decision-making and its accountability to the producers 
In the SP all such power was in the hands of the manager, Ms 
Walker No accountability was practiced, and there were no mechanisms to 
ensure/facilitate accountability. Similarly, management in LBC under Mr 
Langa was all powerful with very little accountability Mechanisms 
available to facilitate accountability were weak In MCC managerial 
authority was in the hands of the manager Mr Grutter's power was, 
however, regularly checked by the producers Management in FSC also 
held full authority with each manager overseen by the General Manager, 
Mr Makoni Accountability to the General Manager and the Executive 
Committee was practiced through weekly reports in committee meetings 
In theory, managerial power was checked by the General Assembly in 
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monthly general meetings In practice, however, this was simply a 
formality because of the disparity in education and expertise between 
management and general members, and the consequent inability of 
producers to effectively challenge management 
With regard to managerial accountability, the SP and LBC were at 
the bottom of a rung of increasing accountability, with FSC located 
towards the centre, and MCC located beyond the mid-point It is important 
to note that relatively more complex managerial structures in FSC did not 
necessarily imply greater accountability In comparison to MCC, the larger 
size of FSC, the greater disjuncture in expertise and education between 
management and producers, and the absence of effective representation of 
the producers hindered greater accountability 
Producers' Power and Participation in Decision-making 
The power and accountability of management in turn has implications for 
the power of producers in relation to management and the extent of 
member participation in decision-making In this regard, there was no 
participation on the part of producers in decision making in the SP The 
spinners were powerless in relation to their manager Member participation 
in decision-making in LBC through practices of "non-opposition" was 
essentially symbolic rather than real leaving producers powerless in 
relation to their more articulate manager In comparison to the 
circumstances in the former enterprises, there was a relatively high level of 
member-participation in daily management and some, though limited, 
participation in medium to long-term decisions in MCC Though limited, 
the latter sphere of participation was real rather than token and occurred by 
simple majority voting Producers in MCC were thus relatively more 
powerful Member-participation and power in FSC was hindered by the 
education disparity mentioned earlier and the lack of effective 
representation of producers' interests. 
In this respect, on a continuum of increasing participation, the SP 
and LBC ranked lowest, with FSC placed about one quarter of the way up, 
and MCC placed slightly above the mid-point 
Quality and Effectiveness 
The above analysis combined with the knowledge gained from the case-
study material, enables one to characterise management in the SP as 
centralised in the hands of one person and imposed on the producers The 
manager was ineffective in empowering the producers and her involvement 
in the process of transformation of the SP into a co-op did not serve the 
spinners' interests Similarly, management in LBC was centralised and 
ineffective both in empowering the producers and in improving economic 
performance Managerial authority in MCC was also centralised The key 
differences in relation to the former enterprises, however, were (a) that 
management was accountable to the producers and (b) that the manager 
was relatively effective in facilitating the empowerment of the producers 
and the improved economic performance of the co op In the case of FSC, 
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managerial authority was centralised in the Management Committee 
resulting in technocratic management This committee was not working 
towards empowering the producers It was, however, working towards 
improving the economic performance of the enterprise Results, however, 
with reference to improved economic performance remain to be seen 
9.5.3 Implications for Cooperative Management 
These comparisons suggest that all the factors above have significant 
implications for the role and effects of management on cooperative 
development and organisation On the basis of these comparisons with 
regard to cooperative management, I conclude that 
(a) skilled and experienced management is a necessary component of 
successful cooperative development, 
(b) management should be chosen by the producers, 
(c) managers should be co-op members remunerated from co op funds and 
(d) there are three prerequisites for accountable management 
1 practicable accountability mechanisms, 
2 an educated general membership and 
3 effective representation of producers interests 
Furthermore, the comparisons suggest a relationship between (a) 
methods of recruitment and appointment of management, (b) its form and 
material base and (c) its accountability There is a further relationship 
between the level of education and degree of effective representation of 
producers, and managerial accountability The contrasting experiences of 
the SP - characterised by management recruited and paid from outside the 
co op, and by unskilled membership - and MCC - with skilled membership 
and a member-manager are indicative of these relationships 
9.6 The Service Organisations 
Each of the service organisations (SOs) in this study were different in 
nature The CWB is a welfare organisation, the MAG, a community 
development organisation, the UWM a political organisation for the 
unemployed and the CSFS, a self-finance scheme for cooperatives Unlike 
the latter two, the former have a religious orientation The CWB and MAG 
were more established compared to the UWM and CSFS which, at the 
time, were younger organisations in formation With specific reference to 
cooperative development, however, the CWB and the UWM were 
inexperienced compared to the MAG and the CSFS Furthermore, the 
UWM, CSFS and MAG had a more grassroots base than the CWB In this 
regard, the unemployed organised by the UWM (with the exception of the 
cooperators in LE and ВС which were in the process of struggling for such 
representation at the time of research) had direct representation on its 
decision-making structures In the CSFS, the cooperators served have 
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direct representation on decision-making structures Similarly, m the MAG, 
the community served is directly represented 
Significantly, with the exception of the CSFS, none of the service 
organisations had a clearly defined policy specifically on cooperatives and 
their activities in the development of such enterprises Although the MAG 
has a clearly defined development policy, it is general rather than 
specifically concerned with co-op development The CWB and UWM, on 
the other hand, had neither a clearly defined general development policy 
nor such policy on co-op development Also significant, is the fact that the 
CSFS is the only organisation established by co ops for co-ops 
Due to a lack of information on the CWB's relationships with 
funders, this section focuses mainly on the MAG, the UWM, and the 
CSFS The MAG, being a relatively established SO, had access to various 
sources of funds thereby enabling it to seek and choose funding on terms 
which suit its development policy On the contrary, at the time of research, 
the less established UWM was dependent on a single source of funds 
through SCAT Its relationship with SCAT was such that it had little, if 
any, power to influence the terms of funding Consequently, when SCAT 
withdrew its support for the unemployed due to changes in its aims and 
policies, the UWM was left in financial crisis 
The CSFS stands out as the most powerful SO in relation to funders 
This is reflected in its legal agreement with the funders and its relationship 
with Zimbank It is one among few SOs in Southern Africa engaged in 
formal financial transactions with a recognised commercial bank The 
evidence indicates that the CSFS is by far the most advanced service 
organisation in the sphere of cooperative development and services 
9.7 Relationships between Service Organisations and Co-ops 
In their relationships with the co-ops concerned, the MAG and the CSFS 
emphasised self-reliance and saw cooperatives as essentially economic 
enterprises which compete in a market This philosophy was reflected in 
their practices Both the MAG and the CSFS did not provide financial 
grants to co-ops, instead, they provided and/or facilitate access to loan 
finance In addition, such financing was accompanied by skilled financial 
management services On the contrary, the practices of the CWB and the 
UWM of providing and/or facilitating access to grants/aid without skilled 
services to accompany such aid contradict the notion of co-ops as self-
reliant, primarily economic enterprises 
In the case of the CWB, its continuous financial support for an 
unviable enterprise, the top-down management relationship, particularly in 
the process of transformation into a co-op, and its essentially employer-
employee relationship with the spinners created a dependent enterprise 
This effectively disempowered the producers, a situation inconducive to 
building self-reliance Similarly, the UWM's practice of providing grants 
and its inexperience and lack of skill in servicing co-ops had a detrimental 
effect on the development of the LBC into a viable, democratically 
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organised enterprise. On the contrary, the approach to co-op development 
of both the CSFS and the MAG, their practices of providing only loan 
finance, and their provision of services by skilled people had positive 
implications for both economic development and démocratisation in the 
enterprises concerned. Of particular importance is the significant role of the 
CSFS in promoting self-reliance in co-ops. 
These comparisons suggest that there is a direct relationship between 
service organisation policy and practice, and cooperative development. 
9.8 Cooperative Consciousness 
In this section I compare levels of consciousness and suggest possible 
implications of particular perceptions within the co-ops studied. 
A significant similarity among the co-ops studied was the occurrence 
within enterprises of different perceptions of a co-op. I attributed these 
differences to variations in people's positions in broader society as well as 
in the co-op. When considering the latter variations, managers differ from 
producers in their perceptions. Furthermore, in FSC, there were variations 
among producers' perceptions possibly attributed to different types of 
consciousness among producers. I proceed by comparing, firstly, 
producers' perceptions and the implications for co-op consciousness and 
development, and secondly, managers' perceptions and their implications. 
9.8.1 Producers' Perceptions of a Co-op 
Most producers in the SP and LBC were unemployed and formed and/or 
joined the enterprises because they needed income for survival. This 
resulted, firstly, in the absence of a frame of reference to cooperation 
among these producers and secondly, in a close resemblance in the 
consciousness among these producers. In both the SP and LBC, producers' 
understandings of a co-op were based on their material need for survival 
irrespective of the organisation of the work environment. These 
perceptions imply (a) that these co-ops were simply one survival strategy 
among others and (b) that in the event of materially more rewarding 
strategies, the cooperative form of organisation became less important. I 
have argued that such consciousness places limits on the development of 
the enterprises into viable, self-sustaining, democratic organisations able to 
provide relatively secure employment. 
Although FSC was formed to save jobs for survival in the face of 
unemployment, these producers, unlike those in the SP and LBC, had their 
immediate experience of work in M&D Enterprises against which to 
compare their situation in the cooperative. This gave them some frame of 
reference to cooperation. Varying perceptions among producers in FSC, 
however, indicated different types of co-op consciousness: (a) for some the 
enterprise was a survival mechanism; (b) for others it was seen as an 
organisation with the potential to provide job security. 
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Unlike in any of the other co-ops studied, members in MCC joined 
the enterprise not only for material reasons, but also because of its 
particular form of organisation This was clearly reflected in the relevant 
quotations in which the central idea was that MCC was different from other 
enterprises because of the absence of baasskap This common central idea 
was based in the producers' common work experiences characterised by 
power relations based on interlinking class and race relations These 
common experiences formed a relatively firm basis for an initial frame of 
reference to cooperation in MCC The presence of such a frame of 
reference had positive implications for the development of the enterprise 
One such positive effect was reflected in the continuous negotiation around 
authority in the sphere of management and the consequent refining of that 
relationship to suit the needs of the co-op 
Significantly, from producers' points of view, the basis for tensions 
around the management relationship differed in MCC and FSC In the 
former enterprise the tension revolved mainly around the negotiation of 
authority, while in the latter it was about the distribution ol surplus and 
benefits These significant qualitative differences show that the struggles 
around management in MCC reveal more advanced member-consciousness 
than in FSC 
Along a continuum of levels of producers' cooperative 
consciousness, and on the basis of the suggested implications of types of 
consciousness, I rank the SP and LBC lowest, with FSC following closely 
ahead of them in the lower ranks, and MCC placed just above the mid-
point 
9.8.2 Significance of these comparisons 
These comparisons suggest, firstly, that there are different types of 
consciousness among producers Secondly, they reveal a relationship 
between the type of consciousness of producers and the long-term 
development of the cooperative In this regard, a consciousness which is 
self-centred in the short-term is likely to be detrimental in the long-term 
By contrast, a consciousness which is organisation-centred and concerned 
with long-term self-interests is likely to have positive effects on co op 
development Furthermore, there is a relationship between producers' 
consciousness and the stage of cooperative development The experience of 
MCC is indicative 
9.8.3 Managers' Perceptions of a Co-op 
The general perception among managers in all the co-ops, with the 
exception of Mr Langa in LBC, was that cooperatives are similar to 
privately owned enterprises in that they are economic enterprises, but 
different in their organisational, decision-making, and ownership 
structures This recognition on the part of managers, more especially 
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member-managers, of the economic function of a co-op as fundamental has 
positive implications tor their long-term commitment to the development 
of the enterprises The position of managers in the cooperative as a whole, 
however, specifically their ultimate responsibility for the economic success 
of the enterprise, and the consequent emphasis in their perceptions on the 
economic function of the co-op can conflict with democratic organisation 
in the enterprise This is evident in the development of technocratic 
management in FSC, for example 
This suggests a tension between the two key goals ot a cooperative 
economic success and democratic organisation Further, the difference in 
managers' and producers' perceptions suggests a tension between these two 
constituencies in a co-op 
9.9 Conclusions 
My comparison of the contexts in which the co-ops operate lead to the 
conclusion, firstly, that the enterprises faced similar constraints Some of 
these are reflected in the constraints identified in Chapter 3 Some of the 
key constraints, however, namely, (a) illiteracy and severe lack of 
education and (b) the impact of the legacy of colonialism on cooperators' 
actions and consciousness are specific to the context of a developing 
society and do not appear among those listed in Chapter 3 These specific 
obstacles to cooperative development have significant implications for both 
theory and practice in the field 
Secondly, I conclude that cooperative development in South Africa 
is embryonic compared to the relatively more advanced movement m 
Zimbabwe The struggles of OCCZIM and the CSFS offer significant 
lessons for co-ops in SA in relation to the organisation of cooperatives in 
society Specifically, the struggles of the collective co-op movement in 
Zimbabwe highlight the importance for co-op orgamsation of (a) a well-
organised co-op movement independent of both the state and aid 
organisations and (b) an integrated cooperative service organisation such as 
the CSFS 
Despite this state of the South African cooperative movement, 
however, there is some basis for its future development Firstly, the history 
of a strong working class movement in SA provides a solid base for a 
growing co-op movement, and secondly, in the light of new political 
developments in SA, the history of an absence of state support for South 
African co-ops is likely to change in the future Among the key challenges 
of a future South African state would be to counter dependency among co-
ops 
When comparing the co-ops at a general level, I find among the key 
similarities a major concern with material survival This feature of 
cooperative activity is very different from activities which form the basis 
for the theory presented in Chapter 2 In the latter ventures, ideological 
reasons for cooperative formation were paramount This particular feature 
of cooperative activity in Southern Africa has significant implications for 
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both theory and practice in the field I have pointed to some of these 
implications in the sections on cooperative consciousness 
My examination of general differences among the enterprises 
indicates that some are worse off than others in certain respects, tor 
example, education, financial resources and managerial skills This leads to 
the conclusion that cooperative development is a process involving various 
stages of development 
In the next and final chapter I present the research findings and 
conclusions of this work In the light of these conclusions, the next chapter 
attempts to conceptualise cooperative development as a process involving 
different stages of development Suggested stages are matched with 
corresponding characteristics Finally, some implications of this 
conceptualisation for cooperative organisation and for service organisations 
are highlighted 
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CHAPTER 10 
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT: A PROCESS 
10.1 Introduction 
In this concluding chapter the theoretical and practical considerations 
reviewed in Chapters 1 and 2 are integrated with the empirical evidence 
given in the case studies I evaluate the degrees of democratic organisation 
in each enterprise in relation to Abell's (1981) principles of democracy and 
Bernstein's (1976) minimally necessary conditions for sustained 
participatory democracy I proceed to categorise each case study in terms 
of Brecker's (1988) stages of cooperative development Following this I 
expand upon the possible characteristics of each of the stages of 
development in this way illustrating that cooperative development is a 
process In addition, I distinguish between the essentially abstract stages of 
co-op development and the reality of this process I suggest some practical 
implications of these stages for service organisations and cooperatives and 
the chapter closes with further key findings and related conclusions 
10.2 Degrees of Démocratisation in the Cooperatives Studied 
In terms of Abells (1981) five principles of democracy and Bernstein's 
(1976) minimally necessary conditions for sustained démocratisation, the 
Langa Spinning Project and Launisma Bnckmaking Co op were 
characterised by low degrees of participatory democracy with little sign of 
progress towards increased démocratisation In the former enterprise this 
was manifested in the absence of the spinners' participation in decision 
making and the dominant role played by the manager, Ms Walker 
Furthermore, the outcome of the process of transformation of this project 
into a cooperative left the spinners powerless in relation to the Sheep Shop 
which continued to play the role an employer with the spinners as piece-
workers In addition, the spinners were concerned with material survival in 
whatever form possible It made little difference to them whether they 
worked for an employer or as a collective This survival consciousness 
further hindered the possibility of démocratisation in this enterprise 
Similarly, members of Launisma Bnckmaking Co-op perceived this 
enterprise as one survival strategy among many This impeded the 
development of a cooperative consciousness Furthermore, the lack of 
member participation in decision-making due to their low levels of 
education, their intemalisation of respect for elders such as Mr Langa 
which left his role as manager unchallenged, and the cumbersome structure 
of financial interdependence of enterprises which perpetuated the unequal 
distribution of scarce financial resources left little room for the 
development of a participatory democratic enterprise 
By contrast, Montagu Carpentry Co-op showed a relatively higher 
degree of democracy with definite signs of movement towards building 
increased democracy This was evident in producers' increasing 
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participation and control over the enterprise at both the levels production 
and decision-making The appointment of a member manager with 
delegated managerial authority and who was clearly accountable to the 
producers further facilitated démocratisation Furthermore, producers' 
active involvement in building an alternative to the dominant culture of 
authoritarian work relationships based on race was indicative of the growth 
of a democratic consciousness 
Although some mechanisms for ensuring democratic participation 
and control were present in Fencing Services Co-op (FSC), the disparity in 
levels of education of general members and management made these a 
mere formality Additionally, in the context of no representative body to 
serve the interests of general members, member-managers' emphasis on 
economic performance and their lack of attention for empowering 
producers resulted in technocracy This pointed to a limited democratic 
consciousness on the part of member-managers These factors were 
indicative of constraints to sustained démocratisation in this enterprise 
However, in the context of FSC's active involvement in establishing the 
Collective Self-Finance Scheme along with other co-ops in Zimbabwe, 
there is a possibility that this enterprise will leam from other more 
conscious members of the Scheme Furthermore, the Scheme does not only 
focus on Financing The availability of a Scheme staff member responsible 
for social problems of general members allows some space for the 
articulation of members' grievances Finally, if the co-op considered the 
recommendations based on this research, namely, that education for 
general members is a priority and that a representative body for these 
members is needed to counter-balance management's lack ot focus on 
further démocratisation, there is room for a move towards increased 
democracy in this enterprise 
10.3 Cooperative Development: A Process 
Brecker's (August, 1988) four stages of cooperative development are 
characterised by different economic, organisational, ideological, and 
political features In the light of his insights I categorise the Langa 
Spinning Project as a pre-cooperative, Laumsma Bnckmaking as non-
viable, while both Montagu Carpentry and Fencing Services Co-op were 
potentially viable at the time of research The evidence provided by these 
case studies enhances these insights by allowing one to expand on his 
characterisation of each stage of development 
10.3.1 The Pre-cooperative Stage 
The Langa Spinning Project exhibited features of a pre-cooperative On the 
basis of this case study I suggest the following additional characteristics of 
a pre-cooperative in the context of a developing economy 
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A co-op at this stage of development usually involves a small group 
of people producing goods on a small scale In most cases in South Africa 
producers are poor, unskilled, unemployed, black, and often illiterate and 
mnumerate Their socio-economic position is a key factor contributing to 
the lack of material resources in the form of finance and equipment in these 
enterprises Often low skill levels result in the production of poor quality 
goods unable to compete on the market 
Their previous work experiences are usually m capitalist firms as 
unskilled wage-labourers under the authority of white (and m some cases, 
coloured) supervisors In some cases producers have been involved in trade 
union activity, while in others they have been continuously unemployed for 
long periods and sometimes involved in organisations for the unemployed 
In the case of black women, their previous work experiences are 
predominantly as domestic workers and/or 'housewives' with little 
organisational experience 
Typically, in societies with histories of colonial / racial domination 
the membership of pre-cooperatives is characterised by a sense of 
powerlessness rooted in their historical position of subordination in society 
In contexts of high and rising unemployment, cooperatives often serve as 
means of survival The marginalised and unemployed population is most 
likely to form or join co-ops in South Africa 
Considering their previous work experiences, people involved in 
pre cooperatives have little or no understanding of cooperative production, 
ideology, and organisation In addition, they have little or no experience of 
operating an economic enterprise and of managing any such venture They 
are thus unable to conceptualise the functions of a co-op as an economic 
organisation A preoccupation with matenal survival in co-ops of the 
unemployed hinders the development of a conceptualisation of the 
cooperative form of organisation Cooperative consciousness is thus highly 
undeveloped at this stage of development 
Such enterprises are sometimes voluntary associations and other 
times initiated by people and/or organisations other than the members 
themselves On the one hand, political leaders and/or elders in the 
community initiate cooperatives On the other hand, political, religious, 
and community development organisations and/or organisations with social 
responsibility programmes are also actively involved in initiating such 
ventures 
The basic cohesive factor in pre-cooperatives is usually the need for 
employment The major concern among members of pre-cooperatives is 
the need for material survival The small scale of such co-ops combined 
with the lack of experience among members of such forms of organisation 
usually contributes to their relatively simple level of organisational 
development 
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10.3.2 The Non-Viable Stage 
Brecker's (1988 8) characterisation of non-viable co-ops includes that they 
have insufficient management skills and material resources in the form of 
assets and reserves, are characterised by subsistence levels of income and 
are not yet capable of generating a surplus sufficient to both sustain 
members and reinvest in expanded production 
In addition, the experience of Launisma Bnckmaking Co-op 
suggests that the basic factors of cohesion in such enterprises include, 
firstly, access to employment even though remuneration is meagre and 
sometimes non-existent and, secondly, the hope that 'things will eventually 
work out' The major concern among members of non viable co-ops is how 
best to meet their need for survival In non-viable co-ops the members 
usually contribute long hours of hard work, often for little or no pay, in the 
hope that some day in the near future they will benefit from their sacrifices 
These sacrifices, however, are usually made in a context where the 
members do not have a conception of the broader factors which have an 
impact on the operation of their enterprise 
Organisationally, such enterprises are relatively undeveloped Often 
one person dominates and makes decisions and/or the enterprise is 
controlled by the organisation funding it Thus, non-viable co ops are often 
characterised by a 'leader follower' syndrome - a situation which 
perpetuates powerlessness among the members Such enterprises usually 
barely survive on the crisis management techniques used by the 'leader' and 
the 'contacts' / 'connections' the leader may have when the co op needs 
help 
10.3.3 The Potentially-Viable Stage 
According to Brecker (1988 8), cooperatives at this stage of development 
have overcome the basic weaknesses of pre-cooperatives and non-viable 
co ops Such co-ops are characterised by a capacity for planning towards 
producing a surplus because they have the minimally necessary managerial 
skills Furthermore, such enterprises are actively engaged in production for 
the market with their major problems being enterprise growth and 
discrimination from conventional financial institutions 
In addition, such enterprises are usually relatively versatile in their 
ability to survive The major concern among members of potentially viable 
co-ops is, however, 'in what form do we survive9' Such enterprises 
sometimes continue to produce cooperatively, in other cases they may 
become small capitalist enterprises These features are reflected in both 
Montagu Carpentry Cooperative and Fencing Services Cooperative 
Society 
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10.3.4 The Completely Viable Stage 
Completely viable cooperatives are economically competitive enterprises 
They are equipped with the required level of managerial skill of which 
forward planning is an integral part Such enterprises have established and 
well coordinated organisational and production structures which contribute 
to economically viable and efficient productive activity Viable co ops 
have secured a niche in the market and are able to sell their produce at 
competitive pnces They have passed the initial stages of enterprise growth 
and are financially secure in terms of both liquid and fixed capital 
resources 
As noted by Brecker (1988 9), cooperatives at this stage ot 
development are capable of obtaining financial assistance on the open 
money market in the form of credit, loans, and/or bank overdrafts 
Furthermore, such enterprises have continuous access to the required 
technical assistance and are able to budget for the cost of such assistance 
Such assistance may be available in various forms, for example, by the 
presence of co-op members with specialised skills, and/or by access to a 
secondary cooperative specialised in rendering such services to co-ops 
Viable co-ops are thus organisationally well developed enterprises 
with an established support network With regard to cooperative 
consciousness, members of viable cooperatives have a clear understanding 
of both the primary economic goals and (unctions of their enterprise, and of 
the goal of démocratisation Furthermore, members proceed to engage in 
constant evaluation of the fulfillment ol these goals in relation to the 
continued growth of the enterprise and the changing needs of its 
membership 
In reality, however, co-ops do not fit perfectly into any one of the 
above stages of development This requires a distinction between the 
abstract characterisation of stages of development as presented above, and 
the 'real' process oí cooperative development as experienced by existing 
enterprises 
10.4 Abstract Stages versus 'Real' Process 
It is important to note that the stages of cooperative development as 
described above represent only theoretical constructs for the purposes of 
enhancing our understanding of cooperative development as a process In 
reality this process is not as smooth as these stages appear to suggest This 
means that no one cooperative will exhibit all the features of a particular 
stage of development (as described above) at one time Some co-ops may 
have the organisational and economic characteristics of the later stage(s) 
but political or ideological characteristics of the earlier stage(s) of 
development This 'uneven development results from the fact that 
cooperators leam through experience and their conscious reflection and 
action on the basis of this experience It is through this process that a 
cooperative form of organisation, consciousness and ideology develops 
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over time Such forms of organisation, consciousness, and ideology grow 
or develop with differential experiences of success in cooperative 
production and organisation 
Uneven development also results from the various factors at play 
during the initial formation of the enterprise For example, a co-op such as 
Fencing Services formed through taking over a capitalist firm is more 
likely to have immediate access to forms of organisational and productive 
structures than a co-op formed by a group ot people who have been 
retrenched and thus have to build an enterprise 'from scratch As illustrated 
by the technocratic managerial practices in this enterprise, however, access 
to more complex organisational and production structures does not 
necessarily imply greater degrees of democracy and/or accountability 
Despite the phenomenon of uneven development, there are real 
categories of co-ops and transitional phases in co-op development 
(Brecker, August, 1988 9) This is manifested in the existence of 
cooperatives with different needs and requirements for continued survival 
and/or growth as spelt out by Brecker (1988) and presented in Chapter 2 
10.5 Implications for Practice 
The conceptualisation of cooperative development as a process has 
important implications for the practices of both service organisations and 
co ops themselves 
10.5.1 Service Organisations 
Brecker (August, 1988 7) writes that 
no two co-ops are the same they grow at different paces, 
require different levels of inputs, and reach "take-off at 
different times" 
This implies, firstly, that service organisations need to recognise that 
different co-ops have different requirements by virtue of their stages of 
development Secondly, it implies that cooperatives require assistance 
throughout their development and not just in the initial stages of formation 
For service organisations this implies a long-term commitment to provide 
the services required by co-ops during their development and to respond 
timely and effectively to changes in these requirements 
Such a commitment is necessary to the process of building 
successful cooperative enterprises capable of contributing to a strong 
cooperative movement This does not, however, imply the continual 
dependence of co-ops on such services and/or organisations The method of 
providing services is of importance in this regard - either this method 
creates dependency or it facilitates self-reliance 
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Brecker (August, 1988) in his writings on the Zimbabwean 
experience points to some practical implications for service organisations 
with specific reference to the stages of cooperative development as 
described above 
In sum, the practical implications for service organisations are that 
co-ops at different stages of development require services and assistance 
suited to these stages This implies that either all types of organisations in 
this capacity must provide all the different services required by various co-
ops, or that such organisations themselves engage in cooperative activity 
aimed at spreading the varied service tasks In the case of service 
organisations which ïnitiate(d) co-ops the implication is a continued 
responsibility to support the enterprises throughout their development with 
a continuous sensitivity to their changing requirements due to this 
development 
10.5.2 Cooperatives 
The practical implications for co-ops relate to the ways in which co-ops at 
different stages of development can learn from each other It is important 
for cooperatives to recognise that they cannot simply take practices utilised 
in one co-op, implement these in their own enterprise, and expect the same 
results Instead, for pre-cooperatives to leam most effectively from 
potentially viable co-ops, for example, it would be important to trace the 
path of development required by a specific pre-cooperative in relation to 
the specific development of a co-op at a later stage of development 
Essentially, co-ops in formation need to set aims and objectives in 
planning their development Learning from more experienced co-ops can 
be useful in setting these aims and objectives In addition, learning from 
more experienced co-ops in itself contributes towards building cooperative 
organisation and consciousness Thus, the practical process of cooperative 
development when accompanied by the conscious reflection and action of 
cooperators themselves represents a praxis People learn the tools and skills 
needed to form a successful co-op at the same time as they work towards 
building a successful co-op Experience, both past and present, and 
conscious reflection and action on the basis of this experience are 
important components of the learning process involved in building a 
successful co-op 
10.6 Findings and Related Conclusions 
The case studies and comparative analysis presented in this dissertation 
have attempted to address the objectives set and the questions developed 
for examination as presented in the introduction 
6 1 I conclude that cooperative development is a process involving stages 
characterised by various degrees of participatory democracy and 
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organisational development In addition, different stages ot co-op 
development are characterised by different levels and types of cooperative 
consciousness Brecker's (1988) identification of these stages as (a) pre-
cooperative, (b) non-viable, (c) potentially viable and (d) completely viable 
is useful when conceptualising cooperative development 
6 2 Although the political motivations of the cooperatives studied cannot 
be denied, the case studies show that material factors are primary in their 
formation and cohesion This challenges Rothschild and Whitt (1986) who 
maintain that material incentives are secondary while ideological factors 
are primary in the formation of co ops My conclusion in this regard is that 
co-ops, in the context of developing economies, characterised by low levels 
of education and skill, poverty and unemployment are formed primarily for 
material (rather than ideological) reasons in people's attempts to survive 
This has important implications for the types ot constraints faced by co-
ops 
6 3 The most common internal constraints to cooperative development in 
the enterprises studied are similar to those identified in Chapters 3 and 4 
and include 
(a) a lack of managerial and technical skills, 
(b) a severe lack of financial resources and 
(c) the absence of democratic norms and procedures 
The following more specific constraints are especially significant findings 
(d) a severe lack of basic education among general members, 
(e) relationships of dependency between co-ops and service organisations 
and 
(f) a 'survival consciousness' among most co-op members 
6 4 With regard to (d) above, I conclude that the lack of basic education is 
a key constraint to effective participatory democracy in the co-ops studied 
Considering that cooperators' level of education has direct implications for 
(a) their effective control over delegated management, (b) their effective 
participation in decision-makjng and (c) the maintenance of such control 
and participation, this constraint can have severely debilitating effects on 
the development of cooperative organisations The specific experiences of 
the Langa Spinning Project, Launisma Brickmaking Cooperative and 
Fencing Services Cooperative Society provide evidence of such effects 
Thus, Szell's assertion is confirmed by my findings that the right 
consciousness is not sufficient for participation, workers' control, and self-
management, instead, a general level of competence among participants m 
combination with the right consciousness is necessary for effective 
cooperation (1989 12) 
6 5 The relationship between co-ops and supporting service organisations 
has important implications for the development of self-reliant enterprises 
with the potential for democracy This relationship, the experience of 
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service organisations in co-op development and their practices have a 
significant influence on the future development of the enterprises 
For example, the relationships between Montagu Carpentry Co-op 
and the Montagu and Ashton Community Services (MAG) organisation, 
and Fencing Services Cooperative Society and the Collective Sell-Finance 
Scheme facilitated self reliance in these enterprises This was manifested in 
their administration of loan finance rather than grants On the contrary, the 
relationships between the Langa Spinning Project and the Catholic Welfare 
Bureau, and between Launisma Brickmaking and the Unemployed 
Workers Movement resulted in dependency because financial aid was 
provided in the form of grants by these organisations which were 
inexperienced in the dynamics of cooperative development 
The latter case studies have shown that this scenario is 
disempowenng for producers A prerequisite for the development of 
sustainable participatory democratic enterprises is that producers are 
sufficiently powerful to influence decision-making and that they have some 
frame of reference to cooperation Self-reliant cooperatives who form part 
of a cooperative network and who are simultaneously engaged in the 
development of other cooperative enterprises, such as in the case of 
Fencing Services Co op and its fellow members in the Collective Self-
Finance Scheme, are more likely to develop into sustainable democratic 
enterprises than isolated cooperatives, such as the Langa Spinning Project 
and Launisma Brickmaking Co-op, locked into dependency relationships 
with donor agencies 
6 6 When co-ops are formed as strategies of survival, the long-term 
success and development of the enterprise as a cooperative is not a key 
goal for producers This is a major obstacle to cooperative development 
and suggests that the cooperative form of organisation may not be suitable 
in a context of material desperation and low skill and education levels 
Once again, the experiences of the Langa Spinning Project and Launisma 
Brickmaking Cooperative are indicative These enterprises were formed for 
reasons of material survival and were characterised by little potential for 
development into sustainable participatory democratic enterprises 
6 7 There is a relationship between mechanisms of democracy and 
organisational efficiency of cooperatives as economic units This 
relationship gives rise to a tension between democratic organisation and 
efficiency For example, on the one hand, democratic participation by 
consensus is not necessarily efficient On the other hand, technocratic 
management in Fencing Services Cooperative and the accompanied little 
regard for general members' grievances are indicative of a tension between 
efficiency and democracy in this enterprise In this regard I suggest that 
there is a threshold of participation at which efficiency and democracy in 
co-op development can be balanced The system of delegated authority and 
of clearly practicable accountability mechanisms practiced in Montagu 
Carpentry Co-op provides an example of such a balance 
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6 8 This leads me to conclude that (a) efficient democracy (a factor which 
is likely to have a positive influence economic success) requires some 
hierarchy and (b) efficient cooperative management relies on delegated 
authority which is regularly checked through practicable accountability 
mechanisms Here Abell's (1981) conceptualisation of organisational 
democracy is useful and relevant He notes that "there is no reason to 
suppose a democratic organisation will operate with a consensus" (1981 
263) and that one should not equate democratic organisation with the 
demise of hierarchy (1981 264) 
6 9 Finally, members in different positions in the cooperatives studied had 
different conceptions of cooperation For example, member-managers in 
Montagu Carpentry Co-op and Fencing Services Co-op tended to 
emphasise the economic function of these enterprises Producers in these 
co-ops were concerned with economic issues to the extent that it affected 
their financial remuneration They were also, however, concerned with the 
power relationships in their enterprises This was manifested in the 
negotiation around managerial authority in Montagu Carpentry and 
grievances voiced about the unequal distribution of resources and benefits 
in Fencing Services Co-op This suggests that the democratic aspect of 
cooperative organisation tends to be of more immediate concern to 
producers This leads me to conclude that cooperative consciousness is not 
a homogeneous objective entity Instead, it is essentially subjective and 
influenced by cooperatore' positions both within the enterprise and in 
broader society Furthermore, members' consciousness is but one among 
many factors influencing cooperative practice 
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APPENDIX 
OPERATIONAL STRUCTURES OF THE COLLECTIVE SELF-
FINANCE SCHEME 
1. Cooperative Development Policy 
The following is a summary of some of the key principles of the Collective 
Self Finance Scheme (CSFS) 
- Real development requires the conscious involvement of the people 
concerned 
- The CSFS determines the content and form of its own programme 
This cannot be influenced or interfered with by donors in exchange for 
their support 
- Co-ops are enterprises whose primary task is to generate surplus to 
raise the living standards of members and provide investment funds for 
development 
- The CSFS is open in principle and national in scope Prospective 
members must meet CSFS membership entena and show that they 
have reached the necessary level of development 
- Members must pay an equity contnbution, agree to a six month 
waiting period before presenting projects for loan finance and retain 
their membership at the scheme for at least two years 
- The CSFS cannot admit pre-co-ops (which it sees as the responsibility 
of the Ministry of Cooperative Development) nor 'start-up' co-ops 
which it defines as having a subsistence level of operation and income 
These are catered for by Zimbabwe Project (ZIMPRO) 
- Member co-ops must be able to put forward planned projects which 
have taken into account labour allocation and reward and the cost of 
management as well as costing inputs, forecasting returns, and the 
careful use of credit to generate a surplus 
- The Technical Support Team (TST) offers the skills to help co-ops 
formulate such plans and monitor the use of credit but under no 
circumstances should it replace the CSFS decision-making processes 
- All projects put forward for loan finance must meet the stnngent 
project formulation requirements of CSFS before they are passed on to 
the bank 
- These projects must be part of an overall development plan of each 
co-op with more than one source of income, each with a different risk 
element The development plan focuses on the total viability of the 
cooperative 
- Co-ops should be able to repay credit from future production surplus 
The financial secunty of the co-op lies principally in strong projects 
presented as part of an overall development plan This is what makes a 
co-op credit worthy Credit must generate a surplus otherwise the co-op 
falls into a debt trap and is left worse off than it was before Default on 
the part of a member co-op cuts off all access to credit and leaves the 
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co-op dependent on welfanst assistance (Analysing the CSFS and the 
CFS, points from Brecker, August, 1988) 
2. Operational Structures and Functions 
2.1 The Council and the Board 
The highest decision-making body, the Council, comprises one nominated 
representative from each member co-op The term of office for Councillors 
is one year The Council meets three times a year with a fourth meeting 
being a delegates Conference This Conference makes policy decisions and 
elects, on an annual basis, a minimum of seven co-op members from its 
midst to the Board Further responsibilities of the Council include making 
amendments to CSFS rules, determining annual programmes, confirming 
new member co ops, and accepting resignations, suspensions and 
expulsions All matters decided upon by the Council require a simple 
majority vote 
The Board elects from its members a chairperson, treasurer, and 
secretary The chairperson of the CSFS at the time of research was Mr 
Andrew Nyathi The Board is accountable to the Council, it meets monthly 
and is responsible for overseeing all activities between Council meetings 
and for directing the affairs of the CSFS More specifically, the Board 
authorises and supervises the use of CSFS funds, and awards, monitors, 
and administers, loans to member co-ops in consultation with Zimbank 
Further duties of the Board include maintaining all records and reports 
necessary to effective management and administration of the CSFS, 
presenting such information to the Council, and determining the grade of a 
member co-op using the grading system devised by the CSFS All 
decisions taken by the Board require a simple majority vote Board 
members who fail to attend three consecutive Board meetings without 
explanation lose their office Furthermore, members receive no payment 
for their responsibility as Board members 
At least one third of the Board is subject to re-election each year 
while both Councillors and Board members are subject to recall by 
cooperatore at all times (Brecker, June, 1988 5, Brecker, October, 1989 1, 
CSFS Project Proposal - Funding for Administrative Costs and Training, 
1989, CSFS Rules 5) 
2.2 The Loans Sub-Committee 
From among its members the Board appoints a Loans Sub-Committee 
(LSC) of three people to receive and consider loan applications from 
member-cooperatives The LSC is responsible to the Board and is required 
to provide a detailed report containing recommendations from the sub 
committee On the basis of the Board's consideration of these 
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recommendations it finally decides whether to approve the application for 
submission to the bank or not (Brecker, June, 1988 15a) 
The rate of interest to be charged on loans is fixed by the Board 
This interest rate, however, does not exceed the minimum overdraft rate in 
Zimbabwe at the time the loan is granted (13% ρ a m January, 1990) 
Furthermore, the Board decides whether interest charged on loans can and 
should be subsidised from CSFS funds A grading system is used to 
regulate the size of loans and subsidies on interest for which member co­
ops are eligible This grading system is based on strict entena relating to 
the quality of financial management in a co-op, its level of organisational 
development, effectiveness of its production planning and the level of 
production performance, and the degree of democratic participation of its 
members in decision-making processes (Brecker, June, 1988 5, CSFS 
Document on Grading Criteria, CSFS Rules 8) 
All loans are secured by the promissory note of the borrower In the 
event of money being used for purposes other than those for which it was 
borrowed, repayment of the loan becomes immediately due In the event of 
the borrowing member not paying a loan or a loan instalment on the due 
date, and without an extension for this debt, the Board and the bank are 
empowered to terminate the debtor's membership and recover the debt 
(CSFS Rules 8) 
2.3 The Tribunal 
The Tribunal is the legal arm of the CSFS responsible for dealing with all 
legal issues affecting the CSFS Such issues include judging any disputes 
which might anse among member-cooperatives, between the structures of 
the CSFS itself, and between CSFS and outside agencies, for example, the 
bank, and dealing with co-ops who default on loan repayments The 
Tribunal has assisted the CSFS with its registration and with the staff 
contracts of the Technical Support Team 
The Tribunal consists of private individuals who are appointed by 
the Board These include volunteer academics, lawyers, and a 
representative from the Ministry of Co-operative Development (CSFS 
Newsletter, No 4, July, 1989) 
2.4 The Coordinator and Technical Support Team 
The Board appoints the Co ordinator of the CSFS who is immediately 
responsible to the Board and who supervises CSFS staff compnsing the 
Technical Support Team (TST) Carl Brecker was the Coordinator at the 
time of research The TST consists of pnmanly office-based staff an 
Office Manager, Receptionist, Administrator, and an Accountant, and 
primarily field-based staff a Training Officer, Management Assistant, 
Agricultural Assistant, and a Social Organiser The TST staff is employed 
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by the CSFS and, under the Co ordinator's supervision, it carries out 
decisions of the Council, Conference, and Board to whom it is accountable 
The TST's central task is to assist cooperatives in formulating three 
year Development Programmes, Annual Plans, and Projects 
A Development Programme broadly outlines the path to be taken by 
the cooperative over a period of three years to achieve growth and 
development in all aspects of its organisation When developing this 
Programme, the TST considers the existing state of the co-op and its aims 
and objectives as stipulated m its constitution The Programme outlines 
major steps to be taken by the co-op to achieve growth and serves as a 
guide for preparing detailed annual plans An Annual Plan is a detailed 
description of all work to be done, all resources (material, financial, 
human) needed to execute work, and all measures required to facilitate 
smooth production during the year 
A Project is a detailed description of a particular part of the Annual 
Plan indicating resources required to execute the project and its place in 
relation to the overall plan It must indicate resources already available as 
well as those sought (finance, credit, training, or other) for the project The 
Project must also indicate how, in the event of receiving assistance, it will 
be utilised to generate sufficiently increased production for both repaying 
the credit and contributing to the overall Development Programme (CSFS 
Document - Programmes, Plans, and Projects) 
In the process of providing assistance to co-ops with the formulation 
of Programmes, Plans, and Projects, important tasks of the TST are to 
evaluate the productive capacity of a co-op, to advise it on how to improve 
performance, to ensure that it meets basic requirements for eligibility for 
loans and interest subsidies and to transfer skills to it through formal 
training and extension services Furthermore, the tasks of the TST field-
staff include visiting co-ops, identifying their problems and needs, 
including training needs, offering advice, and seeking possible solutions to 
any problems 
In addition, these staff ensure that CSFS cooperatives receive 
maximum services from all available institutions offering services to co-
ops, including government services In this way the TST serves as a link 
between the range of services available to co-ops in Zimbabwe and CSFS 
co-ops Moreover, the TST is required to identify additional services 
required by co-ops and to organise that such services are delivered to the 
enterprises These TST services are designed to empower cooperatore to 
effectively control production of a surplus 
The TST also services the Board by making available to it any 
information relating to cooperative development and by assessing possible 
implications of any such information (Brecker, June, 1988 11, 12, 
Brecker, October, 1989, CSFS Project Proposal - Funding for 
Administrative Costs and Training, 1989) 
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3. Financing 
The Scheme obtains its funds from four sources Firstly, the member co-
ops pay annual subscriptions to and buy shares in the CSFS The annual 
subscription for each member is Z$ 100 while shares are Z$ 200 each 
Subscription shares are limited to Z$ 1 500 while share capital is limited to 
Z$ 4 000 per co-op ( CSFS Newsletter, No 1, October, 1988, CSFS 
Project Request, April, 1989 2, TST Report, September, 1989 3, Brecker, 
June, 1988 7) This money serves, in part, as security for loans from the 
bank 
Secondly, a consortium of foreign donor agencies have agreed to 
make deposits of sizeable amounts of money to the CSFS bank account and 
to sign Letters of Guarantee for the CSFS which serve as further security 
for loans from the bank The latter arrangement provides financial 
resources without donors paying money directly to co-ops or the Scheme 
The third source of finance comes from the Bank of Zimbabwe (Zimbank), 
and the fourth is in the form of a development grant from donors for 
financing CSFS overhead expenses and its Technical Support Team (CSFS 
Newsletter, No 1, October, 1988, Brecker, June, 1988 7,8) 
Donor funding in the form of deposits with the bank serve two major 
purposes One of these is to serve as collateral enabling the bank to 
advance loans to CSFS co ops, and the other is to generate a necessary 
source of income tor the CSFS This income derives from interest earned 
on donor deposits and enables the CSFS to subsidise co-ops who cannot 
afford the commercial interest rate, to generate its own capital base, to 
cover costs arising from its growth, and to serve as buffer funds against the 
depletion of donor deposits in the event of covering bad debts 
Donor funding in the form of Letters of Guarantee serve as collateral 
in the event of bad debt risks This form of funding, however, does not 
generate interest (CSFS Project Request, Apnl, 1989 7) It is a long-term 
aim of the CSFS to diminish its reliance on development grants once it has 
begun to establish an increasing capital-base of its own thus enabling it to 
earn its own income and become completely self-financing (Brecker, 
August, 1988 4) 
4. Conception of Self-Financing 
According to Brecker (June, 1988 7, 8), the self-financing aspect of the 
CSFS refers mainly to two outcomes of equity capital holdings by 
member-cooperatives in the scheme 
The first of these is that loan capital is seen as an advance on 
productive surplus to be generated by the project needing finance Such 
capital is advanced only once it is ascertained that the project to be funded 
is either able to generate sufficient funds to repay its own loan, or that it 
enables the cooperative as an entire unit to improve its economic 
performance to such an extent that it is able to repay the loan requested 
198 
This means that all projects must fit into the cooperative's general 
development plan 
The second is that the project loans system is based on a finance 
matching scheme related to the size of CSFS funds Each member co op 
must contribute some equity capital (subscriptions and shares) towards 
building the mutual funds of the CSFS It is against these funds that the 
bank advances loans to member co-ops These mutual funds may consist of 
subscriptions, shares, earned interest, grants and donations to the Scheme 
(not to the co-ops), and other sundry income This means that member 
cooperatives have a sound interest in generating funds for the CSFS and in 
ensuring that no member defaults as this will restrict loan funds through the 
depletion of mutual collateral 
A further self financing feature of the CSFS is that it does not 
provide free grants nor interest-free loans The only free service offered by 
the CSFS to its members is the technical assistance financed by its 
development grant In addition, self-financing in the case of the CSFS 
implies that member cooperatives recognise that it is only through their 
own performance and development as economic units that they will 
progress towards becoming viable cooperatives able to obtain funds on the 
commercial financial market 
Thus, in the case of the CSFS, self-financing does not mean that the 
Scheme relies solely on funds from its member cooperatives Nor does it 
mean that financial assistance from non-cooperative sources such as the 
state and foreign donor agencies will not be employed Instead, the view is 
that the development of cooperatives into viable enterprises is a process, 
and a lengthy one, too, to which donor agencies and the state can best 
contribute by offering surety for loans rather than handing out free 
emergency grants which tend to perpetuate dependency relationships 
(Brecker, June, 1988 7, 8) 
5. Conception of Credit 
For the CSFS "[g]iving credit to a cooperative means to give to them, in 
advance, a portion of their future incomes" (Brecker, August, 1988 10) 
This requires member co-ops to plan on repaying credit out of the surplus 
to be produced on a daily basis For this reason the CSFS provides credit to 
co-ops for specific projects within an overall development programme 
CSFS credit facilities come with technical assistance aimed at transferring 
needed skills thereby facilitating the ability of its member-cooperatives to 
realise their respective development plans In this way the CSFS provides 
credit for development and for the purposes of empowering cooperatore to 
take full control of their enterprises 
One of the ways in which the CSFS has succeeded in empowering 
members of its cooperatives is through the provision of specially designed 
training for co-op member-managers A further significant feature of the 
CSFS credit system is that all its credit operations are based entirely on 
bank finance (Brecker, August 1988 10, 11, 16) No free grants or 
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donations in the form of either money or machinery and equipment are 
administered to member-cooperatives of the CSFS 
6. Relationships with other Organisations 
6.1 Donor Agencies 
The CSFS has entered into a legal agreement with foreign donor agencies 
which help fund it Among the key donors at the time of research was 
HIVOS This agreement states that funding by all agencies shall be in the 
form of a block grant stipulating the amounts allocated for collateral 
investments, capital expenditure, and recurrent costs Such grants can cover 
any part of the CSFS total budget for the first four years of its 
development Any funds received by the CSFS from other agencies, 
however, shall be for purposes other than those stipulated in the CSFS-
donor agreement Furthermore, Letters of Guarantee and of Contract from 
each agency must stipulate its involvement over the whole four year period 
of the CSFS Project 
The CSFS is required to submit annual progress reports to donors 
following the annual audit ot the organisation A final report at the end of 
the four year period is also required by each donor In addition, the CSFS is 
required to keep accurate financial records, to submit audited annual 
accounts illustrating how contributions to the Scheme have been spent, and 
at the end of the four years it must submit a full audited review of the 
financial affairs of the CSFS 
Donor agencies reserve the right to suspend payments under certain 
conditions These are, firstly, if their financial contribution is not being 
used in accordance with the descnption of the CSFS Project and, secondly, 
if the annual progress and financial reports have not been submitted by the 
CSFS within three months after the end of its financial year (Terms of 
Agreement between CSFS and Funding Agencies, January, 1989) 
Furthermore, part of the CSFS agreement with donors is that the 
CSFS is to have a separate formal agreement with the Zimbabwe Banking 
Corporation Limited (Zimbank) This agreement between the CSFS and 
Zimbank concerns the investment or holding of deposits made available by 
donors as collateral for bank loans advanced to CSFS member 
cooperatives The terms of agreement are as follows 
a) that deposits invested shall not be available to the CSFS for 
use other than as collateral for a period of four years 
b) that the interest earned on such deposits shall be available 
to the CSFS but only for those purposes as stipulated in the 
CSFS Project Document 
c) that the deposits are a capital grant from the funding 
agencies to the CSFS and are not repatriable 
dj that after the initial four years have expired the CSFS is 
free to utilise the collateral deposits in any other ways it sees 
200 
fit but which are beneficial to the member-cooperatives as 
whole (Terms of Agreement between CSFS and Funding 
Agencies, January, 1989) 
6.2 Zimbabwe Bank 
The CSFS has chosen to work with Zimbabwe Bank (Zimbank) for various 
reasons These include that there is no cooperative development bank in 
Zimbabwe and that Zimbank is a local bank and the only one prepared to 
offer both support and financial services to cooperatives Moreover, the 
Zimbabwean government holds the controlling shares in this bank it has 
direct investments in Zimbank of about 60% (Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989 
151) Hence, according to the CSFS (Project Request, April, 1989 8) this 
bank is most likely to be sympathetic to the aims of government policy on 
co-ops, and/or at least more open to persuasion in this regard than most 
other banks in the country Furthermore, this bank offers facilities required 
by the CSFS such as, a banking facility, an Agnbank facility for Us 
agricultural co-ops, and a hire purchase facility (CSFS Document -
Relationship between Zimbank and CSFS, CSFS Project Request, April, 
1989 8, 9, Brecker, June, 1988 9,10) 
Zimbank offers a range of services to CSFS co-ops These include 
the provision of overdraft facilities and loans, monitoring co-op projects 
together with the CSFS, paying regular visits to the cooperatives to ensure 
that they are successfully managing their finances, and training cooperative 
financial managers in banking procedures, among others (CSFS Document 
- Relationship between Zimbank and CSFS, CSFS Project Request, April, 
1989 8,9, Brecker, June, 1988 9, 10) 
The procedure for co ops to receive loans from the bank is as 
follows Once the co-op, with the TST's assistance, has worked through its 
Programme, Plan, and Projects and has detailed the project for which it 
requires financial assistance, a loan application is submitted by the co op to 
the I^oans Sub Committee which submits it to the Board of the CSFS for 
approval Once approved, the Board submits the application to the bank 
which considers it on its own ment applying the usual banking procedures 
(CSFS Document - Relationship between Zimbank and CSFS, CSFS 
Project Request, April, 1989 8, 9, Brecker, June, 1988 9, 10) 
The application of usual banking procedures implies that as a 
commercial bank, Zimbank advances its own funds for loans to CSFS co-
ops CSFS funds in the form of donor deposits thus serve as collateral only 
This gives the CSFS the opportunity to invest its donor funds with other 
banks as well, as long as such funds can serve as collateral for loans from 
Zimbank for CSFS co-ops In the process of advancing loans to CSFS co-
ops, the amount of bank funds to be used depends on the requirements of 
the project, the amount of CSFS mutual funds available as secunty, and the 
amount of guarantee funds available as surety from donors 
Furthermore, Zimbank is required to charge a commercial rate of 
interest for CSFS use of its funds in order to provide the bank with income 
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to cover the costs of administration among other costs The bank supervises 
its own loans including those to CSFS co-ops The bank thus does not treat 
cooperatives any differently from other types of enterprises when assessing 
loan applications (CSFS Document - Relationship between Zimbank and 
CSFS, CSFS Project Request, April, 1989 8, 9, Brecker, June, 1988 9, 
10) 
There are, however, some advantages to working with Zimbank 
Firstly, this bank offers the CSFS interest rates of 14% while it charges 
conventional enterprises 16% This significant concessionary interest rate 
for CSFS co-ops has been granted by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
CSFS won this concession through negotiations with the Ministry of 
Cooperatives which in tum approached the Reserve Bank Furthermore, 
Zimbank has several branches all over Zimbabwe especially in growth 
point areas This facilitates the opening of accounts by each of the CSFS 
co-ops (CSFS Document - Relationship between Zimbank and CSFS, 
CSFS Project Request, April, 1989 8, 9, Brecker, June, 1988 9, 10) 
Zimbank requires that co-ops open accounts with it and that the 
enterprises cooperate with the bank in centralising all CSFS co-ops 
accounts by using certain branches of the bank This facilitates the bank's 
ability to manage and monitor the loans of these co ops The cooperative 
members, on the other hand, require quick and efficient service from the 
bank when processing loans In addition, the cooperatives expect to be 
treated like viable businesses and require the bank's financial advice on the 
efficient management of their transactions (CSFS Document Relationship 
between Zimbank and CSFS, CSFS Project Request, Apnl, 1989 8, 9, 
Brecker, June, 1988 9, 10) 
In the process of approving loans for CSFS co-ops, the bank s 
decision is final Furthermore, the bank considers only those loan and 
project applications submitted to it by the CSFS Board In the event of the 
bank's rejection of any such application, its reasons for rejection are 
discussed with the CSFS Board and the cooperative concerned (CSFS 
Document Relationship between Zimbank and CSFS, CSFS Project 
Request, April, 1989 8, 9, Brecker, June, 1988 9, 10) 
6.3 Organisation for Collective Cooperatives in Zimbabwe 
The CSFS as an autonomous organisation has a relationship of cooperation 
and support with the Organisation of Collective Cooperatives in Zimbabwe 
(OCCZIM) This relationship is manifested in CSFS's willingness to 
service co-ops referred to it by OCCZIM, provided these enterprises meet 
CSFS membership requirements as stated in its rules OCCZIM is a much 
broader organisation and its member-cooperatives include enterprises at all 
levels ot development CSFS, on the contrary, restricts its membership to 
potentially viable enterprises and is thus a more specialised type of co-op 
organisation 
The CSFS does not perceive itself to be in competition with 
OCCZIM nor does it espouse to substitute the representative role 
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performed by OCCZIM for the entire co-op movement in Zimbabwe 
Nevertheless, the CSFS sees its specialised services to potentially viable 
co-ops as benefiting the co-op movement as a whole by providing practical 
examples of successful cooperative enterprises (CSFS Project Request, 
April, 1989 25) 
6.4 The State 
In this section I deal with CSFS relationship with the state in the form of 
the Ministry of Cooperatives The Ministry provides to CSFS co-ops all its 
legally enacted services such as the registration of co ops, supervision, 
training, and auditing services, among others In addition, the CSFS has 
established close relationships with senior officials in this Ministry who 
show an interest in the CSFS as one component in the establishment of a 
cooperative development bank in Zimbabwe (CSFS Project Request, April, 
1989 10) 
Furthermore, the Ministry extends special training facilities, as 
defined by the CSFS, to this organisation In the light of CSFS's needs for 
special courses for its TST, Board and Council members, and co op 
members such training facilities beyond the standard training offered by 
the Ministry is important for the development of the CSFS In addition, this 
state department provides for special training equipment which the CSFS 
cannot afford The Ministry has also indicated a willingness to organise 
and finance educational visits to Cooperative Banks in other countries such 
as Spain, Botswana, Kenya, and Mauritius Such visits will provide the 
CSFS with valuable insights and will assist in familiarising the Zimbabwe 
Bank with the special requirements of cooperative enterprises (CSFS 
Project Request, April, 1989 10) 
Moreover, the CSFS requires the support of the Ministry of 
Cooperatives in negotiating concessions for cooperatives on bank interest 
rates Such support is also needed in the form of permission from the 
Ministry for importing CSFS capital equipment on a duty free basis 
Furthermore, in the event of CSFS participation in international 
conferences dealing with cooperative credit provision the support of the 
Ministry is required (CSFS Project Request, April, 1989 10) 
In sum, the CSFS relationship with the Ministry of Cooperatives is 
related to the provision of training and services and facilitating the CSFS 
relationship with the state as a broader entity Significantly, the Ministry 
also negotiates for economic concessions to CSFS and its co-ops 
6.5 Local Non-governmental Organisations 
Much the same as its relationship with OCCZIM, the CSFS has a 
reciprocal relationship with some non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
for example, Zimbabwe Project (ZIMPRO), while its relationship with 
NGOs in general is mainly mutually supportive For example, CSFS and 
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ZIMPRO introduce each other as organisations to cooperatives requiring 
their respective specialised services ZIMPRO deals mainly with 'start-up' 
co-ops while CSFS deals with potentially viable co-ops Such mutually 
supportive relationships among all NGOs are meant to maximize and refine 
the services and support provided to cooperatives in the movement as a 
whole 
Furthermore, its emphasis on mutually supportive relationships with 
other local NGOs enables the CSFS to gain access to various kinds of 
facilities provided by other organisations, for example, training equipment 
and training centres (CSFS Project Request, April, 1989 25) Zimbabwe 
Project (ZIMPRO), Glen Forest, Mostrud, Zimbabwe Foundation for 
Education with Production (ZIMFEP), Co-operation for Research, 
Development and Education (CÒRDE) in Botswana, and The Institute for 
Technology and Development (Tecnica), are among the local NGOs with 
which the CSFS has developed mutually supportive relationships 
The CSFS relationship with Tecnica has been especially significant 
Tecnica is an organised network of skilled volunteers "committed to social 
justice" (CSFS Newsletter, No 4, July, 1989 4) This NGO is based in 
Zimbabwe and shares premises with the CSFS Tecnica finds and places 
skilled volunteers in organisations requiring specific services Such 
volunteers are placed for short periods ranging from one to three months, 
depending on the availability of the volunteer and the needs of the 
organisation requiring the skills Placements are for short periods firstly, 
because volunteers do intensive training for the purposes of transferring 
skills and then leave, and secondly, because these people finance their own 
placements The short periods prevent the host organisation from becoming 
dependent on skills provided by volunteers (CSFS Newsletter, No 4, July, 
1989 4) 
By July, 1989, Tecnica had placed with the CSFS three computer 
specialists to train its staff and assist in establishing a database, a retired 
investment banker to advise the organisation on the best ways to invest 
their collateral and guarantee donor funds, and a manager to transfer 
managerial skills to member-managers at Fencing Services Co-op (CSFS 
Newsletter, No 4, July, 1989 4) 
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DUTCH SUMMARY 
Coöperatieve Ontwikkeling als Proces: Vier Case Studies van 
Produktieve Coöperaties in Zuidelijk Afrika 
Coöperaties worden meestal gevormd in tijden van sociale, politieke en/of 
economische crises Zij komen vaak op als voorbeeldorganisaties tijdens 
sociale veranderingen Dit is een micro-studie van vier coöperaties in Zuid-
Afrika en Zimbabwe in de jaren tachtig De vorming van coöperaties in 
Zuid-Afnka vertoont opwaartse en neerwaartse tendensen die min of meer 
parallel lopen met opkomst en neergang in het politieke verzet tegen de 
repressieve staat In Zimbabwe kwamen coöperatieve activiteiten van 
gemarginaliseerde groepen in de samenleving sterker op na de strijd voor 
de onafhankelijkheid 
De bijdrage in sociale verandering die meestal van coöperaties wordt 
verwacht, stellen zware eisen aan hen als vormen van alternatieve sociale 
organisaties Ze moeten economisch, financieel en sociaal levensvatbaar 
zijn en tegelijkertijd overleven als organisaties met een hoge democratische 
participatie In deze studie worden de democratiseringsprocessen, 
vooruitgang en terugval daarin, van vier coöperaties onderzocht. De case 
studies leveren een illustratie voor dit ontwikkelingsproces waarin 
verschillende stadia kunnen worden onderscheiden, ieder gekarakteriseerd 
door een verschillende graad van democratisering Zo worden de 
voorwaarden en beperkingen van de ontwikkeling naar duurzame, 
democratische organisaties met een hoge participatiegraad onderzocht Een 
doel van deze studie is de praktische ervaringen van coöperaties van 
werkelozen en sociaal gemarginaliseerde mensen in Zuidehjk-Afrika te 
delen met andere voorstanders van coöperatieve ontwikkeling 
De doelstellingen van deze dissertatie zijn drievoudig Allereerst is 
het de bedoeling om de graad van democratische participatie in elk van de 
bestudeerde ondernemingen vast te stellen Op de tweede plaats wil zij 
proberen te verkennen of coöperatieve ontwikkeling een proces is waarin 
verschillende stadia van democratische ontwikkeling met een verschillende 
graad van democratisering te onderscheiden zijn Tenslotte is het derde 
doel om de coöperaties met elkaar te vergelijken en, in het bijzonder, om 
de Zuidafnkaanse context en ervaringen te vergelijken met die in 
Zimbabwe Deze vergelijking is belangrijk om de verschillende stadia in 
ontwikkeling te illustreren en lessen te trekken uit de ontwikkelingen in 
Zimbabwe 
In een poging om de eerste twee doelen te bereiken wordt allereerst 
een schets gegeven van theorieën over de vorming van democratische 
organisaties De verschillende stadia in het proces van coöperatieve 
ontwikkeling worden van elkaar onderscheiden pre-cooperatief, met-
levensvatbaar, potentieel levensvatbaar, en verschillende stadia van geheel 
ontwikkelde organisaties Deze theoretische schets maakt het mogelijk om 
concepten te ontwikkelen waarmee het empirisch materiaal kan worden 
begrepen en geordend Het belangrijkste concept daarbij is 
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'Participatonsche-Democratische Organisatie' (PDO) Dit is een soort van 
'ideaal-type' dat wordt beschreven, waarbij de beperkingen van de 
bestaande theorieën worden aangegeven 
De schets van de theorieën maakt het ook mogelijk om specifieke 
vragen te stellen aan het empirisch materiaal Twee sets van vragen, elk 
gerelateerd aan de doelstellingen van dit onderzoek, worden in deze 
dissertatie dan verder onderzocht De eerste set, met betrekking tot de 
eerste doelstelling, omvat de volgende vragen (a) tot welke graad zijn de 
bestudeerde coöperaties democratisch in hun praktijken9 (b) ontwikkelen 
deze coöperaties zich in de richting van meer democratische organisaties7 
(c) hebben de organisaties de potentie om zich uiteindelijk tot een 
effectieve PDO te ontwikkelen7 De tweede set, deze gerelateerd aan de 
tweede doelstelling, omvat de volgende vragen (a) is coöperatieve 
ontwikkeling een proces waarin verschillende stadia met een verschillende 
graad van democratisering zijn te onderscheiden9 (b) als dat zo is, wat zijn 
dan de stadia waarin de bestudeerde coöperaties zich bevinden9 (c) wat zijn 
de criteria waarmee we deze verschillende stadia kunnen onderscheiden9 
(d) wat zijn de implicaties van antwoorden op bovengenoemde vragen voor 
coöperatieve organisatie en ontwikkeling9 
In hoofdstuk drie worden de specifieke praktische problemen waar 
coöperaties in een kapitalistische omgeving mee geconfronteerd worden, 
uiteengezet Om analytische redenen, maak ik een onderscheid tussen 
'externe' en 'interne' problemen De eerste refereren aan de obstakels in de 
omgeving waarin de coöperatie functioneert, terwijl de tweede betrekking 
hebben op zaken die het proces van democratisering van binnenuit 
belemmeren De externe problemen omvatten (a) de marginale positie van 
coöperaties in kapitalistische economieën, (b) het ontbreken van een 
ideologie van democratische organisatie in dergelijke sociale formaties, (c) 
het gebrek aan een passende legale structuur voor zulke ondernemingen en 
(d) de institutionele discriminatie tegen coöperaties, vooral waar het de 
toegang tot financiële middelen betreft De interne problemen omvatten (a) 
de tijd die nodig is om democratisering in de praktijk te brengen, (b) het 
gebrek aan democratische structuren, normen en procedures, (c) de wijzen 
van aanpak van interpersoonlijke conflicten, (d) de verschillen in 
vaardigheden en ervaring tussen de leden van de coöperatie, (e) het gebrek 
aan passende vaardigheden, (f) het gebrek aan financiële middelen en (g) 
de interne organisatorische grenzen aan de groei 
Deze problemen wijzen op de noodzaak van scholing voor 
democratie / samenwerking die zowel de waarden van democratie als de 
toepassing ervan in de praktijk, bevat Effectieve samenwerking vereist 
echter niet alleen geschoolde, bekwame deelnemers, maar ook deelnemers 
die een coöperatief bewustzijn hebben of tenminste de potentie hebben dit 
bewustzijn te ontwikkelen In dit hoofdstuk worden enkele aspecten die 
aan de basis staan van de ontwikkeling van een coöperatief bewustzijn 
onderzocht Het belicht, tot besluit, het belang van structuren die de 
coöperatieve waarden en hun toepassing in de praktijk ondersteunen, de 
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mogelijke functies en dilemmas van deze structuren en het plaats enkele 
kanttekeningen bij de steun van de staat aan coöperaties 
Hoofdstuk vier begint met een algemene schets van de context 
waarbinnen de opkomst van coöperaties in het Zuid-Afnka van de jaren 
tachtig gezien moet worden Hierbij wordt ten eerste aandacht besteed aan 
de bredere politieke inhoud van coöperaties als onderdeel van de 
verzetsbeweging tegen apartheid en kapitalisme in Zuid-Afnka Dit wordt 
gevolgd door een overzicht van de coöperaties in Zuid-Afnka in die jaren 
Aangezien er geen gevestigde en georganiseerde beweging van coöperaties 
is in Zuid-Afnka, worden de coöperaties uit verschillende provincies kort 
in clusters behandeld Er wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen de coöperaties 
die een band hebben met dienstverlenende organisaties en diegene die een 
band hebben met de vakbonden Dit hoofdstuk geeft tevens een algemene 
profielschets van de nieuwe coöperaties en de problemen die zij 
tegenkomen Het debat over de rol van coöperaties bij de opbouw van het 
socialisme, dat op het moment van onderzoek gaande was, wordt kort 
weergegeven Dit debat vond plaats voor de val van het 'bestaande' 
socialisme in voormalig Oost-Europa Tot slot schetst het hoofdstuk een 
reeks vooruitzichten waardoor de dienstverlenende organisaties, die 
coöperaties initiëren ot ondersteunen, worden beïnvloed 
Hoofdstuk vijt vormt het begin van het empirische gedeelte van de 
dissertatie In dit hoofdstuk wordt de positie van het Langa Spinning 
Project als coöperatief experiment van het Catholic Welfare Bureau 
onderzocht Zijn ontwikkeling en het begin van zijn omvorming tot een 
coöperatie, onder de directie van een manager van het Catholic Welfare 
Bureau, toont enkele problemen met de top-down 
ontwikkelingsbenadenng In hoofdstuk zes verschaft de case van de 
Laumsma Brickmakmg Co-op een voorbeeld van hoe de armen worden 
gevangen in een cyclus van armoede binnen een context van concurrentie 
om schaarse middelen Deze studie wijst tevens op de negatieve gevolgen 
van hulp Dit doet vermoeden dat binnen een context van schaarse 
middelen en de dagelijkse strijd om te overleven, het toepassen van 
participatieve democratische samenwerking steeds moeilijker wordt 
De cases die behandelt worden in hoofdstuk zeven en acht geven een 
wat hoopvoller beeld De ontwikkeling van de organisatie van de Montagu 
Carpentry Co-op laat duidelijk de toenemende democratisering van de 
onderneming zien Deze gaat gepaard met een toenemende empowerment 
van haar deelnemers door middel van collectieve controle over de 
produktie Een belangrijk kenmerk van deze onderneming is de benoeming 
van een blanke manager die verantwoording af moet leggen aan de 
producenten Deze studie laat zien hoe producenten de strijd aanbinden met 
racistische machtsrelaties op het werk en op die manier een coöperatief 
bewustzijn beginnen te ontwikkelen Dit wijst op het belang van de strijd 
tegen ongelijke sociale machtsverhoudingen voor 
ontwikkelingsstrategieën 
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De studie van de Fencing Servîtes Cooperative Society in hoofdstuk 
acht, begint met een inleiding over de context van Zimbabwe en de 
geschiedenis van de coöperatieve beweging in dat land De rol van de staat 
bij de ondersteuning van coöperaties en de onevenredige verhouding tussen 
zijn beloften en de dagelijkse praktijk, worden kort behandeld Na deze 
inleiding, ga ik verder met een verslag van de ontwikkeling van de Fencing 
Services Cooperative Society Deze studie toont enkele moeilijkheden die 
de arbeiders tegenkomen als zij, in een poging hun werk te behouden, een 
kapitalistische onderneming overnemen In dit specifieke geval betekent dit 
de overname van een onderneming met een hoog opgelopen schuld en heel 
weinig liquide middelen, alsmede de erfenis van een kapitalistische 
management structuur en de praktische toepassingen daarvan in de vorige 
onderneming Een belangrijk aspect van deze studie is de vorming van een 
Collectief Zelf-financienngs Stelsel (Collective Self Finance Scheme) 
georganiseerd en democratisch gecontroleerd door de leden van de 
coöperatie De operationele structuren van dit stelsel, zijn 
ontwikkelingspolitiek en praktijk, en zijn relaties met donor-organisaties, 
zijn belangrijke voorbeelden voor andere coöperaties voor mogelijke 
methoden om te komen tot self-reliance In de context van 
donorafhankelijkheid en een ernstig gebrek aan financiële middelen bij de 
leden van coöperaties, voorziet het Collectief Zelf-financienngs Stelsel in 
een belangrijke leervanng 
De Zimbabwe case vormt de afsluiting van het empirische gedeelte 
van de dissertatie en wordt in hoofdstuk negen gevolgd door een 
vergelijkende analyse van de bestudeerde ondernemingen en de ervaringen 
van beide landen Dit hoofdstuk geeft een overzicht van de algemene 
overeenkomsten en de meer specifieke verschillen tussen de vier 
bestudeerde coöperaties De verschillen in de ontwikkeling van de 
organisatie, niveaus van coöperatief bewustzijn en de graden van 
democratisering van de ondernemingen, laten zien dat iedere coöperatie 
zich in een bepaalde fase van coöperatieve ontwikkeling bevindt 
In hoofdstuk negen en tien probeer ik de theorie en de empine te 
integreren In het laatste hoofdstuk deel ik iedere case studie in op grond 
van de stadia van coöperatieve ontwikkeling beschreven in hoofdstuk twee 
Het Langa Spinning Project is ingedeeld als een precooperatie, de 
Launisma Brickmaking Cooperative is niet levensvatbaar, terwijl zowel de 
Montagu Carpentry Cooperative als de Fencing Services Cooperative 
Society worden geclassificeerd als potentieel levensvatbare coöperatieve 
ondernemingen Dit hoofdstuk werkt de meest in het oog lopende 
kenmerken van ieder stadium binnen de Zuidehjk-afrikaanse context uit 
Belangrijk echter is dat het aantoont dat de stadia van coöperatieve 
ontwikkeling niet meer zijn dan theoretische constructies, gemaakt om ons 
inzicht in het proces vergroten In werkelijkheid verloopt dit proces niet zo 
vloeiend als de stadia doen vermoeden Bovendien past geen enkele 
coöperatie precies binnen éen stadium De praktische gevolgen hiervan 
voor de conceptualisering van coöperatieve ontwikkeling als proces, 
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worden onderzocht voor zowel dienstverlenende organisaties als voor de 
coöperaties zelf 
Dit hoofdstuk eindigt met een presentatie van de bevindingen van 
het onderzoek en de daarbij behorende conclusies Deze omvatten de 
volgende 
(a) Ik concludeer dat coöperatieve ontwikkeling een proces is dat 
zich voltrekt in stadia, die gekarakteriseerd worden door verschillende 
graden van participatieve democratie en organisatorische ontwikkeling 
Verder worden de verschillende stadia van coöperatieve ontwikkeling 
gekarakteriseerd door verschillende niveaus en typen van coöperatief 
bewustzijn Breckers (1988) indeling van deze stadia in (a) pre-cooperatief, 
(b) niet levensvatbaar, (c) potentieel levensvatbaar en (d) volledig 
levensvatbaar, is bruikbaar als we coöperatieve ontwikkeling willen 
conceptualiseren 
(b) Hoewel de politieke motivaties niet ontkend kunnen worden, 
laten de case studies zien dat materiele factoren van primair belang zijn 
voor de vorming en cohesie van de bestudeerde coöperaties Dit is in strijd 
met de bevindingen van Rothschild en Whitt (1986) die beweren dat 
ideologische en niet materiele factoren van en zodanig belang zijn voor de 
vorming van coöperaties Mijn conclusie is dat coöperaties, in de context 
van zich ontwikkelende economieën, die gekenmerkt worden door een laag 
niveau van onderwijs en vaardigheden en door armoede en werkloosheid, 
in eerste instantie gevormd worden vanuit materiele (in plaats van 
ideologische) overwegingen vanuit een poging om te overleven Dit heeft 
belangrijke gevolgen voor het type problemen waar coöperaties mee 
geconfronteerd worden 
(c) De meest algemene interne problemen die coöperatieve 
ontwikkeling in de bestudeerde ondernemingen belemmeren, vertonen veel 
overeenkomsten met de problemen die in hoofdstuk drie en vier 
geïdentificeerd werden Dit zijn (1) een gebrek aan management en 
technische vaardigheden, (2) een ernstig gebrek aan financiële middelen en 
(3) het ontbreken van democratische normen en procedures Ook de 
volgende, meer specifieke problemen, zijn belangrijke bevindingen (4) een 
ernstig gebrek aan basiseducatie van de leden, (5) afhankelijkheidsrelaties 
tussen coöperaties en dienstverlenende organisaties en (6) een 
overlevingsbewustzijn onder de meeste cooperatieleden 
(d) Met betrekking tot punt с 4, concludeer ik dat het gebrek aan 
basiseducatie een hoofdprobleem is voor een effectieve participatieve 
democratie in de bestudeerde coöperaties In aanmerking nemend dat het 
onderwijsniveau van de leden directe gevolgen heeft voor (a) hun 
daadwerkelijke controle over gedelegeerd management, (b) hun effectieve 
participatie in de besluitvorming en (c) het in stand houden van deze 
controle en participatie, kan dit probleem een zeer verzwakkende 
uitwerking hebben op de ontwikkeling van coöperatieve organisaties De 
specifieke ervaring van het Langa Spinning Project, de Laumsma 
Bnckmaking Cooperative en de Fencing Services Cooperative Society 
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leveren hiervoor het bewijs Zo wordt door mijn gegevens Szells stelling 
bevestigd 
' dat het noodzakelijke bewustzijn met voldoende is voor 
participatie, controle door de arbeiders en zelf-management, 
daarentegen is een algemeen niveau van bekwaamheid onder 
de deelnemers gecombineerd met het noodzakelijke bewustzijn 
nodig om te komen tot effectieve samenwerking' (1989 12) 
(e) De relatie tussen coöperaties en ondersteunende dienstverlenende 
organisaties heeft belangrijke gevolgen voor de ontwikkeling van self-
reliant ondernemingen met een potentieel voor democratie Binnen deze 
relatie hebben de ervaring van de dienstverlenende organisaties met 
betrekking tot coöperatieve ontwikkeling en de toepassing daarvan in de 
praktijk, een belangrijke invloed op de toekomstige ontwikkeling van de 
ondernemingen Bijvoorbeeld, de relaties tussen de Montagu Carpentry 
Co-op en de Montagu and Ashton Community Services organisatie, en de 
Fencing Services Cooperative Society en het Collectieve Zelf-financierings 
Stelsel bevorderden self reliance in deze ondernemingen Dit 
manifesteerde zich in de toekenning van financiering in de vorm van 
leningen in plaats van giften De relaties tussen het Langa Spinning Project 
en het Catholic Welfare Bureau, en tussen de Laumsma Brickmaking Co-
op en de Unemployed Workers' Movement resulteerden, daarentegen, in 
afhankelijkheid omdat de finanuele hulp in de vorm van giften werd 
gegeven Deze ondersteunende organisaties hadden geen ervaring met de 
dynamiek van coöperatieve ontwikkeling Deze laatste case studies tonen 
aan dat deze opzet de producenten onmachtig maakt Een voorwaarde voor 
de ontwikkeling van duurzame, op participatie gebaseerde, democratische 
ondernemingen is dat de producenten voldoende macht hebben om de 
besluitvorming te beïnvloeden en dat zij beschikken over een 
referentiekader voor samenwerking Self-reliant coöperaties die onderdeel 
uitmaken van een cooperatienetwerk dat tegelijkertijd bezig is met het 
opzetten van andere coöperatieve ondernemingen, zoals in het geval van de 
Fencing Services Cooperative en de andere deelnemers aan het Collective 
Zelf-financierings Stelsel, zullen waarschijnlijk eerder in staat zijn zich te 
ontwikkelen tot duurzame democratische ondernemingen dan geïsoleerde 
coöperaties, zoals het Langa Spinning Project en de Laumsma 
Brickmaking Cooperative, die vastzitten in een afhankelijkheidsrelatie met 
hun donoren 
(f) Als coöperaties gevormd zijn vanuit een pure 
overlevingsstrategie, zal het langetermijn succes en de ontwikkeling van de 
onderneming als coöperatie niet het belangrijkste doel zijn van de 
producenten Dit is een belangrijk obstakel voor coöperatieve ontwikkeling 
en suggereert dat de coöperatieve vorm van organisatie niet geschikt is in 
een context van grote armoede en een laag niveau van vaardigheden en 
educatie Ook hier zijn de ervaringen van het Langa Spinning Project en de 
Laumsma Brickmaking Cooperative illustratief Deze ondernemingen zijn 
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gevormd vanuit een overlevingsstrategie van haar deelnemers en worden 
gekenmerkt door weinig potentieel voor ontwikkeling in duurzame 
participatieve democratische ondernemingen. 
(g) Er bestaat een relatie tussen mechanismen van democratie en de 
organisatorische doelmatigheid van coöperaties als economische eenheden. 
Deze relatie zorgt voor het ontstaan van een spanningsveld tussen 
democratische organisatie en doelmatigheid. Bijvoorbeeld, aan de ene kant 
is democratische participatie door middel van consensus niet 
noodzakelijkerwijs efficiënt. Aan de andere kant, het technocratische 
management van de Fencing Services Cooperative en de daarmee gepaard 
gaande beperkte aandacht voor de onvrede van leden, illustreren het 
spanningsveld tussen doelmatigheid en democratie in deze onderneming. 
Mijns inziens bestaat er echter een participatiedrempel waarop 
doelmatigheid en democratie in coöperatieve ontwikkeling in evenwicht 
gebracht kunnen worden. Het systeem van gedelegeerde autoriteit en van 
duidelijk uitvoerbare mechanismen van accountability, zoals toegepast in 
de Montagu Carpentry Cooperative, geeft een voorbeeld van dit 
evenwicht. 
(h) Dit leidt mij tot de conclusie dat (a) doelmatige democratie (een 
factor die waarschijnlijk een positieve invloed heeft op economisch succes) 
enige hiërarchie vereist en (b) dat doelmatig coöperatief management 
steunt op gedelegeerde autoriteit die regelmatig gecontroleerd moet worden 
door middel van praktische mechanismen van accountability. In dit kader 
is de conceptualisering van organisatorische democratie van Abell (1988) 
relevant. Hij stelt dat 'er geen reden is om te veronderstellen dat 
democratische organisatie zal opereren op basis van consensus' (1981:263) 
en 'dat men democratische organisatie niet moet gelijkstellen aan het 
overdragen van hiërarchie' (1981:264). 
(i) Tenslotte, hebben leden in verschillende posities binnen de 
coöperatie verschillende opvattingen over samenwerking. Bijvoorbeeld, 
lid-managers van de Montagu Carpentry Cooperative en de Fencing 
Services Cooperative waren geneigd de economische functie van deze 
ondernemingen te benadrukken. De producenten van deze coöperaties 
interesseerden zich alleen voor economische problemen als hun financiële 
vergoeding erdoor werd getroffen. Ze houden zich echter ook bezig met de 
machtsrelaties binnen hun ondernemingen. Dit wordt duidelijk tijdens de 
onderhandelingen over managementautoriteit in de Montagu Carpentry 
Cooperative en het uiten van de onvrede over de ongelijke verdeling van 
middelen en opbrengsten in de Fencing Services Cooperative. Dit 
suggereert dat het democratische aspect van coöperatieve organisatie van 
directer belang is voor de producenten. Dit brengt mij tot de conclusie dat 
coöperatief bewustzijn geen homogene objectieve eenheid is. Integendeel, 
het is in wezen subjectief en wordt beïnvloed door de positie van de 
coöperatieleden zowel binnen de onderneming als in de samenleving waar 
zij deel van uitmaken. Daarnaast, is het bewustzijn van de leden niet meer 
dan één van de vele factoren die invloed heeft op de coöperatiepraktijk. 
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